The sole question presented on this bankruptcy appeal is whether a divorced father who is contributing substantial support to his three minor children, who are in the custody of their mother, living separate and apart from the father, is entitled to an exemption under Missouri law as “head of a family.” 1
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in a reported opinion at
Under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24, a bankrupt has, under prescribed conditions, a right to claim state exemptions on his assets.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Appellant Murray is single having been divorced from his wife. He is the father of three minor children by that marriage. Custody of the three children was awarded to the mother. The mother and three children live in Pacific, Missouri, separate and apart from Murray, who lives with his parents, who are not dependent upon him for support. Murray provides $50 per week for the support of the children in compliance with the divorce decree.
Murray filed his petition in bankuptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt on May 9, 1967. The appellee, Ben Zuke, Trustee in Bankruptcy, refused to allow Murray his claimed exemptions as the head of a family. The Referee in Bankruptcy and the District Court sustained the actions of the Trustee, holding it essential to the status of being the head of a family that the party so claiming actually live with the family in addition to meeting other requirements.
The phrase “head of a family” is not defined in any of the Missouri statutes of which it is a constituent part. Various Missouri cases have construed the phrase “head of a family” under different factual contexts in regard to the exemption statute and the homestead laws. But no Missouri case has enunciated a precise definition of the phrase under the particular or even similar factual context of the case at bar.
The homestead laws which provide a special exemption against execution by creditors utilize the same concept of an individual’s status as “head of a family” for qualification purposes and lend considerable guidance in the construction of that phrase, though there is an additional requirement of occupancy under the *485 homestead laws that does not necessarily apply in its entirety to the other exemption laws.
Missouri laws define homestead and require that premises claimed as a homestead “shall be used by such housekeeper or head of a family as such homestead.” Y.A.M.S. § 513.475 (1959). Missouri courts have construed this statutory definition of homestead to require both ownership and occupancy by the head of a family. Rouse v. Caton,
“The head of a family, primarily, is the husband or father. To constitute a family, the members need not reside in one house. Barney v. Leeds,51 N.H. 253 . The man who has a wife and child dependent on him for support is the head of a family, though they do not reside under the same roof.”
We, therefore, do not think that the Missouri courts have imposed residing with the family as an absolute requirement for qualification under the general exemption statutes. It is our opinion that the rationale in the case of Biffle v. Pullman,
“It is in entire accord with the spirit of the homestead law that so long as such liability exists the right of homestead exemption should be maintained in him. But whatever may be the rights of the father, mother, and the children in the homestead, inter sese, after such a divorce, there can be no question that the- law exempted it from sale under general execution, whereby they might all be deprived of that protection which the law intended to secure them.”
Thus, in Biffle, a father, with an obligation to support his children, was found to be eligible for the homestead exemption, and thus was considered head of the family as required by the Missouri Homestead Act, in spite of the fact that he was divorced and neither lived with nor managed the household affairs of his former wife and children.
The Trustee in Bankruptcy argues that Biffle no longer has vitality because under V.A.M.S. § 452.140 (1959), 2 there are no longer any exemptions, where the purpose of the execution against property is to enforce an alimony payment, and thus a case like Biffle can no longer arise. It seems to us that the alteration of the statute argues against the Trustee’s position, since it tends to show the *486 legislature’s awareness that but for the statutory change, a divorced man supporting children not in his custody would still be head of the family and entitled to an exemption. And the statutory change did not affect general creditors but only the spouse.
The statutory change is not otherwise relevant since it professes to eliminate exemptions only where the purpose of the execution is to enforce an alimony award, while in the present proceeding we are concerned with the bankrupt’s right to an exemption against the general creditors, not against his spouse or against his children. We do not think the statutory change eliminates the vitality of Biffle as applied to the instant proceeding.
Even if we assume that the purpose of the exemption statutes is to protect not the divorced father, but only the former wife and children, as perhaps the statutory change suggests, (a theory which has been doggedly resisted in Missouri, see Maag v. Williams,
The cases relied on by Trustee Zuke of Ridenour-Baker Grocery Co. v. Monroe,
V.A.M.S. § 451.290 (1959) 3 would indicate that the husband or father is presumed to be head of the family. Does a divorce eliminate his right to exemptions where he is otherwise discharging his obligation to care for and support his minor children? We do not think it should. In order to overcome the presumption that a father is head of his family the Missouri courts have required that for another relative to qualify as head of the family he must be the financial supporter of the family and the manager of its household affairs. See, Ridenour-Baker Grocery Co. v. Monroe, supra, Duncan v. Frank, supra, and Wade v. Jones, supra. But the fact that a relative other than a father is held to be head of the family because he supports it and manages its household, does not lead to the conclusion that a father who supports his family but does not live with his family, is not the head of his family. The case of Ridenour, supra, in viewing the general family concept states at 634 of 43 S.W.: “In the absence of proof to the contrary, we enter *487 tain no doubt that the father was the head of [the] family in the contemplation of law.”
In short, the Trustee’s eases hold that a person who is not the father may be the head of the family if he supports the family and manages its affairs. But these are not holdings that a father may not be the head of the family unless he lives with the family and manages its affairs. .. .
The Trustee claims that State v. Haney,
The definition of any word or phrase must be considered in the factual context in which it is used or applied. Similarly any decisional construction of the phrase “head of a family” must be viewed in the light of the circumstances to which it is applied. No Missouri case has undertaken to enunciate an all-inclusive precise definition of the phrase and it may well be that the phrase is incapable of an all-inclusive precise definition, particularly in view of the manifold factual circumstances that can develop in this field.
We, therefore, feel that more than one non-inclusive definition is permissible and necessary to cover varying contexts. Since exemption laws were manifestly enacted for the relief of a debtor, and more particularly for his family, and should be liberally construed, we think a divorced father who is discharging his legal and moral obligation in supporting his minor children, should, as against general creditors, be entitled to claim the status as head of a family under the Missouri exemption laws.
Judgment reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion,
Notes
. V.A.M.S. § 513.435 (1959) allows “the head of a family” exemptions on enumerated types of property. V.A.M.S. § 513.-440 (1959) supplements the above section by allowing an “in lieu of” exemption not exceeding $500 for the chattels mentioned in subdivisions (5) and (6) of the above section with some limitations not pertinent to this case.
. Ҥ 452.140. No property exempt from attachment or execution when
“No property shall be exempt from attachment or execution in a proceeding instituted by a married woman for maintenance, nor from attachment or execution upon a judgment or order issued to enforce a decree for alimony. * * ífc »
. Under § 451.290:
“ * * * [A] married woman may invoke all exemption and homestead laws now or hereafter in force for the protection of personal and real property owned by the head of a family, except in cases where the husband has claimed such exemption and homestead rights for the protection of his own property.”