87 Iowa 483 | Iowa | 1893
— We have before us the abstract, and two additional abstracts, - of the appellant, and three additional abstracts of the appellees, and denials that
The law is well settled that, if property be conveyed with the design on the part of the vendor, participated in by the vendee, to defraud his creditors, the vendee’s title will not be protected, notwithstanding he pays a sufficient consideration. Chapel v. Clapp, 29 Iowa, 191; Williamson v. Wachenheim, 58 Iowa, 277. In such a case the creditor may have the conveyance set aside, and the property subjected to the payment of his debts. A Iona ficle purchaser for value, without knowledge of the intended fraud, will, however, be protected in his title. See McClain, Dig. “Fraudulent Conveyances.” The protection of the law being-extended only to good-faith purchasers, a succession of fraudulent conveyances may be set aside in an action by the creditor of the first grantor; but, when the original or succeeding conveyance is to a good-faith purchaser, he will be protected in his title. That the conveyance from A. M. Dunn to William M. Dunn was executed and accepted with intent to defraud the creditors of A. M. Dunn, we are in no doubt. We are
This same question was before this court in the case of Dunn v. Wolf, 81 Iowa, 688, wherein it was held that there was a sufficient showing to implicate Sarah E. Dunn in the intended fraud of William M. Dunn, and sustaining the district court in dismissing her petition. One of the reasons given for the conclusion is, ‘ ‘the failure of the plaintiff, in her own behalf, to explain the many badges .of fraud against her apparent on the trial.” The evidence now before us is not materially different from that then presented as to the badges of fraud mentioned in that opinion; but in this case we have the evidence of Sarah E. Dunn taken at great length, wherein we think she explains these badges of fraud, and shows herself to have purchased the property in good faith, for value, and without any participation in or knowledge of the intended fraud of A. M. and William M. Dunn. Her evidence being quite lengthy, it is not practicable to even state the substance thereof in full. As to the relation of the parties, it shows that she was married to A. M. Dunn in March, 1883; that she did not then know William; and that thereafter he only visited them occasionally when in town; that she did not know anything about the property of A. M. or of William, only that William owned the farm in question; that- she did not know what debts there were owing; and that she did not know anything about the case with Wolf, only that they were having such a lawsuit. She states as her reason for buying the farm that she had sold a farm which she owned eight miles from town to her brother,
The evidence shows that, since their marriage, A. M. Dunn has looked after the business 'of his wife, and that he was active in advising and bringing about this transaction between Mrs. Dunn and W. M. Dunn. The appellant contends that he was the agent for Mrs. Dunn in this transaction and that she is bound by his knowledge of the fraud. The evidence does not show agency; it does not appear that Mr. Dunn had authority to or assumed to do anything that would bind his
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.