83 Mo. App. 633 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1900
The plaintiff is the widow of W. C. Brown. She sues on a benefit certificate issued by the defendant order on the life of her husband for the sum of two thousand
“The court declares the law to be that if it finds from the-evidence in this case that William C. Brown assaulted John Rodgers without provocation, and that during such assault he received wounds at the hands of said Rodgers, from which he died, then they must find for the plaintiff in the sum only of $585.50; and in this connection the court further declares the law to be that mere words never justify an assault.”
Under our views of the law we need not discuss the evidence as applicable to the instruction given by the court. In our opinion the evidence failed to establish any defense to the action. In the case of Harper v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506, one of the conditions of the policy was that if the insured “shall die in the known violation of a law of the state,” then the policy should be void. In interpreting this clause in the contract the court applied the maxim noscitur sociis, and held that it should be construed only to extend to instances in which the party died in the commission of a felony. That case was properly decided under the rule invoked, for in the other clauses of the contract which stipulated for the avoidance of the policy no offense below the grade of a felony was mentioned. Thus in one of the clauses .it was provided that “if the party shall die by the hands of justice,” the policy should be forfeited. If the forfeiting clauses of the policy in the case in hand were the' same the liability of the defendant under the foregoing decision would be beyond dispute, for the deceased was only guilty of striking Rodgers with his' hand, which was a misdemeanor. But the forfeiting clause here under consideration is found in company with another, which provides that if the death of Brown “shall be caused or superinduced by-the use of intoxicating liquors, etc.,” which offense is neither a felony nor misdemeanor. This renders the reasoning in the Harper case inapplicable. Being therefore free to dispose of the case according to our conceptions of the law we are inclined to adopt the reasoning of this court in the case of Wolff v. Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App. 236. Under that decision
Again, the judgment is for the right party for the further reason that BroAvn’s contract of insurance was not affected by the subsequent by-law. The new law as applicable to existing contracts of insurance is unreasonable, and hence inapplicable, for to apply it would be to materially change the contract without the consent of the insured. We have decided the identical question at this term of the court in the case of Smith against this defendant.
AVith the concurrence of the other judges the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed. It is so ordered.