*1 nation,” upon we see no basis which the

trial court’s control over the introduction expert testimony expanded can be

the extent that respondent argues here:

the exclusion of a report that the statute

expressly states is admissible. We con-

clude that it would be an abuse discre-

tion for the trial to exclude

evidence of the DEA drug testing simply

because the pretrial chemist conditions the presence

interview on the government

counsel. suppressing order evidence of the

DEA tests is vacated and the case is re-

manded for further proceedings consistent opinion.

with this

So ordered. BROWN, Appellant,

Latasha STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 99-CM-241.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued July 2000.

Decided Dec.

Frankfurt, Berman, De- Jeffrey S. Public Service, appel- fender were on brief for lant. Sulzbach,

Patricia Assistant United with Wilma A. Attorney, States whom Lewis, Attorney, and United States John III, McLeese, Roy R. Fisher and Assistant Attorneys, were on the brief United States appellee. SCHWELB, Judge, Associate Before KING, Judges. and BELSON and Senior BELSON, Judge: Senior Latasha was found Appellant Brown non-jury in a trial of one count of guilty Appellant simple argues assault.1 in trial court committed reversible limiting police her cross-examination of a who part officer took the arrest appel- precluding redirect examination of only and af- disagree lant’s witness. We firm.

I. the evening On of November telephoned police Steven Williams requested picking up his chil- assistance Street, Southeast, where dren from 1641V aunt, Brown, Latasha re- appellant their re- had been sided. Williams issued him from straining order which barred contact with the mother of his children. avoid help police He asked for of the up picking any possible confrontation when children, Of- custody. whom he had Mars- Joseph and Arleen ficers Cabillo him. responded ham-West assist While Williams remained outside resided, building appellant apartment door and police on the knocked occupants. to the identified themselves building Appellant apartment exited and walked toward Williams. She boisterous, fussing and “very loud and Despite at several cursing [Williams].” calm Lanoff, police officers to requests Public Defender Ser- Jennifer Klein, down, at vice, appellant continued to curse Jackie whom James (1996 § Repl.). D.C.Code Williams and refused to go court, back into her sound discretion of the trial and we apartment. Appellant swung at Officer will only reverse on a showing of abuse Cabillo with a closed fist when he attempt- of that discretion.” Deneal v. United ed to (D.C.1988) arrest her for disorderly (ci- conduct. He was able to avoid being omitted); struck tations Jones v. United *3 ducking down. Appellant’s 513, (D.C.1986) sister 516 A.2d (holding the jumped on pre- Officer Cabillo’s back to extent of cross examination is within the vent him from handcuffing appellant. court). Of- sound discretion of trial “[W]e ficer Marsham-West subdued appellant’s inquiry limit our to whether the trial sister. Officer Cabillo was then able to court’s decision was fair and rational.” appellant handcuff and arrest her. Taylor, supra, 661 A.2d at 643.

II. standard, Applying the above we find no abuse of discretion in the trial Appellant first contends that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. It important court in limiting erred the cross-examina- to observe that the trial court did not tion of Officer Cabillo regarding whether preclude “an entire line of relevant cross- complied he with proper police procedure examination” as claimed by appellant. after an police assault on a Appel- officer. The trial court instructed defense counsel (1) lant explore wished to three matters: question he could not Officer Cabillo paperwork extent of that Officer Cabil- “generally [about] what his understandings completed (2) lo incident; following the are regulations of the generally what whether the officer interviewed wit- police time, practice is.” But at the same (3) arrest; nesses after the and the offi- the court permitted counsel to establish familiarity cer’s with Metropolitan Police through Officer Cabillo that he did not Department (“MPD General Order 701.3 interview Orders”) any witnesses and advised coun General regarding police proce- sel that he question could Officer Cabillo dures handling police assaults on offi- any paperwork further about completed he cers. According counsel, to defense case, relative to the a matter he had al purpose of such questioning was to estab- ready (a objection. covered without lish bias matter appeal) not raised on permitted court also questions the same and to call into the credibility of be asked of Officer Marsham-West. the arresting court, officer. Before this appellant asserts that Officer Cabillo failed States, In Greer v. United 697 A.2d “to locate and take statements from all 1207, (D.C.1997), we ruled that de- witnesses to an assault police on a officer” fense may permissibly adduce evi- required by general order and this dence police conducted investi- failure reflected on credibility the officer’s gation in a manner departed from and was “evidence that the assault never procedures. standard But we did not indi- took place.” cate in Greer that such evidence must al-

