86 W. Va. 468 | W. Va. | 1920
This writ of error seeks reversal of an order setting aside a verdict for $5,500.00 and granting a new trial, reinstatement of the verdict and judgment thereon for $5,000.00, a remittitur of $500.00 having been filed by the plaintiff.
The verdict was- set aside October 2, 1919, on condition that the defendant pay the costs of the trial on or before the first day of the next regular term of the court, which was October 21, 1919. On that day, a motion was made to set aside the order granting a new trial, for failure to pay the costs; but was resisted on the ground of mistake, the check for payment thereof having been inadvertently mailed to Baltimore, Md., instead of Keyser, W. Va. Before this motion was passed on, October 29, the remittitur was filed and another motion to set aside the order of October 2nd made and founded upon the remittitur. Both motions were, overruled, October 29th.
The discretion of the trial court amply justified its action in overruling the first motion. It could have set aside the order for non-payment of costs, or let it stand and awarded an execution for the costs. Code, ch. 138, sec. 5. As payment of the costs was tendered in resistance of the motion, there, was no occasion for such an award.
The verdict was set aside on the ground of an error in an instruction given for the plaintiff, without objection or exception. Right and power in the trial court to set it aside on such ground is denied in argument, but it is explicitly affirmed by authority. Roane Lumber Co. v. Lovett, 72 W. Va. 328; Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77. To make such an error available in the appellate court, an exception is necessary, of course; but the right of any court to correct'its own errors in due time stands upon a footing somewhat different from that of the right of a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of another court to make the correction. This distinction is so obvious and so thoroughly established that citation of authority for it is unnecessary. However, see 20 R. C. L. p. 300.
The, cause of action was alleged negligence in the treatment of a severe and complicated wound, in a private hospital owned and conducted by the defendants as partners in business, one of whom personally treated it. The, plaintiff, a boy, was only about nine years old, when injured. He suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the right leg, two or three inches from the ankle. While he was riding in a fruit wagon, the horse became frightened, ran away and upset the wagon, and his leg was crushed by it some way. At the suggestion of the family physician, Dr. Bell, he was taken to the hospital the same evening, Monday, Hovember 11, 1918, where Dr. Hoffman, one of the defendants, dressed the wound, with the assistance of Dr. Bell. A piece of bone protruded and the flesh was considerably
On the discovery of the unfavorable change, the head nurse, in addition to alteration of the treatment, endeavored to notify Dr. Maxwell and was unable to reach him, but at 10:30 A. M., be came to the boy’s room on bis round of visits to patients, and was informed as to the situation. The treatment adopted by the, nurse was then continued, possibly with slight modification. According to his testimony, he visited the boy twice between 10:30 A. M. and 1:30 P. M When he returned at 2:30 P. M., the condition he found convinced him that amputation was necessary, and he, immediately notified Dr. Bell and endeavored to get into communication with members of the family. Dr. Bell thinks he was called about 3 or 3:30, and going to the hospital, he found circulation had ceased and gangrene extended three or four inches above the knee. Before going 'to the hospital, however, he spent some time in an effort to communicate with the family. Dr. Maxwell says he inquired as to whether any of the family were, about the hospital, and, being informed that they were not, went to the house of his parents, and finding nobody there, went to the residence of the grandparents,, where he found the boy’s aunt. Whether he notified her of the change of condition, he. does not say. He claims he told the grandmother, at about 5 P. M., the boy’s condition was
As to some of this history, there is a good deal of conflict in the evidence. The aunt says she was at the hospital on Wednesday from 9 A. M. until 12, when she was sent out of the sick room by Dr. Maxwell, who, as well as the, day nurse, told her, some time that morning, the boy was doing well. She says Dr. Maxwell saw her in front of his office at 3 P. M. and told her the case looked favorable. The mother says she went to the hospital Wednesday between 2 and 3 o’clock, and remained there until between 5 and 6 o’clock, spending the greater part of the time in the boy’s room, and that the nurse told her, just before she left, the boy was getting along fine. When she reached her mother’s house, on her way home, her mother informed her that Dr. Maxwell had been there and told her the boy’s leg would have to be taken off. The grandmother says she was at the .hospital Wednesday from 1 until 1:30 P. M., and that Dr. Maxwell came in about 4 o’clock, and again about 1 o'clock, and then told her the boy’s leg would have, to come off at the hip, and she requested him to wait until she got the boy’s father,
