Brown v. Zurich USBrown v. Zurich US
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Zurich US, appeals from the January 14, 2002 judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, approving the December 4, 2001 magistrate’s decision denying appellant’s
{¶ 2} On or about October 27, 1999, plaintiff-appellee Pamela J. Brown’s husband, Thomas Ellis Brown, died in an automobile accident. At the time of his death, Mr. Brown was employed at Wang Global. Appellant provided life insurance coverage to employees of Wang Global. At the time of his death, Mr. Brown was covered under appellant’s Accidental Death Benefit policy. As spouse and beneficiary under Mr. Brown’s policy, appellee attempted to collect death benefits from appellant. The policy provided in relevant part:
{¶ 8} “SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS & LIMITATIONS
{¶ 4} “A. A loss shall not be a Covered Loss if it is caused by, contributed to, or resulted from:
{¶ 5} “1. Suicide, attempted suicide, or a purposeful self-inflicted wound;
{¶ 6} “* * *
{¶ 7} “C. No benefits will be paid for a Covered Loss contributed to, either directly or indirectly, by a Covered Person’s being:
{¶ 8} “1. under the influence of any controlled substance, unless such controlled substance was prescribed by a physiciаn and taken in accordance with the prescribed dosage.”
{¶ 9} Mr. Brown’s policy also provided for enhanced benefits paid to the beneficiary “which equals 10% of the Principal Sum up to a maximum $10,000.” However, such enhanced benefit will not be paid “if the driver of the automobile in which the Insured was riding was either:
{¶ 10} “1. intoxicated.
{¶ 11} “a. An Insured will be conclusively presumed to be intoxicated if the level of alcohol in his/her blood exceeds the amount at which a person is presumed, under the law of the locale in which the accident occurred, to be intoxicated if operating a motor vehicle.”
{¶ 12} Karen Doyle, Senior Claims Specialist of Zurich American Insurance, was assigned to Mr. Brown’s claim. Doyle reviewed the police report, Mr. Brown’s death certificate, and the toxicology report. On April 7, 2000, Doyle informed appellee that her claim was denied because Mr. Brown had a blood-alcohol content of 0.16, and the fatal accident was a result of Mr. Brown’s intoxication, which was not accidental.
{¶ 13} On September 13, 2000, appellee filed a complaint against appellant, alleging bad faith and breach of contract. On November 3, 2000, appellee filed a motion for default judgment alleging that appellant failed to plead or otherwise defend. On November 14, 2000, the trial court granted appellee’s motion, and set the matter for a damage hearing before a magistrate on January 25, 2001.
{¶ 14} At thе January 25, 2001 hearing, appellee was present and represented by counsel; however, appellant failed to appear. On March 12, 2001, the magistrate issued her decision awarding appellee $54,000 in compensatory damages, $300,000 in punitive damages, and $118,000 in attorney fees, plus $225 in court costs. Appellant did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision.
{¶ 15} On April 3, 2001, the trial court approved and adopted the magistrate’s decision entering final judgment in favor of appellee against appellant in the amount of $472,000 with interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum, and court costs in the amount of $225. Also on April 3, 2001, appellee filed a motion for prejudgment interest. On April 17, 2001, the trial court rеferred the case to an evidentiary hearing for June 5, 2001, on appellee’s motion.
{¶ 16} On April 19, 2001, appellant filed a
{¶ 17} In a decision rendered on Dеcember 4, 2001, the magistrate denied appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, holding that appellant failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief. No objections were filed to the magistrate’s decision. On January 14, 2002, the trial court aрproved and adopted the December 4, 2001 decision of the magistrate. Appellant appeals, assigning the following three assignments of error:
{¶ 18} “First Assignment of Error:
{¶ 19} “The trial court abused its discretion in holding that the named defendant is not entitled to relief from judgment for failure to demonstrate excusable neglect where the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that the summons and complaint served on appellant were lost in the mailroom and never made it to the attentiоn of any individual with the capacity to respond on behalf of the appropriate company.
{¶ 20} “Second Assignment of Error:
{¶ 21} “The trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that a company answering on behalf of the named defendant could not demоnstrate that ‘Zurich US’ is not a legal entity where a party moving for relief from judgment need only allege a meritorious defense, not prove it will prevail on the defense, and where the trial court did not consider vacating the judgment as void.
{¶ 22} “Third Assignment of Error:
{¶ 23} “The triаl court decision is void to the extent that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellee’s bad faith and punitive damages claims.”
{¶ 24} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are interrelated and, as such, will be аddressed together. In its first and second assignments of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that appellant was not entitled to relief pursuant to
{¶ 25} Without reaching the merits of appellant’s first and second assignments of error, we note that although appellee hаs not argued that appellant has waived its right to appeal, appellant failed to file objections to the magistrate’s December 4, 2001 decision denying its
{¶ 26} Here, the magistrate rendered the decision on December 4, 2001. Appellant had until December 18, 2001, to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. However, appellant failed to do so. The trial court approved and adоpted the magistrate’s decision on January 14, 2002. A party who does not file written objections to a magistrate’s decision may not raise on appeal issues on the merits that might have been the basis of the objections.
Clendenen v. Fannin Realty, Inc.,
Franklin App. No. 01AP-1295,
{¶ 27} This court, in construing
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} In its third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellee’s causes of action for bad faith and punitive damagеs pursuant to the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Appellant contends that “ ‘[t]here is no dispute that the plan at issue in this dispute is an ERISA plan governed by
{¶ 30} ERISA,
{¶ 31} ERISA broadly preempts state law relating to employee benefit plans.
Richland Hosp., Inc. v. Ralyon
(1987),
{¶ 32} In this case, the affirmative defense of the ERISA preemption issue raised by appellant is not jurisdictional in nature but a matter of choice of law.
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux
(1987),
{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.