59 Misc. 2d 736 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1969
This is an article 78 proceeding instituted by the petitioner Wyamon E. Brown against the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, to restrain and enjoin the respondent Commissioner from conducting a hearing relative to petitioner’s operator’s license.
On March 31, 1968 the petitioner was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated in the City of Syracuse. He refused to submit to a chemical test.
It is petitioner’s contention that such frequent scheduling of hearings was an abuse of the hearing officer’s discretion and prejudicial to his rights since he is bound each time he receives a notice of a hearing to attend because the statute (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1194) makes failure to attend a hearing result in mandatory revocation of his driver’s license.
The Attorney-General, appearing for the Commissioner, concedes that the above recitation of the facts as alleged by the petitioner is accurate. He does contend, however, that these facts are insufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested because (a) there has been no hearing as to whether the petitioner’s license must be revoked and in the absence of any final action by the Commissioner the petitioner is not an aggrieved party under article 78 and (b) the Commissioner acted pursuant to section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law based upon the petitioner’s refusal to submit to a chemical test.
The contentions of the respective parties do raise the underlying question as to whether the discretionary administrative power of the Commissioner in compelling the attendance of the petitioner at a number of adjourned hearings may be limited.
Standards for the conduct of a motor vehicle hearing ordinarily would be found in rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner and filed in the Department of State (N. Y.
Viewed in light of the Manual’s provisions, the first adjournment was at petitioner’s request because his attorney was away and was granted by the hearing officer in the exercise of his own discretion; the third was caused by the arresting officer’s illness, which is a legal excuse and the adjournment was granted as of right. The second, fourth and attempted fifth adjournments were not based on legal excuses and were, therefore, all an exercise of the hearing officer’s discretion.
Previously promulgated rules regarding adjournments of motor vehicle hearings state that the Bureau Manual (no longer available) provides for three adjournments if satisfactory reasons are presented; after the third, anyone requesting a fourth is notified that no further postponement can be granted unless the circumstances are extremely unusual. (Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York, Benjamin Report, vol. 4 Department of Taxation and Finance, p. 256 [1942].)
The petitioner’s license itself is a property right (Matter of Moore v. Macduff, 309 N. Y. 35 [1955]) within the protection of the due process clause (N. Y. Const., art. I, § 6); (Matter of Breslow v. Hults, 26 A D 2d 931, 932 [1st Dept., 1966]). Such driver’s license is of value and a citizen should not be deprived of it except by due process of the law. On all rescheduled hearing dates the petitioner and his attorney were present. Quite obviously, the petitioner was present at these multischeduled hearings for the purpose of protecting his license. Plainly, the practice by the Commissioner of scheduling hearings and then adjourning them without limitation because the arresting officer (whose presence was an obligation of the Commissioner) did not appear, is a violation of the petitioner’s rights.
Concededly, the administrative proceeding for the revocation of a driver’s license and the criminal prosecution (dismissed in Justice Court in this case) arising out of the same violation proceed independently of each other and the outcome of one is of no consequence in the other (Matter of Finocchario v. Kelly, 11 N Y 2d 58, supra; Matter of Bowers v. Hults, 42 Misc 2d 845 [1964]). However, the fact should be noted that,
A scholarly and affirmative view of judicial intervention during the course of unduly protracted administrative hearings is contained in an analysis of Deering Milliken Inc. v. Johnston (295 F. 2d 856) which upheld a District Court injunction against the National Labor Relations Board from proceeding with certain further hearings. While recognizing that in these circumstances the court is substituting its judgment for that of the administrative tribunal, such does not appear beyond the proper scope of the judicial process. When agency procedures unduly infringe upon the rights of private citizens, such concern those broader aspects of the legal order for which the courts are primarily .responsible. (Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The Right to Relief from Unduly Protracted Hearings, 72 Yale L. J. 574, 586 [1963].)
Under the standards to be applied here, the attempt by the respondent to reschedule this hearing for the fifth time was an abuse of the hearing officer’s discretion under article 78 of the CPLR warranting judicial intervention. “ The officers of our government, from the highest to the lowest, are equally subjected to legal restraint ” (Gilchrist v. Collector of Charlestown, 10 Fed. Cases 355, 356 [1808]; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 220 [1882]).
Accordingly, the Commissioner is permanently enjoined from holding a hearing in this matter.