29 A.D. 342 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1898
After the jury was impaneled the defendant’s counsel made a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. The question presented, therefore, is the same as it would be upon a demurrer to the complaint, involving a determination as to its sufficiency as stating a cause of action. The material allegations, summarized, are that the defendant was the owner of certain premises in East Eighty-fourth street in the city of Hew York, and that portions of the building erected thereon were let in flats or apartments to several tenants; that the halls and stairs in the building were a common passageway to and from the street for the tenants and other persons
It has been many times held that where premises are occupied by several families, and the halls or passageways are under the control of the landlord, the only obligation resting upon him is to use care in keeping them in a reasonably safe condition. Ordinarily, the landlord is under no general duty to keep his hallways lighted. (Halpin v. Townsend, 2 City Ct. Rep. 417; affd., 107 N. Y. 683; Hildebrand v. Schenck, 2 City Ct. Rep. 249; Jucht v. Behrens, 26 N. Y. St. Repr. 690; Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 131 N. Y. 674; Gorman v. White, 19 App. Div. 324.) There are, however, exceptions to this general rule growing out of some unusual construction of hallways or passageways which, in order to render them reasonably safe to persons lawfully using them, need to be lighted. Thus, where the flooring of the hall or passageway is uneven, or arranged with steps or an opening, such as an elevator shaft, so situated as to be cut off from the natural light of day, by reason of which darkness their presence. cannot be known, failure on the part of the landlord to supply artificial light is negligence. A case well illustrating this exception to the general rule is Sunderlin v. Hollister (4 App. Div. 478), in which we find so full a review and discussion of the cases bearing upon this point as to make repetition unnecessary. That was an action for alleged negligence, in
There is no inconsistency between these latter cases and the ones first cited, which hold that the landlord is under no obligation to keep the hallway lighted; for both are but applications of the same general rule, that the owners of property are bound to use reasonable care to keep such portions of the premises as are under their control in such condition that those who lawfully go there shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger. Where, therefore, there is nothing exceptional in the construction of the hallways or passageways of an apartment house or tenement, there is no duty incumbent upon the landlord of supplying artificial light either by day or night. But where the construction is unusual, then, if in order to render it reasonably safe to those lawfully using it, artificial light be necessary, a state of facts is presented from which a jury may infer that the duty devolving upon the landlord, of using reasonable care in regard to his premises, has not been fulfilled.
If the fair inference, therefore, from the allegations of the complaint, was that the defendant was sought to be cnarged merely because he failed to supply artificial light to the hallways, then, clearly, the judge below was right. But the error into which he fell grew out of the fact that he failed to give due weight to the further allegation in the complaint which we have pointed out as to the construction of this particular hallway. For it will be noticed that the plaintiff alleges that she “ came upon one or more steps or stairs down and directly across said hall, and that in consequence of the insufficient light in said hall and on said steps or stairs” she “ stepped off and over and fell, or pitched forward,” and was injured. Fairly construed, this was tantamount to saying that the steps across that dark hall were dangerous, and that ordinary care required that they should be artificially lighted, because only then could it be concluded that they were reasonably safe. For we must consider this in connection with the further statement that the accident occurred in the daytime, and that at such time the light coming through a transom at the end was not sufficient to reveal the danger. While many of the
The dismissal of the complaint, therefore, was error, for which the judgment appealed from should be reversed, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Van Brunt, P. J., Barrett, Rumsey and Patterson, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.