10 Ala. 999 | Ala. | 1847
Ordinarily the discharge of one partner is a discharge of all, because it is impossible to know what are the engagements between the partners themselves, and the release of one prevents the others from holding him liable to any extent whatever, but if the partner himself agrees that the release to himself shall not affect the rights of the creditor as to others, it is virtually an agreement also, that the rights of his partners against him shall remain unchanged. If he stipulates that the creditor may proceed against other parties to the joint contract, he certainly will not be permitted to deny their demands on himself, which are in effect induced by his own consent. [18 Vesey, 20; Smith v. Winter, 4 M. & W. 454.] It is very possible the plaintiffs are entitled to prevail here, on the principle that nothing but a technical release, or payment, will discharge a principal debtor, as was held under very similar circumstances to those presented here in Row-ley v. Stoddard, 7 John. 206, but we prefer to rest our decision on the ground previously stated, as there are decisions which hold the giving of additional security as equivalent to a release. [Booth v. Smith, 3 Wend. 62.]
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.