An evidentiary ruling admitted, ways and declined to rule whether, court is reviewed for abuse of case, discretion. in the circumstances of that This court will set aside an exercise of trial the curtailment of cross-examination was “only upon discretion showing an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1212. De- grave States, Taylor abuse.” v. United argued fense counsel at trial that the offi- 636, (D.C.1995) 661 A.2d (quoting Irick procedures cer’s “failure to follow certain 26, v. United ... goes credibility to his and bias as to 1989)); Irving see v. United 673 whether or not this incident even took A.2d Accordingly, place.” The court determined that this regard cross-examination, “the ex line questioning tangential, was “too too tent remote,” of that examination is within the probative and was not as to ance, new appellant actually qualification committed the substan-

whether impeachment matters elicited ruling This with- tive facts or evidentiary assault. by the 1 McCoRmick on of the trial and will cross-examiner.” the discretion (John Strong § at 119-20 W. Price v. be overturned. Evidence Cf. omitted). ed.1999) (citations (D.C.1997) ed., (ruling 5th trial court did not abuse its discretion pur of the nature and view rejecting effort to offi- establish examination, pose of redirect there no credibility by cer’s and lack of show- bias right to in it. It engage absolute cannot ing complete forms failed two used to revisit all matters covered funds). required for use of confidential preceding This cross-examination. cross-examination, differentiates it from *4 III. of which can be as a matter undertaken contention Appellant’s second right concerning subjects all the covered pre- trial its by court abused discretion examination, preceding well direct of cluding appellant’s redirect examination credibility.2 affecting as matters See witness, only Troy Harris. After counsel States, 274, Grayton v. United 745 A.2d government completed for the his cross- (D.C.2000); 279-281 Jones v. United Harris, examination of he stated that he States, 513, (D.C.1986); 1 A.2d 516 517 judge further questions. no trial 19, 88, 32, § supra, § McCormick, at at you. may step “Thank You said hand, can 119. On the there be said other thereafter, Immediately down .” a right provided to be to redirect counsel “Actually, said I have a brief redi- proposes deal which first to with matters rect, honor,” point at which trial your up came 1 cross-examination. See your Step said “call next witness. 32, § supra, McCormick, at 119. Such your Appel- down. next witness.” Call a to giving right matters rise to redirect attempt trial make lant’s counsel did not to a range, including cover factual mat broad concerning the proffer nature direct, brought up on see ters not Johnson he redirect examination wished to conduct. States, 516, (D.C. v. A.2d 518 United 298 Appellant on asserts for the first time 1972), undermining the credi and evidence appeal that of redirect neces- witness, Stitely v. bility of the see United sary credibility in order to rehabilitate his (D.C.1948). 491, A.2d 492 See 61 by for “clarifying Mr. Harris’s reasons Minihan, 1208, Mo. also v. 355 Johnson court, testifying, coming to his motives (error (1947) to exclude 200 S.W.2d 334 help and the extent to which his desire to on redirect that would have ex evidence appellant or sister affected the sub- her on plained impeachment evidence adduced testimony.” stance of examination); v. Man cross Villineuve “[Rjedirect limit examination is 250, 748, Ry., 60 A. chester 73 N.H. Street ed matters which first raised on to were (when (1905) writing 750 inconsistent cross-examination, opposing cross, testimony introduced on direct responding on redirect.” party merely explain deny inconsisten opportunity 861, 365 v. Dobson United redirect); McCormick, supra, on cies (D.C.1981) (quoting Singletary v. United 32, § at 118-121. (D.C.1978)); 1064, States, 383 A.2d Although in this matter v. see Hilton United to limit the redirect on had the discretion reply “The redirect Harris, v. of see Hairston may explanation, of avoid- examination take form is, however, explore mit cross-examination matters "delimited Cross-examination contradict, scope modify, v. explain direct examination.” Hart or which tend to (D.C. States, 538 A.2d given testimony direct” Id. on "Therefore, 1988). per should

