58 Tenn. 32 | Tenn. | 1872
delivered the opinion of the court.
The complainants are heirs at law of Ephraim Broyles, deceased, who died in 1843 without issue, but leaving the defendant, Margaret, his widow, who, in 1848, became the wife of defendant WaddeL The heirs at law of Ephraim Broyles were his brothers and sisters, eleven in number, of whom three are the complainants in this bill, which they have brought for the partition of the real estate of said Ephraim.
The real estate consists of one tract of 160 acres, out of which dower has been allotted to the widow, upon which she and her husband, the defendant Wad-del, have resided for more than twenty years, during which time the defendant Waddel has possessed and
It is certainly true, as a general rule, that a tenant cannot, without the concurrence of the rever-sioner, place improvements upon the life estate and compel the reversioner to pay for them upon the falling in of the life estate: 1 Wash., 24. And a mere acquiescence on the part of the reversioner or remainderman would not bind him. He must, in-general, have concurred, consented, or connived at the ameliorations upon his estate, in order to be estopped from resisting the demands for improvements as a set off to the rents; for, otherwise, it would be, in the language of Judge Green, to reward him for volunteering his labor on another man’s land, and to punish the owner for permitting him to do it: 6 Hum., 327. Nor does this case fall within the principle stated — that one who makes improvements upon a life estate does it at his peril, and cannot in general demand reimbursement.
The defendant Waddel was not a life tenant only. He owned the controlling interest in the whole estate. He was tenant for life of the dower during the joint lives of himself and wife, and he was tenant in common also of the whole estate, both in presentí and in remainder. It does not appear that his possession of
The facts of this case are peculiar. We have no case precisely like it, and it must rest upon the general principle that in such cases a court of equity does not act as a mere ministerial agent, but recurs to its own peculiar and flexible powers of administering its relief ex equo et bono — according to the rules of right and its own notion of general justice between the parties. The salient features of this case are, that the defendant was not an intruder upon this estate or any part of it; he had a right to occupy. He “knew not his own severalty,” but was at home upon any part of the estate. He found the estate in a wasted and dilapidated condition, and, though under no obligation to do so, he has, by his industry, by his expenditure of money and his excellent husbandry, almost doubled its value to himself and Ills co-tenants. This enhancement of value is in the
With the decree thus modified, the cause will be remanded for another account and further proceedings.