William Enockson, a Sioux City, Iowa, police officer, appeals the district court’s order denying his claim of qualified immunity. We reverse and remand.
I.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 7, 1984, Sioux City police officer Martin Pot-tebaum observed Bruce Tagstrom ride his motorcycle through a stop sign in Sioux City. Pottebaum also noticed that Tag-strom was operating the motorcycle without a functioning headlight. After running the stop sign, Tagstrom was forced to lay the motorcycle down on its side in the street to avoid hitting another vehicle. Pottebaum called out to Tagstrom, but Tagstrom fled the scene on his motorcycle, and a high-speed pursuit began.
The chase ended when Tagstrom struck another vehicle and was thrown from his motorcycle against a nearby tree and rendered unconscious. Attempting to avoid the aftermath of that collision, Pottebaum lost control of his car and struck some parked vehicles, suffering serious injuries and being knocked unconscious as a result. Enockson was driving the second police pursuit car and was the next officer on the scene.
Enockson went first to Tagstrom, recognized that he was seriously hurt and unconscious, and immediately called an ambulance. Enockson next checked on Potteb-aum, and finding him in serious condition called a second ambulance. Enockson then remained with Pottebaum. Other officers quickly arrived on the scene, checked Tag-strom, and kept onlookers away from him until the ambulance arrived. The ambulance arrived for Tagstrom within several minutes of Enockson’s call.
Tagstrom filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against Enockson, Potteb-aum, other police and city officials, and against the city of Sioux City, alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights as protected by the fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments when they pursued him at high-speed, seized him unreasonably, and intentionally denied him medical care. Tagstrom also alleged several pendent state claims. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing the constitutional claims against all defendants except the denial of medical care claim against Enockson.
Enockson was in no way deliberately indifferent to Tagstrom’s medical needs.
Tagstrom’s reliance on
Cooper v. Dyke,
Tagstrom asks us to find that Enockson had an affirmative duty to render medical assistance himself, such as giving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation or CPR. However, Tagstrom points to no cases that clearly establish that Enockson had such a duty.
See Maddox v. City of Los Angeles,
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) when the record “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” There is nothing in the record to indicate that Enockson deprived Tagstrom of any constitutional right. “The facts shown by [Tagstrom] simply do not create a triable issue of fact.”
Wright v. South Arkansas Regional Health Center, Inc.,
We reverse the order appealed from, and we remand the cause to the district court with directions to dismiss the constitutional claim against Enockson.
Notes
. Enockson’s motion to strike the supplemental material submitted by Tagstrom is granted.