H41 United, States, A.2d other examining about some matter cov- 1985), it ered in which might would have error to exclude cross-examination or all might proper redirect provided unless counsel unable to not have basis for provide any Therefore, basis for redirect. redirect. As a result defense counsel’s counsel, it upon was incumbent when he failure the record af- proffer, to make a proceed make, wished to with redirect evaluating fords no whether Har- basis for make, attempt proffer of the testi responses dealing ris’ with his questions mony expected, explaining to the motivation for testifying would have been request the basis of his for redirect likely finding to affect the trial court’s Jones, supra, examination. 516 A.2d at guilt. Cf. (defendant preserve failed to claim however, conclude, We cannot proffer error because insufficient for proffer defense’s failure to make burdens court). review “[Although confronting it requirement with the of establishing after may risky he has ruled prevail appeal error in order to business, defense counsel should have considering without first whether the trial proffered testimony expected to judge’s conduct that he demonstrated “was Walker, elicit.” United States 146 manifestly unwilling proffer entertain a *5 95, 99, U.S.App.D.C. 1171, 1175 449 F.2d evidence, contrary of relevant to his re- (1971). we in As stated McBride v. Unit McBride, sponsibility.” supra, 441 A.2d at ed (D.C.1982), 656 record, Having the trial considered “[w]hen trial balks admitting at judge we conclude that trial the did not evidence, certain normally counsel should unwillingness. exhibit such an make an offer proof.” of on We went stated, As we thing have first observe jurisdiction that this has consis trial judge government said after counsel tently adhered to the following principle: questions stated he had no further A ruling of the court that a “Thank you. step You Im- may down.” propounded by party to his own wit- thereafter, mediately defense counsel said ness should not be answered must be redirect, “Actually, I your have a brief by an testimony followed offer honor,” upon which the trial judge said expected, by something that would your “call Step next down. witness. Call it, clearly indicate it is desired to if your next witness.” reserve the point review by the court. for The judge’s trial initial statement Id. (quoting McCurley v. National Sav down,” you. step “Thank may You was a ings Co., 10, 12, & Trust App.D.C. routine and perfunctory statement that tri- 154, 156 (1919) added)). F. (emphasis judges appears al it commonly make when While prof- failure of counsel make a that a witness finished his or has her may fer if excused thrust of the be, testimony. It cannot taken to testimony excluded had been appar- made itself, any the court indication that would before, id., ent what gone had see in proffer regarding proposed not entertain a this case there was no indication of the redirect. questions pre- defense counsel would have Harris, sented to much less the The trial to the judge’s response answers defense questions produced. those would have counsel’s statement that subsequent We he agree cannot suggestion dissent’s had a brief redirect —that the witness that apparent it was that step “defense counsel should down and counsel should attempt would imputa- inappropriate. to counteract call his next witness—was (Dissent 4). p. tion of at sought bias.” 1145 & n. The should or at least have Defense well regarded proffer regarding counsel could have awaited a redirect. But circumstances, we agree bias cross-examination as so routine under the cannot that he would been have more interested conduct showed that he prevented proffer by á either coun- a never manifestly unwilling entertain sel, per- nor admonish counsel for