The plaintiffs case proceeds largely upon the hypothesis- of improper treatment by Dr. Hoffman in the first instance, it being contended that the use of the plaster-paris cast in such- a case is unskillful and unprofessional, on account -of the probability of swelling and consequent constriction interfering with or cutting off circulation of the blood at the extremity. Gangrene results from such constriction, if continued long enough. One theory of the defense, founded largely upon the, testimony of Dr. Maxwell, is that gangrene was occasioned by infection, gas bacillus in the wound, which noticeably developed on Wednesday morning, but the true character of which was not dis-eernable until later in the day. The proof by expert testimony that the use, of the plaster-paris cast, in the reduction of a compound comminuted fracture, is permissible, approved and widely adopted by the profession, is overwhelming. Neither Dr. Bell nor Dr. Gerstell, testifying as witnesses called by the plaintiff, condemned it as being violative of approved modern practice. In answer to a question, the former said: “That, of course, depends somewhat upon the man doing the work. Some prefer using one method and some another. It would not be bad practice, but good practice, to use bandages of that kind in order to prevent the parts from moving as much as possible.” He further said he had himself used the cast in reduction of such fractures. Though he said he had never used one in a case, like the one involved here, it was not shown that he had ever treated one, exactly like it, and he did not disapprove the treatment adopted by Dr. Hoffman in the ease in question. Dr. Gerstell retired from the practice of surgery a good many years ago and said he did not know what the modern method of treatment was. On this point he said: “I do not know what the ordinary practice in Mineral County is at the present time.” He had previously made the same, statement in slightly different words. He was permitted, however, to say that, if the bones were eom-
The trial court certified that errors in the giving of instruction No. 2, at the instance of the plaintiff, was the ground on which the verdict was set aside. That instruction assumed the existence of evidence tending to prove, the use of the plaster-paris cast was improper and had caused development of gangrene, by interruption of the circulation, and negligence on the part of the nurses and physician in charge of the patient after the surgical operation, resulting in development of gangre,ne. It submitted inquiries as to whether the cast caused interruption of the circulation; whether Dr. Hoffman exercised the usual and ordinary skill of physicians in the locality “in the treatment and setting of the fracture,” and gangrene resulted from non-exercise, thereof; and whether the nurses and physician in charge after the operation exercised the usual and ordin- • ary skill of nurses and physicians in the locality “in taking care of the plaintiff after the operation,” and gangrene resulted from non-exercise thereof..
Obviously, the first part of it is predicated solely upon the use of the plaster-paris cast. There is no evidence in the case to which it can be referred, except the testimony of Dr. Gerstell, unless it is competent for the jury to go beyond the, inquiry as to what is usual and ordinary surgical skill in the locality, or
Eve,n though the method in use when Dr. Gerstell practiced may still be in vogue in some places, and, in the opinion of some surgeons, may be the best method of treatment in cases of compound fracture, the method adopted by Dr, Hoffman was widely recognized and generally approved by the medical profession. That fact justified his usé of it, even though a different one, might have been more efficacious, and absolves him from both the charge of lack of skill and the charge of negligence in the use of the plaster-paris east. Hence, in so far as the instruction propounded the inquiry whether the use of that method was unskillful practice or negligence, it had no foundation whatever in the evidence, and the error in giving it constituted good ground for setting aside the verdict.
Nor is there any evidence, of lack of competency on the part of the nurses or Dr. Maxwell. The duties and responsibilities of the day nurse were comparatively light. The night nurse, had had eighteen months experience and no witness attempted to say that was insufficient to qualify he,r. The head nurse’s competency was not questioned by anybody. There is not the slightest evidence that Dr. Maxwell was incompetent to discharge the duties for which he was retained. Nor is there any evidence of negligence on the part of any of the nurses. Not
For another reason, which the court did not assign, the verdict may have been impeachable, namely, the admission of the evidence of Dr. G-erstell as to the method of treatment a quarter of a century prior to the date of the action complained of here. “In determining- the degree of care and skill the law exacts of physicians and surgeons, regard must be had to the state of advancement of- the profession at the time of the treatment. They are held to exercise the ordinary care and skill of their profession in the light of modern learning and enlightenment on the subject. Their treatment is measured by the standard existing at the, time they practice, and not that which may have existed at some time in the past.” 29 R. C. L. p. 384. See also Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, and Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159. Error in the admission of this evidence may have been cured by instructions given for the defendants, which told the jury the skill required was such as complied with the standard prevailing in the community at the time of the treatment. However, it should not be admitted in another trial, for it is clearly inadmissible.
To sustain the action of the court in granting a new trial, insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is invoked. On the same ground, it is insisted, by way of cross-assignme.nt of error, that the court should have given a peremptory instruction asked for by the defendants and refused. As the orde,r complained of is sustained upon another ground, it is unnecessary to enter upon an inquiry as to the sufficiency of the. evidence, in passing upon the propriety of that order. Although an appellate court may, and sometimes does, pass upon the sufficiency of the, evidence, for the purposes of a new trial, when it is unnecessary to do so in order to reach a conclusion as to
Yor the reasons stated, the judgment complained of will be afiirme.d.
Affirmed.