151 N.W. 34 | N.D. | 1915
This litigation involves a tract of land situated within the limits of the city of Williston. The first instrument with which we are concerned is a deed from the St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba Railway Company (now known as the Great Northern) to the plaintiff, which deed contained the following clause: “Reserving, however, to the St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba Railway Company, its
Williston, N. D., August 30, 1899.
Deceived .of Joseph Cartier, sixty-four and eighty one-hundredths dollars, to be delivered to Bruegger Mercantile Company upon receipt of a proper deed to his land.
(Signed) Williams County State Bank,
By W. H. Denny, Cashier.
Plaintiff was notified of this deposit, and further notified that one
(1) The first and principal contention of the respondent is that the deed and title offered by Bruegger was in all things sufficient, because the reservation of right of way was void, and we are cited to the case of Lange v. Waters, 156 Cal. 142, 103 Pac. 889, 19 Ann. Cas. 1207, and particularly to the note which follows the last citation. We think the position of the trial court in this matter is erroneous for the following reason. The defendant was entitled not only to a good title, but to a title which was good beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle is stated in Hedderly v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 443, 18 Am. St. Rep. 521, 44 N. W. 527, as follows: “Courts will.not compel a vendee to take an unmarketable title when he has stipulated for a good one; and a title is deemed unmarketable, within this rule, where, although it may be good, there is a reasonable doubt as to its validity. The term ‘reasonable doubt’ is always used in this connection, because, as a doubt might be suggested or question raised as to most titles, .it would go far to do away with the remedy by specific performance if a mere doubt raised, without regard to its character, were permitted to defeat the action. A doubt as to the title may be raised upon a question of law or upon a question of fact, or upon both law and fact. It is impossible to state any precise and definite rule by which to determine when a doubt raised upon a question of law is to be deemed reasonable.
(2) The next proposition upon which the respondent relies is the finding of the trial court that defendant knew of the condition of the title and agreed under the terms of the contract to accept the same. The clause of the contract upon which they stand reads: “It is hereby declared and agreed by the party of the second part that he has entered the above written contract, relying on his own knowledge of said premises, and not upon any representations made by the party of the first part, or by any other person, touching the situation, character, or quality thereof.” It seems clear to us that this provision relates merely to the quality and location of the land, and was inserted to prevent any question as to warranties in those particulars. It does not, however, contemplate the title, as other particulars of the contract cover that. It may be conceded that defendant actually knew of this reservation,
(3) Appellant next insists that the defendant was in default in his payments because the $60 deposited with the bank was not unconditionally paid to him. In this respect, he points to the fact that it was deposited in the bank to be paid to him only upon his producing the additional evidence of title. We must consider in this connection that this action is brought hy Bruegger in equity, and he must show equity upon his own part before he can obtain relief. From the foregoing findings, it is evident that he could have had his money without question by obtaining from the railway company a release of its right of way reservation. The testimony shows that the money is still in deposit, and there was no doubt at any time of the safety of the $60 payment. Under those circumstances, it would be grossly inequitable to enforce a forfeiture against the defendant. It is our conclusion that the defendant is entitled' to specific performance of his contract, and that plaintiff must furnish, in addition to the warranty deed already tendered, a release from the railway company of its right of way. It is true that he might seasonably have brought an action against the railway company and quieted his title against it by establishing his contention that the reservation was void, but this he has not attempted. In fact, the evidence shows that at the present time plaintiff has obtained a release. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed.