delivered the opinion of the court.
The controversy in this case grows out of thе eighth and eighteenth sections of the аct of limitations of 1844. By the former it is provided, “ That judgments shall not be revived by scire facias, nоr actions of debt be maintained therеon, nor executions issued, after the expiration of seven years next aftеr the date of such judgment.” The latter prоvides, “ That the periods of limitations estаblished by the act, shall commence
In this case more than seven years had elapsed, between the issuance of the present execution and the one next preceding, and of consequence more than seven years had transpired after the judgment But the exеcution in controversy was issued in less than seven years after the passage оf the law.
It is an established rule not to give а retrospective effect to a law, unless it is the manifest intention of the legislаture, that such construction should be plаced upon it.-/-No such intention is evinced in this instance. On the contrary, the declаration is express, that the period оf limitation shall commence from the passage of the act. We should extend its operation beyond its plain prоvisions, if we were to make the law relate back and affect judgments renderеd previous to its passage, and make it constitute a bar as to them by computing the time, between the rendition of the judgment and the passage of the law. This would аlso interfere with the last clause of thе section, which contemplates the application of the previоus laws, to those cases in which the limitation had commenced running at the time of thе passage of this act.
It seems to us, therefore, that the law under consideration is only applicable where the period of limitation has elapsed subsequent to its passage. This was the view taken in the court below, and the judgment is affirmed.