26 Vt. 741 | Vt. | 1854
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This action is brought to recover the value of property, sold by the defendant as an officer, upon execution, for the sole debt of the husband, the property being the annual products of the wife’s land, in possession, and carried on at the expense of the husband. The parties, before their intermarriage, made, in contemplation of such an event, what they considered a marriage settlement which was a stipulation between themselves, merely, and without the intervention of trustees, that the wife
It is claimed, first, that the marriage settlement, as it is called, was sufficient to exempt the annual crops of the wife’s land from attachment and levy of execution, on the husband’s debt. But such-a contract, without the intervention of trustees, will not, at law certainly, have that effect. Such a contractso executed, is incomplete. It is, at most, but an agreement to make a suitable marriage settlement. And the parties, beneficially interested, whether the wife or children, may, on application to a court of equity, compel the execution of such a settlement, as the court shall deem reasonable, which will then be effective to protect the property at law. 2 Story’s Eq. Jurisp. § 983, 999.
In regard to the effect of the statute, which is similar to those «f some of the other American states, there seems to have been, ito some extent, a popular impression, that it would exempt the annual products of the wife’s land, from the control of the husband ■or his creditors. Such was the decision of the court below, and such the impression of one member of this court, at the first argument. But a careful examination of the terms of the statute, cannot fail, we think, to convince all, that the words used have no very marked fitness, to express the yearly products of land, which are the joint results of labor and the use of the land.
Rents, issues and profits, more commonly, in the books, certainly -signify a chattel real interest in land, a kind of estate growing out of the land for life, or years, producing an annual or other rent. And in this statute, it is so connected with “ the interest of the husband in her right in any real estate,” so as to induce «the the suspicion, certáinly, that the legislature supposed they were only limiting the husband’s control over such estate, as he would upon the marriage, acquire in the wife’s land, and really doing
And if we regard, in the statute under consideration, the terms “ rents, issues, and profits,” a's equivalent to yearly products, we must all allow, that this statute has, in express terms, required the transfer of such yearly products, to be by deed of the husband and wife jointly, and to give effect to such provision, we must hold, that any other mode of alienation, even for value, cash in hand, if you please, or necessaries for the family, or .to pay the very laborers upon the land, is altogether void.
The very use of the term conveyance, in the statute, with reference to this intei’est, shows the probable application of the term to some estate in the realty, for it is scarcely supposable, that the legislature would have used such a term, requix-ing it to be executed, with all the solemnities of other deeds of real estate, for the transfer of mere personal chattels.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded.