Bruestle v. StateBruestle v. State
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- Before:
- Anderson
OPINION
ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.On March 5, 2003, appellant Richard Brian Bruestle pleaded guilty to and was sentenced to life imprisonment for the stabbing and shooting death of his aunt. Bruestle did not file a direct appeal or a motion to withdraw his plea within the time allowed for a direct appeal. Bruestle subsequently retained new counsel and filed a postconviction petition, claiming that he was incompetent to plead guilty and that his trial counsel was ineffective due to counsel’s decision not to fully pursue an insanity defense or make an incompetency argument before Bruestle pleaded guilty. The postconviction court denied Bruestle’s petition for relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
On December 7, 2002, Saint Paul police officers responded to a 911 call and, upon arriving at the home of Lorene Nell McIntyre, discovered appellant Richard Brian Bruestle outside the home with blood on his clothing. Bruestle told the officers to shoot him because he had a gun and would shoot them, but instead of continuing to confront the officers, Bruestle threw his gun on the ground and apparently surrendered. Bruestle told the officers that he had killed a woman. He said that he had stabbed the woman 15 times and that there were no bullets in his gun because he had “filled the victim full of lead.” Nearby, the police found McIntyre’s body.
McIntyre was Bruestle’s aunt, with whom he was living at the time of her death. Bruestle told the police officers that he and McIntyre had been arguing about the taste of her chili, and as a result, McIntyre told Bruestle to get out of the house. Bruestle further told the officers that he believed McIntyre attempted to phone 911 as a result of the argument, and that infuriated him. The officers arrested Bruestle at the scene and transported him to jail.
Bruestle was indicted by a grand jury for murder in the first degree, in violation of MinmStat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2004);
We will be having problems with our expert budget soon. This is the type of case that needs experts but we need your cooperation to keep expenses down. If Owen Nelson tells you (and you need to ask) at an early point that he cannot help you, cancel the remainder of his work. We do not need another report which echoes the courts [sic].
District court records indicate — and the postconviction court found — that Dr. Nelson visited Bruestle in jail on December 19, 2002, for an unknown period of time.
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The district court record does not indicate that Nelson generated a report regarding his visit(s) with Bruestle. On January 30, 2003, the public defender withdrew the motion for a
On March 5, 2003, Bruestle changed his plea and entered a plea of guilty to first-degree premeditated murder.
Public defender (PD): Richard, you’re— there are some defenses you’d be waiving by entering this plea here as well. You told me you were drinking that day, and you’re waiving an intoxication defense; do you understand that?
Bruestle (B): Right, yes.
P.D.: And the other defense we talked about is a mental illness defense?
B.: I understand.
P.D.: Finally, I think you’ve got some history of mental illness; you’re taking medication right now?
B.: Correct.
P.D.: Is that affecting the way you’re thinking here today?
B.: It’s actually helping.
P.D.: So, you’re clear-headed?
B.: Yes.
P.D.: You understand what’s going on here today?
B.: Yes.
P.D.: Is this really what you want to do to take care of your case here today?
B.: I deserve it.
Following this exchange, the court made further inquiry into Bruestle’s mental illnesses and mental condition and apparently satisfied itself that Bruestle was competent to proceed with the plea. Bruestle then affirmed for the court that he thought his public defender had given him good counsel and had been supportive and helpful.
In laying the factual basis for his plea, Bruestle stated that he had been living with McIntyre for about 90 days before her murder. Bruestle testified that he sometimes argued with McIntyre, and that on December 7, 2002, they were arguing when he took a knife and began stabbing her and that she ran outside of the house. Bruestle agreed with the autopsy report that he stabbed McIntyre over 30 times. He also testified that after stabbing McIntyre multiple times, he went back into the house, retrieved a gun, brought it back outside, and shot McIntyre five times, emptying the gun in the process. He said that he then went back into the house to get more bullets because he intended to shoot himself. He stated that when he left the house, he confronted the police officers, spoke to them, surrendered, and was arrested. Following Bruestle’s testimony about the facts surrounding McIntyre’s death, the district court convicted Bruestle and sentenced him to the statutory sentence of life imprisonment.
On October 2, 2003, while in prison for McIntyre’s murder, Bruestle attacked a fellow inmate and cut the inmate’s throat, apparently acting without provocation. The district court hearing the prison assault case ordered that a
Meanwhile, on January 26, 2004, Brues-tle, with the assistance of new counsel, filed the current petition for postconviction relief, asking that the judgment of conviction and sentence against him for McIntyre’s murder be vacated and a new trial ordered or, in the alternative, that an evi-dentiary hearing be held or that his sentence be reduced. Bruestle based his request for relief on his claim that he was incompetent to plead guilty and that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not pursue an insanity defense or make an incompetency argument.
As part of the postconviction proceeding, the state and the defense submitted three mental evaluations of Bruestle. One is a brief evaluation done to determine whether Bruestle was disabled for the purposes of receiving social security benefits; the other two are the
Neither the defense nor the state has provided expert testimony regarding Bruestle’s mental state at the time he killed McIntyre. In the court-ordered
As part of the postconviction proceedings, the state asked Bruestle to waive his attorney-client privilege so that the state could obtain information from Bruestle’s trial counsel regarding the investigation done into Bruestle’s mental state. But Bruestle refused to waive this privilege. He also refused to waive his medical privilege relating to his mental condition, so the state apparently was unable to obtain information from Dr. Nelson regarding his evaluation of Bruestle. The postconviction court then denied relief without an eviden-tiary hearing on June 29, 2005. Bruestle appealed the postconviction court’s denial of relief to our court.
