195 Mich. 27 | Mich. | 1917
The bill of complaint herein was filed against the defendants as stockholders and incorporators of the Coronet Corset Company, bankrupt, to enforce their alleged unpaid stock subscriptions, and to .compel them to pay a sufficient sum to liquidate the unpaid portion of the debts allowed against said bankrupt, in the bankruptcy proceedings.
As stated by complainant, the controversy centers chiefly around the questions whether the incorporators actually turned in for common stock the property stated in the articles to have been so turned in; whether such property, if actually turned in for common stock, was of the kind permitted by the statute, and was sufficiently itemized and the valuation of each item given; and whether there was actual fraud in the valuation of such property, if the statute was otherwise complied with.
The Coronet Corset Company of Grand Rapids, Mich., was incorporated on December 17, 1909, under Act No. 232, Pub. Acts 1903, and amendments (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 9017 et seq.) ; its articles being duly recorded in the office of the secretary of State and of the county clerk of Kent county.
The case being at issue as to all of the defendants except Edward C. Weeks, the bill was dismissed as to him.
The learned circuit judge who heard the case, and heard and saw all of the witnesses testify therein, filed a written opinion as the basis of the decree entered below. After a thorough examination of the record and the numerous briefs, we are of opinion that the circuit judge reached the correct conclusion in the case upon the several issues raised; and we are so well satisfied with the statement' of the case by him that we insert the opinion here. It is as follows:
“This action is brought by George C. Brown, as trustee in bankruptcy of the Coronet Corset Company, to recover certain assets of the bankrupt.
*30 “The Coronet Corset Company of Grand Rapids was. incorporated December 17, 1909, with an authorized capital stock of $150,000, divided equally into common and preferred, of the par value of $10 a share. The articles of association represent that of the preferred stock $50,000 was subscribed and paid for as follows: $44,000 in cash and $6,000 in property. The common stock was all subscribed for by the defendant Holden Joslin, and was paid for in property valued at $75,000. One-half of this, stock was turned back to the company by Joslin with the understanding that it should be issued to subsequent purchasers of preferred stock at par, as an inducement to the sale of that stock. .The details of this arrangement were that subscribers to preferred stock should receive, without additional cost, 50 per cent, of amount of their subscriptions in common stock. The property turned into the corporation by Joslin in payment for the common stock consisted of all the tangible and intangible assets of the Coronet Corset Company of Jackson, Mich., and of the P. Schultz & Company of Hastings, Mich.
“It is the theory of the bill of complaint that this property was intentionally and fraudulently overvalued, and that the general scheme of the organization was carried on in pursuance of a conspiracy to defraud the public and creditors. The liability of all the defendants is. based on the alleged fraudulently excessive valuations with an additional liability on the part of the defendant Jarvis for $1,500 of unpaid preferred stock subscriptions, and on the part of defendant Eugene J. Weeks and Edward C. Weeks for transferring their stock after debts had been contracted and with the knowledge of the failing condition of the business, and with the intention of escaping liability.
“The charges of fraud and misconduct on the part of the incorporators of this company are wholly unsupported by any evidence. I am not able to say from the evidence whether there was any very extravagant valuation placed on the property which was turned in by Mr. Joslin to pay for the common stock; but I am satisfied that, if there was, it was due to an honest error in judgment induced by an apparently well-founded enthusiasm as to the ultimate success of the business. It was at least a good faith valuation. I therefore find that there was no fraud in fact or in*31 law, and that therefore no liability attaches to any of the organizers of the corporation because of the valuation placed upon the property for which the common stock was. issued.
-“Neither is there any evidence of conspiracy or unlawful purpose in the promotion and organization of the company. And, if there was no fraudulent overvaluation of the property, the common stock was fully paid, and, as it belonged to Mr. Joslin, he had a right to sell it or give it away as he pleased. It follows that there can be no recovery from any of those defendants who purchased preferred stock and received therewith, without cost, 50 per cent, of the amount in common stock.
“As to the claim of $1,500 against the defendant Jarvis, who subscribed for the-amount of preferred stock and did not pay for the same, I am of opinion that .the liability for the payment of this unpaid subscription should be shared by all the other incorporators. It affirmatively appears from the evidence that, when Jarvis subscribed for the $1,500 additional amount of preferred stock, he was acting for all of the incorporators and made the subscription at their request in order to make up the $50,000 for the preferred stock. It was not intended that he should pay for it, and it was in fact subsequently returned to the treasury and with their consent. As I said, the testimony shows that Jarvis subscribed for this stock to make up the $50,000 which the articles of association represented to have been paid in for the preferred stock. ' After the organization, he surrendered this stock with the consent of the company; but such surrender did not relieve him of liability. He is liable for the subscription, but, under the circumstances, I think that the other incorporators, should be required to share the responsibility with him and make good the amount of this subscription. I therefore find that all of the incorporators are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amount subscribed by Mr. Jarvis,' as trustee.
