147 Ark. 555 | Ark. | 1921
(after stating the facts). Counsel for the defendants first seek to uphold the decree on the ground that the plaintiffs are barred of relief under the seven-year statute of limitations. "We can not -agree with counsel in this contention. The land was the homestead of Jake Bookout when he died. His youngest son, Owen Bookout, died in March, 1920, at the age of 15 years. If the land belonged to Jake Bookout and was his homestead at the time of his death, the statute of limitations would not begin to run against the adult children until the termination of the homestead of the youngest child. Smith v. Scott, 92 Ark. 143, and Burel v. Baker, 89 Ark. 168.
The widow abandoned the homestead after her husband’s death and agreed that the title should be placed in the defendants, her adult sons, when they should pay the balance of the purchase money. This did not affect the rights of the plaintiffs, however. Where the widow abandons the homestead, the right to the entire homestead thereupon vests in the minor child or children. Stubbs v. Pitts, 84 Ark. 160; Gatlin v. Lafon, 95 Ark. 256, and Martin v. Conner, 115 Ark. 359.
W. H. Bookout, A. R. Bookout and J. W. Bookout furnished the greater part of the consideration at the time the contract for the purchase of the land was entered into with Lowrance, and it was agreed that they should have a proportionate part of the land for their interest. This is clearly established by the testimony. Although the contract was made in the name of Jake Bookout, the father, a resulting trust was created in favor of the sons, W. H. Bookouit, A. R. Bookout, and J. B. Bookout in the land. Davis v. Dickerson, 137 Ark. 14; Lasker-Morris Bank & Trust Co. v. Gans, 132 Ark. 402.
It follows from this that Alma Brownfield would be entitled to claim as one of the heirs of Jake Bookout, deceased, her interest in that part of the land which was the homestead of her deceased father, unless she is estopped by her conduct from claiming her interest in the same. Where a person, with actual or constructive knowledge of the facts, induces, by his words or conduct, another to believe that he acquiesces in a transaction, or that he will offer no opposition thereto, and that other, in reliance on such belief, alters his position, such person is estopped from repudiating the transaction to the other’s prejudice. And this is so regardless of the particular intent of the party whose acquiescence induces action. 321 C. J., p. 1216, section 221; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jur. (2 ed.), section 818. See, also, Thompson v. Wilhite, 131 Ark. 77; Davis v. Shelby, 136 Ark. 405; Fagan v. Stuttgart Normal Institute, 91 Ark. 141, and Rogers v. Galloway Female College, 64 Ark. 627.
This doctrine rests upon the principle that, if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. This principle of natural justice decides against the plaintiffs in this case. Alma Brownfield knew the circumstances under which the original contract was made, and that a balance of the purchase price remained due and unpaid at the time of her father’s death. She declined to take any part in paying out the land and knew that it was agreed between her mother and her three adult brothers that they should finish paying out the land and take the title in themselves. They had already made the greater part of the initial payment in their father’s lifetime with the understanding that they should receive a proportionate part of the land. Alma Brownfield allowed them to remain in possession of the land after they had paid it out and to make valuable improvements thereon. In 1918 before this suit was instituted, they sold the land to Dave Boles for a valuable consideration, and he made improvements thereon which enhanced the value of the land in the sum of $150. These facts and circumstances make a case of equitable estoppel against Alma Brownfield, and she cannot be permitted in a court of equity to assert her legal rights against the defendants in whose favor the estoppel is invoked.
The estoppel against Alma Brownfield is equally efficacious in its operation upon all who claim under her. Therefore, her children are estopped to maintain this action.
As shown in our statement of facts, Eliza G-oodson, the sister of Alma Brownfield, executed a quitclaim deed to the land to the defendants and disclaims any interest in the present suit.
It follows that the decree must be affirmed. •