proffer. The circumstances here are to be did he McBride, in supra, argue Having those efforts to law. contrasted with sistent record, objection to a trial where the court sustained reviewed the entire we con- line of and then refused did cross-examination clude that the trial not indicate to make an offer of request unwillingness counsel’s to en- to counsel a manifest proof. redirect. proffer regarding tertain a did not state that counsel As defense failed accept proffer, would either after of denial of redirect preserve the issue any Harris’ or at other cross-examination plain for timely proffer, we review error. The record no point in the trial. contains (be McBride, 441 A.2d at 655 supra, Cf. cause that the trial had issued indication adequately pre counsel defense prohibition against proffers, general appeal review served issue for comparable judge’s announcing a trial error). plain harmless error not Under not normally permit advance that he would “the error com error standard any objection during opposing counsel’s clearly plained prejudicial of must be so closing argument, practice upon jeopardize very rights substantial we in Hammill commented v. United of the trial.” integrity fairness and Watts A.2d A.2d 1976). has failed contrary, quite Appellant To to demon prejudice. While spirited advancing arguments degree on behalf strate that appellant evidentiary appellant that “redirect was critical matters earlier asserts case,” particular she cannot substanti note trial. We *6 prof absence a re- ate that claim. In the of judge when the and counsel break, fer, sumed, already this cannot evaluate how after a lunch their length testimony might matter redirect of have colloquy question- on the of ing police regarding officer altered the outcome. arresting police applicable police to assault on orders Affirmed. cases, judge officer stated proposed of “credi- defense counsel’s line SCHWELB, Judge, Associate re- bility bias” examination “too and dissenting: you mote. I won’t let do It’s too remote. majority My acknowl- colleagues it for that reason.” When the defense peremp- judge the trial erred edge that argu- attempted resume Ms. at- torily permit Brown’s declining to ment, If “Ruling it. judge against said torney to a redirect examination of conduct credibility, you doing purposes it for of are respect witness with the sole defense ... probative I think it is too remote not first time on cross- matters raised for the ” enough here.... any of issue hold, however, that the They examination. Undeterred, continued defense counsel applies, Ms. plain error standard stating, it also argument with “and standard, Brown has not satisfied for goes went on to bias.” Counsel af- must therefore be that her conviction per- in an several more sentences effort majority with agree firmed. I cannot him suade to let examine on plain case for appropriate that this The trial listened to coun- orders. Instead, apply I would con- error review. and did admon- argument further not sel’s analysis error and re- ventional harmless advocacy continuing his ish counsel for conviction. verse Ms. Brown’s after had ruled. I. by his

While the trial showed others, in rever- jurisdiction, In this interest to both counsel his statements rare. exceedingly are plain for error along expedition, with sals moving the trial H43 prevail upon ground ty orderly jus- order to a not administration of court, properly preserved in the trial tice. criminal defendant must show both that however, ought forget, We not to that it i.e., “plain,” the trial error was is the defendant and not attor his or her “obvious,” and that miscarriage a clear ney likely go prison who is when the See,