“As to the claim that the Hastings business which was practically owned by Walter H. Wright, was transferred subject to a credit of $1,225, the original arrangement seems to have been that Mr. Wright was*32 to have such a credit on his preferred stock subscription; that being the estimated value of the raw and manufactured stock of his company. When the articles of association were made, however, no mention was made of the credit of $1,225 to Mr. Wright; so that in fact the assets of the Hastings Company were turned in free from any incumbrance. Subsequently, some one acting without authority included this amount of $1,225 in a check for Mr. Wright’s manufactured stock. Wright immediately turned it back in partial payment of his preferred stock subscription of $5,000. As he was not entitled to the $1,225 credit, to that extent his preferred stock subscription is unpaid. I therefore find that Walter H. Wright is liable for $1,225 due on his preferred stock subscription.
“As to the liability of the defendants Eugene J. Weeks and Edward C. Weeks for transferring their stock to parties in Montana with the intention of escaping liability, I find that when the transfer was made the defendants Weeks did not know that the bankrupt was in a failing condition, and that they did not make such transfer with a view to escaping liability on the stock.
“Having found that there was no fraud in the organization of the company and that Joslin was the owner of common stock, which was fully paid, it follows that no liability attaches to defendants Stowe, Thiele, Frick, Conger, Kelsey, and Forrester, and as to them the bill should be dismissed.
“The defendants Jarvis, Eugene J. Weeks, Edward C. Weeks, Wright, Knott, Joslin, Mitts, Otte, and Kelly, are jointly and severally liable for the payment of $1,500 on the preferred stock subscribed by Jarvis.
“In view of the character of my conclusions of fact, it is not necessary to pass upon the questions of law which were so ably briefed by counsel.
“All the creditors are entitled to participate.
“A decree will be entered in accordance with these findings.”
The plaintiff has appealed.
A few facts in support of the above should be stated:
This Grand Rapids corporation was organized by combining the business of the Coronet Corset Com
The Hastings concern was also an active, going one, manufacturing corset accessories, including brassieres, bust forms, hip pads, etc., and had been in the business at Hastings for about five years. Although its capital was limited, it was doing a business of from $10,000 to $20,000 a year. It sold its product all over the country from New York to San Francisco. The business was capable of very great expansion with sufficient capital to push it. It not only had an established trade throughout the country, but it also had various trade-marks and names that had become generally known and were of great value. It also had patents and customers’ lists which were valuable.
The inception of the plan which finally resulted in bringing these two businesses to Grand Rapids, and uniting them in one company, was the offer of Mr.
“My ambition to get out of the business was what prompted me to sell the business. I felt that at that time I was making a great sacrifice in so doing. My relations with Mr. Joslin were' the very pleasantest. Doubtless, that had much to do with the matter of my offering him this opportunity as against other men in our employ. Undoubtedly, this friendship had much to do with the price named in the option I gave him. I think it was my suggestion that the' name Coronet Corset Company should be perpetuated, and very naturally I had an ambition in that I had made a success of the business.”
After getting this option on the Jackson plant and concern, Mr. Joslin, believing the business and accessories of the Hastings concern to be a valuable adjunct to the corset business, ■ took an option on that business at the inventory value of equipment and merchandise. Negotiations followed, all of which, as well
“The amount of common stock actually paid in is the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars, all of which has been paid in property, an itemized description of which, with the valuation at which each item is taken, is as follows, viz.:
“The following described property now situate in the city of Jackson, Michigan, used in or incident to*37 the business of manufacturing and selling of corsets and other kindred articles and accessories thereto, which business for many years last past has been and at the date of the transfer of said property to this company was owned and actively operated as a going concern by the Coronet Corset Company, a corporation of the said city of Jackson, Michigan, viz.:
“The miscellaneous machinery and appliances, including 70 sewing machines used in and connected with said business; the steam plant consisting of engines, boilers, pumps, and other equipment connected therewith; the machinery, equipment, materials and supplies constituting the printing plant of said company ; the office fixtures of every kind and nature; all the general equipment connected with the handling of the stock, material and output of said company and business, and all shafting and other miscellaneous articles of every kind and nature connected with said business; the following registered trade-marks used in connection with the sale of the output of said business, viz.: La Fillette, Colonial, Filrone, La Blanchette, B/C Flexibone, Flexo-Waldo, Coronet, La Crossine, Her Ladyship, and C. C. Co., Jaxon, the mailing lists and customers’ lists connected with said business; together with the corporate name and good will of said established business valued at sixty thousand dollars.
