409 N.E.2d 251 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1977
This is an appeal from a ruling by the Lucas County Common Pleas Court enjoining the appellant, Toledo Mental Hygiene Clinic, from enforcing its mandatory retirement policy against an employee, appellee Oril Brown.
This case involves a unique situation in which a public employee is subject to two conflicting retirement policies, one imposed by her private employer and one imposed by the state through R. C. Chapter 145. The circumstances under which this situation arose are as follows. The Clinic is presently an independent private agency which contracts with the Lucas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Board to provide specified mental health and retardation services. It is basically an autonomous unit, run by its own directors pursuant to R. C.
The trial court found in Brown's favor and the Clinic here appeals, assigning as error the following:
"I. The trial court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, defendant-appellant, Toledo Mental Hygiene Clinic, is an `employer' as defined in Sub-section D of Section
"II. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that any requirement that the defendant-appellant, Toledo Mental Hygiene Clinic, places or attempts to place, upon plaintiff-appellee, which compels her retirement prior to the 30th day of June next following her attainment of the age of seventy (70) years would be unlawful as a violation of Section
While the parties agree that appellee Brown is a "public employee" as that term is defined in R. C.
R. C.
"`Public employee' also means one who is a member of the retirement system who continues to perform the same or similar duties under the direction of a contractor who has contracted to take over what before the date of such contract was a publicly operated function. The governmental unit with whom such contract has been made shall be deemed the employer for the purposes of administering Chapter 145 of the Revised Code."
The governmental unit in this case is the Mental Health Board. However, R. C.
The court below resolved the issue by ruling that the Mental Health Board is Brown's employer under R. C.
This ruling conforms to the recognized duty of the court in cases of statutory construction to construe ambiguous statutory sections to harmonize and give full effect to all sections whenever possible. Furthermore, as a matter of policy we find it illogical, unreasonable and inequitable to deny a member of PERS the protection that system affords because of the change in status of her employer resulting from bureaucratic reorganization, which change affected neither the previous employer-employee relationship, nor the employee's membership in PERS. Appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken.
As the Clinic is an employer for the purpose of R. C.
Judgment affirmed.
POTTER, P. J., and CONNORS, J., concur.
"An employer may, as of the thirtieth day of June of any year, terminate the employment of any member who has attained the age of seventy years. Any such employee whose employment is not so terminated shall be required to present a certification prior to the thirtieth day of June of each year by a physician licensed * * * that the member is physically and mentally competent to perform the duties of the particular position which he occupies. * * *"