justice e.g., resulted. United v. States plain precludes plenary ap error doctrine Olano, 725, 732, 1770, U.S. 113 507 S.Ct. pellate might consideration of what other (1993); 123 L.Ed.2d 508 Watts v. United wise be a meritorious defense contention. (D.C.1976) States, 706, (en attorneys, Criminal defense like the rest of banc). standard, This exacting is most us, mortals, are mere and we should my experience and in it is almost never require perfection and do not barristerial Therefore, practical satisfied.1 as a mat- preserve point appeal. order to for If ter, once we plain decide invoke the underlying counsel has asserted the claim doctrine, error appeal the defendant’s trial, at the defendant is not restricted on certainly doomed, almost and her dreams appeal precise evaporate arguments reversal to the made in into the “eerie atmo- sphere See, of never-never land.” Meredith v. e.g., City trial court. Yee v. Fair, (5th Cir.1962). 696, 298 F.2d Escondido, 519, 534, 503 U.S. 112 S.Ct. 1522, (1992); 118 L.Ed.2d 153 Salmon There are sound for reasons our reluc 949, tance to judgment plain reverse a er 1997). Moreover, apply we have avoided purpose ror. “The requiring specific ing rule a mechanical or objection prosecution is to enable the manner, wooden and we have relaxed the respond contentions raised and to standard where an issue has arisen unex possible make it for the trial judge to pectedly and where it would be unreason correct the situation without jettisoning expect respond able to counsel to the trial.” Hunter v. United pristine accuracy to an unforeseeable de 139, (D.C.), denied, A.2d cert. 506 U.S. See, Salmon, e.g., nouement. supra, 719 (1992). 113 S.Ct. 121 L.Ed.2d 444 953; Further, A.2d at Duvall v. United A.2d 452 n. 5 *7 [ljitigants permitted should not be to keep objections some of their in then- my opinion, In appeal pres- this does not hip pockets and to only disclose them to type ent the of situation for which the appellate tribunal; the “[o]ne cannot plain error standard was to designed or verdict, take his chance on a favorable which it ought applied. to be For the reserving a right impeach to it if it below, reasons set forth I would that hold happens go to way.” the other Palmer claim, namely, Ms. Brown’s that her coun- Patouillet, Constr. Co. v. 42 A.2d Troy right sel was denied the to on regarding Harris redirect examination cross, prosecution issues the on raised Id. In the kind of situation for which it designed, plain adequately preserved, was was and that this the error rule should firmly ought enforced the interest of finah- claim to on its be evaluated merits. me, my memory Partnership, 1. Unless fails I have never Columbia v. Wical Ltd. voted, years (D.C.1993) in more than twelve and a half (reversing judgment 182-86 bench, appellate on the to a criminal reverse notwithstanding in civil case the fact that plain conviction for But error. see Coreas v. invited). very error was There have been few plain during error reversals that time. If I 1989) (reversing improper conviction for applied the believed that error standard prosecutorial argument despite the lack of a appeal, to this I too would vote to affirm Ms. timely objection); seq. id. at 606 et cf. Brown’s conviction. (Schwelb, J., dissenting); see also District of proffer regarding make a the content of II. byBut proposed his redirect examination. trial, Troy At Harris was Ms. Brown’s any the that such proffer time could have testify to for the the sole witness called made, judge already twice examination, Har- defense. On direct Mr. to step ordered Mr. Harris down and twice testified, alia, that ris inter Officer Cabillo to call his next witness. ordered counsel acting arrogant an and truculent judge’s ruling emphatic The had been during contretemps manner his with Ms. friends, Any Brown and her that Cabillo was further cryptic. argument as it was physical altercation aggressor his have counsel would constituted disobe- Brown, that Brown nev- with Ms. and Ms. The dience of the directives. swung er at him. case thus boiled subject had shown no interest judge credibility down between Mr. to a contest any proposed matter of redirect examina- police. On and cross-examina- tion, step and his that Mr. Harris order tion, Mr. Harris that he was acknowledged next down and that counsel call his witness sister, of Ms. boyfriend Brown’s opinion, In a fair my was unconditional. sisters, help in court both and to reading exchange between happen anything that he did not want probability high counsel demonstrates either of them. proffer would been futile and that a have knows, lawyer As norm probably antagonized it would have upon completion of cross-examination of in this the trier of judge, who case was attorney called witness is who fact. proceed witness examination. redirect Moreover, simply a situa- this case, however, is not this what tion in which had sustained happened. prosecutor As soon as the com- objection could overruled which counsel Harris, pleted Mr. his cross-examination of him asked to reconsider. The have crystal the judge made it clear—not once call next had twice counsel to his ordered but was not several times —that he dis- witness and twice ordered the witness posed permit redirect examination and circumstances, step down. Under these that Mr. Harris’ stint the witness stand reasonably inquiring attorney might was at an end. whether Brown’s Without Ms. further, anything defense counsel had apprehended that refusal do what have addressed witness: him had told witness possi- you. may step trifling Thank down. do would have been You contempt. bility of astonished, Ms. Obviously Brown’s attor- ney responded: is not the kind of situation in which This I Actually, have a brief redirect. relegated defendant should criminal *8 be, However, judge’s it was not to for the to on attempt secure reversal quixotic a counsel, rejoinder, first to directed plain error friendly than terrain of the less witness, then and to counsel to the then The claim that Ms. Brown review. basic again, unambiguous was as as it was dis- that her attor- appeal namely, makes on — missive: ney a redirect ex- was entitled to conduct your Call next witness. amination the sole defense witness—was Step down. fact, In in trial de- preserved the court. next your