“Also the property and assets of every kind and nature used in or in connection with the business of manufacturing and selling corsets and other accessories, which for several years last past and at the date of transfer thereof to this company, was owned and. actively operated as a going concern by W. G. Wright at the city of Hastings, Michigan, under the assumed name of P. Schultz & Company, consisting of all the machinery, equipment and fixtures of every kind connected with said business, including a registered trade-mark ‘The Just Wright,’ used in connection with the output of said business, together with the trade and good will of said established business, of the value of fourteen thousand dollars; two letters patent of the United States, numbers-and-, of the value of one thousand dollars.
“All of the above-described property and established business of said above-described going concerns,*38 namely, the Coronet Corset Company of Jackson, Michigan, and P. Schultz <& Company of Hastings, Michigan, of the total value of seventy-five thousand dollars, heretofore sold by said respective companies, has been taken over and is to be continued^ and operated as one going concern by this company in the said city of Grand Rapid's, Michigan.
“The amount of preferred stock actually paid in is the sum of fifty thousand dollars, of which forty-four thousand dollars has been paid in cash, and six thousand dollars has been paid in other property, an itemized description of which, with the valuation at which each item is taken, is as follows, viz., one hundred sewing machines for manufacturing purposes of the value of six thousand dollars.”
Holden Joslin subscribed for all of the common stock. Mr. Weeks and others testified that these properties were worth more than $81,000.
No impartial person can read this record, and especially the testimony of Mr. Weeks, Mr. Wright, Mr. Jarvis, and Mr. Clapperton, without being satisfied that the charges of fraud and misconduct on the part of the incorporators are wholly unsupported by any evidence. • The issuance of stock in consideration of property will be presumed free from fraud, unless the contrary clearly appears. Referring to the matter of good will, it may be said that the good will of a business, though intangible, is property, and stock of a corporation issued for such good will is issued for property actually received within the meaning of laws allowing stock to be paid for in property. 4 Thompson on Corporations (2d Ed.), § 3955, and cases cited in notes.
In White, Corbin & Co. v. Jones, 79 App. Div. 373 (79 N. Y. Supp. 583), where a corporation purchased with its capital stock the property, business, and good will of a firm, it was held that the value of such good will should be taken into consideration in determining whether the property of the firm as transferred to
In Washburn v. Wall-Paper Co., 26 C. C. A. 312 (81 Fed. 17), it was said:
“The good will of a business is property, and may have a value independent of any particular locality or any specific tangible property, and stock of a corporation issued for such good will is issued for property actually received, within the meaning of the New York stock corporation law.”
In Bininger v. Clark, supra, it is said that the good will of a business is an important part of its property, and will be protected by a court of equity whenever a proper case arises.
Referring to the claim of $1,500 against the defendant Jarvis, which is for unpaid preferred stock, subscribed by him, we think that the circuit judge properly held that all of the incorporators were liable therefor, for the reason stated by him. This holding was the basis of the appeal of defendants Weeks and Kelly.
The defendant Wright has not appealed from the
What we have said of good will applies with equal force to patents and trade-marks. We are of the opinion that the description, itemization, and valuation of the property in the articles were a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute, and that the same are conclusive in the absence of fraud.
Attention is called by plaintiff to the sixth subdivision of section 2 of Act No. 146, Pub. Acts 1907, which contains the following (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 9018):
“Provided, that only such property shall be so taken in payment for capital stock as the purposes of the corporation shall require, and only such property as can be sold and transferred by the corporation, and as shall be subject to levy and- sale on execution, or other process issued out of any court having competent jurisdiction, for the satisfaction of any judgment or decree against such corporation.” i
It is urged that no levy of execution can be made upon the intangible property mentioned. The bill made no claim of this kind; but, passing that point, we think that the “other process” referred to in the statute should be held to be broad enough to include decrees and orders of a court of chancery. That patents, trade-marks, and good will can be, and often have been, sold under process of the courts of chancery, must be conceded. The fact that good will cannot be sold separately we do not deem important.
The decree of the court below is in all things affirmed, and no costs in this court will be allowed to either party.