“A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction that carries a presumption of regularity.”
Hummel v. State,
617 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn.2000). “A petitioner for posteonviction relief has the burden of establishing the facts alleged in the petition by a fair preponderance of the evidence.”
Shoen v.
Bruestle argues that the postcon-viction court erred when it dismissed his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his incompetency claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. Bruestle’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on his contention that his trial counsel erred by failing to adequately pursue Bruestle’s potential insanity defense and incompetency argument. Bruestle asserts that had his counsel not so erred, he would not have pleaded guilty.
A plea may be withdrawn to correct a manifest injustice.
In order to succeed in asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Bruestle must demonstrate (1) that his counsel’s performance “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ” and (2) “ ‘that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for [his] counsel[’s] errors.’ ”
Voorhees v. State,
627 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn.2001) (quoting
State v. Lahue,
585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998));
see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In other words, in order for the postconviction court to conclude that Bruestle’s trial counsel was ineffective, the court would
The petitioner bears the burden of proof on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and there is a strong presumption that “ ‘counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.’ ” State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 716 (Minn.2003) (quoting Lahue, 585 N.W.2d. at 789). We accord particular deference to counsel’s trial strategy. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d at 789. We review the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. See Carney v. State, 692 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn.2005).
As previously noted, Bruestle has the burden to prove that his counsel was ineffective, yet he has presented no evidence to that effect. There is no expert testimony in the record regarding either Brues-tle’s mental state at the time he killed McIntyre or at the time he pleaded guilty. The only
Bruestle has submitted three mental evaluations unconnected to the McIntyre killing and asks us to draw the inference that, based on these evaluations, he was so likely insane under the
M’Naghten
rule at the time of the killing, or so likely incompetent at the time of his guilty plea, that his trial counsel’s decision not to pursue a
Bruestle further argues that the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), requires that his plea be withdrawn due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. In
Rompilla,
defendant Rompilla was convicted of a brutal murder and was facing the death penalty.
Id.
at -, 125 S.Ct. at 2460. Rompilla’s counsel failed to review certain information and evidence, despite having convenient access to the information and evidence, and despite knowing that the state would be presenting the evidence to the sentencing jury
Bruestle also claims that the postconviction court erred in concluding without an evidentiary hearing that he was competent to plead guilty. In support of this claim, he argues that Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633 (Minn.1977), requires that he be granted relief. In that case, Burt represented himself and pleaded guilty to burglary after steadfastly refusing any assistance of counsel. Id. at 634. We noted that, at the time Burt entered his plea, “the court apparently was unaware of any facts which would cast doubt on [Burt’s] capacity to make an intelligent decision whether to waive counsel.” Id. at 635. The presen-tence investigation, however, revealed facts indicating that Burt was “of considerably lower than average intelligence,” casting doubt on his capacity to intelligently waive counsel. Id. at 635-36. But Burt is not helpful here because it dealt with a situation wherein a defendant waived his right to counsel. Being without counsel, Burt had no advocate to bring up or investigate the possibility of incompetency. Bruestle, in contrast, was represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty, and his counsel in fact did conduct an investigation into a possible incompetency argument. Again, Bruestle has produced no evidence that he was incompetent at the time of his plea, and we accordingly will not depart from the judgment of the postconviction court that Bruestle was competent at the time of his plea.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Bruestle has not met his burden of raising an evidentiary question that merits a postconviction hearing, and neither Burt nor Rompilla supports his contention that an evidentiary hearing was merited. Therefore, we hold that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bruestle’s petition for postconviction relief without holding a hearing.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Murder in the first degree — life without release is available as a possible charge when the defendant has previously been convicted of a “heinous crime” less than 15 years before the murder.
. Minnesota Statutes
. Bruestle‘s current counsel stated in an affidavit that he spoke to Nelson and Nelson stated that he had seen Bruestle on three occasions: once in December 2002, once in January 2003, and once in February 2003.
. The
. Part of Hanson‘s interview with Bruestle regarding Bruestle‘s competence was recorded as follows:
The defendant noted that he has heard of the insanity plea. He defined this as “It means that at the time you committed your crime, you were insane.” He was asked to define the term “insane.” He stated, “You’re not mentally competent, maybe.” He was asked whether he would consider such a plea in the present case. He responded to this by stating, “A doctor once told me that he thought I was crazy, but not insane.” He was asked his understanding of the difference between “crazy” and “insane.” He stated, “With crazy, you do a lot of spontaneous things. Humorous or comical, but you know right from wrong. In this case, I might be insane, because I didn‘t know right from wrong. Most people would say I was wrong, but considering the circumstances, I didn‘t feel I was wrong.” The defendant was asked to define the term plea bargain. He stated, “A plea bargain is like a compromise. You plead guilty to the crime. A lesser offense or crime, and you bypass a trial by taking a plea bargain. You admit your guilt. The consequences are less harsh.”
. Minnesota Statutes
No person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime while mentally ill or mentally deficient so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a defense; but the person shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act the person was laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.