Call witness.2 the, response judge’s or- fense counsel’s record, step der the down—“Actual- holds, witness majority The on this that a redirect” —was at least required ly, I have brief attorney Ms. Brown’s was keeping the period transcript in with the obvious fact that Although 2. there more is commands, judge, giving orders which speaker, at the conclusion of each these obey. obliged witness were points be counsel the I that exclamation would believe objection My in at 1141. col- arguably garding all but name.3 redirect.” Id. Although attorney Ms. Brown’s did not recognize thus the leagues present precise argument at trial the because, erred, they but affirm in their namely, now that he wished to view, plain applies. standard As the error makes— “dispel” the bias evidence adduced the noted, however, I previously disagree government on cross-examination —he had majority’s plain the identification of error so,4 very little opportunity to do and he proper the of review. standard proffer proposed could have made a whether, remaining question The as- only by disregarding redirect examination suming point properly pre- judge’s repeated insistence that Mr. served, step down judge’s prejudicial and that counsel call his error was my opinion, See, next witness. In we cannot e.g., harmless. Kotteakos v. United fairly say attorney that Ms. Brown’s failed States, 750, 765, 328 U.S. 66 S.Ct. anything to do that a reasonably compe- (1946) (articulating L.Ed. 1557 harmless attorney tent would have done under the standard). view, my rather this is same circumstances.5 Nevertheless, balance, a close call. I on vote to reverse Ms. Brown’s conviction.

III. fact, perspective From the of the trier of All members of evidently the division dispositive question this case was: agree that judge’s per- the trial refusal to Who should be believed? If Mr. Harris mit redirect examination was erroneous. telling the truth regarding Ms. majority'expressly As the acknowledges, part affray Brown’s with Officer “there can be said to be a right to redirect Cabillo, guilty then Ms. Brown was not provided proposes to deal with Indeed, ought to have acquitted. up matters first came in cross-exam- if even was unsure where the Maj. Further, op. ination.” at 1140. lay truth but entertained reasonable quote majority, trial judge’s “[t]he re- police doubt version of regarding sponse to the defense counsel’s ... state- encounter, required he was to find the ment that had a [counsel] brief redirect— guilty. impera- defendant not It was thus step witness should down and that fully tive that the trier of fact make a counsel should call his next witness-was inappropriate. credibility informed assessment of the should have witness, sought proffer or at least Troy awaited a re- the sole defense Harris. 3. If "Objection, proffer expected counsel had said: I have a we stated that a of a witness’ redirect,” application brief of the implausible. testimony ordinarily required where the surely error standard would objection has sustained an to a I do not believe that counsel’s failure to use particular question inquiry. or line of "objection” change the word should result materially A.2d at That differs 656. situation import object when the of his words was to here, presented from the for in this case one judge's directive. judge precluded asking any counsel from Moreover, redirect examination. Moreover, given prosecu- the content of the Harris, proffer by defense counsel McBride tor’s cross-examination of Mr. it could reasonably anticipated that defense coun- would not have constituted disobedience of attempt imputa- directives; sel would to counteract the the witness had not *9 tion of bias. We have held that where the "step and counsel had not been told to down” proposed questioning line of on redirect ex- call his next witness. Even been ordered to apparent, proffer required. amination is no is so, recognized in that ”[t]he we McBride 644, See McBride v. United proffer . have enforced the re- courts .. 656-57 fashion,” id., rigid quirement in a and we rejected government’s the claim by majority 5. None of the cases cited the applied. 655. standard should be Id. at requiring proffer counsel to make a involved provides support for McBride therefore scant comparable presented circumstances to those McBride, 3, supra example, government’s position. here. In note for the

1146 Mr.,

But the not make an not be could such Harris’ truthfulness could a fully until informed one Ms. Brown’s coun- informed assessment on the truncated rec- cross-examination, opportunity sel him. had an to the ord before On witness on the matters raised cross. depict had Har- prosecutor sought Mr. As the record stood when the found partisan as a biased a ris witness—as who prosecution Ms. Brown guilty, had wanted Ms. Brown to win and who would permitted been Mr. interrogate be willing therefore to lie order to save bias, but the de- relating on issues to his response, her. the defense was entitled fense had not. show, attempt on redirect examina- tion, regardless friendship of his with great a Redirect examination can make sister, and Ms. Brown her Mr. Harris was Wig- deal of difference. One Professor of a man who told the truth. The determina- more’s illustrations tells the tale.6 colorful whether Mr. Harris was credible tion apply Judge If we Irving were well turn redi- could on his demeanor on Goldberg’s tongue-in-cheek test for harm- confronting error,7 examination im- rect when less Ms. Brown win would a and, cakewalk, implicit- of putation partisanship, bias for the error was not minuscule mendacity. ly, proof guilt hardly gargan- The assessment of and the of though very pain- whole 6. Maurice The Old Munster Circuit matter were Healy, Esq., (1939): X,” him, asked, Only one art is more difficult you ful "Mrs. "were he is, cross-examination]; art of [than your In the love with husband?” cir- object re-examination. Herein cumstances, possi- no answer but one was advocate to overcome the effect of a object ble, lay therein and skill of advocate. destructive This cross-examination. was,” replied, faintly. "I she Carson miracle; you per- attained if a can’t moment; jury for looked at the a lift- them, you your form had much better allow ing gently: eyes towards asked his her he go witness to the box further out of without things "Is one of about there these question. I once heard Sir Edward Carson you my you friend has asked which regret?” perform country, that miracle in this short- again, only answer Once one ly griev- after the client had war. His "No,” possible. replied. she Carson defamed; ously justi- the defendants had moment, paused appeared for he be fied, and in furtherance their defense X,” said, thinking. oppor- "Mrs. he "if the endeavoured that he some- to shew again you tunity today, arose would adventurer, thing living upon entirely of an proud happy again?” and to do it all "I his wife’s fortune. Carson’s case was that would,” cried, she lifted her advocate to every there is difference in the world be- X,” "Thank-ye, said enthusiasm. son, Mrs. Car- exploits his tween man who rich wife gave jury down. The his client sat who, having man and the married a rich £5000, questions and it was those three wife, help plaintiff allows him. her to verdict. won the very severely; had been handled his wife Wigmore 6 John H. Wigmore, on Evidence was asked on the threshold the cross- 1896, (Chadbourn ed.1976). § at 739-40 rev. your examination: “When did husband last may It as Sir Ed- be that "miracle” such day's do a work?” and she to answer would not been forthcom- ward Carson’s have began didn’t Then that she know. a terrific case, ing but able counsel Ms. wearing in this bombardment. “Your husband is coat; might well have to use redi- very Brown been able handsome astrachan where did get gave paid "I rect that there was a it?” it to him.” "Who examination show Royce you guilt. for the Rolls arrived in this of his client’s reasonable doubt morning?” money "How much "I did.” into error The infusion "harmlessness” put purchase your did he towards exception, must be the doctrine country?” "Nothing.” mansion in the And employed. sparingly A minuscule must on, through minute of all so examination guilt, gargantuan coalesce error must expenses daily couple. of the married imagi- displays where the accused even Cross-examining counsel sat down with a Pantagruelian dimensions. nation of very expression. slowly satisfied Carson 1240, Chapman F.2d v. United up long, body, lifted lean smoothed his denied, (5th Cir.), U.S. cert. melancholy gown, face to- silk turned his (1977); S.Ct. 52 L.Ed.2d 393 see also lady, He wards and said: "Mrs. X.” Clark paused a let the voice v. United moment to musical sad, tone, ). (D.C.1991) (quoting Chapman n. weary its Then in a obtain effect. *10 instead, Invoking, tuan. the more conven- Kotteakos,

tional standard enunciated 1239, I

supra, 328 U.S. at 66 S.Ct. assurance, say pon-

cannot “with fair after

dering happened stripping all that without whole,

the erroneous action from the judgment substantially swayed was not

by the error.” I would therefore reverse

Ms. Brown’s conviction. KLOCK, Appellant,

Robert Ollie COMPANY,

MILLER & LONG al., Appellees.

No. 99-CV-1135. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court of

Argued Oct. 2000.

Decided Dec.