EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., as Governor, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Respondent; JOHN MAYFIELD, JR., Real Party in Interest.
S.F. No. 23290
In Bank. Aug. 21, 1975.
Aug. 21, 1975.
15 Cal. 3d 52
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Iver E. Skjeie, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard D. Martland, Deputy Attorney General, for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rawles, Hinkle, Finnegan, Brigham, Carter & Petersen and Jared G. Carter for Real Party in Interest.
TOBRINER, J.-The question before us is whether the Governor may at his pleasure terminate the appointment of real party in interest, John Mayfield, as a public representative to the North Coast Regional Commission. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 (
Governor Reagan appointed Mayfield to the North Coast Regional Commission on December 31, 1972. On May 18, 1975, Governor Brown notified Mayfield that the Governor was terminating that appointment and naming a successor. Mayfield challenged that action by suit for declaratory relief and mandate, and on May 21 secured a judgment of the superior court ordering the Governor to revoke the order removing Mayfield. Observing that the work of the North Coast Regional Commission would be hampered if the status of Mayfield or his successor were uncertain, and advised that similar disputes had arisen respecting membership in other regional commissions,1 we assumed jurisdiction to resolve this controversy.
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 is an initiative measure enacted by the voters in November of 1972. The act establishes a state commission (
The North Coast Regional Commission includes the counties of Del Norte, Humboldt and Mendocino. Its membership consists of six representatives of local government-one supervisor and one city councilman from each county-and six public representatives. Public representatives are appointed “equally by the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly” (
The California Constitution of 1849, in article XI, section 7, mandated that “When the duration of any office is not provided for by this Constitution, it may be declared by law, and if not so declared, such office shall be held during the pleasure of the authority making the appointment.” The Constitution of 1879 reenacted this declaration as article XX, section 16. Although article XX, section 16, was repealed in 1972, the rule it established remains viable by codification in
Relying upon the rule enunciated in these constitutional and statutory declarations, California courts have frequently held that appointed officials without fixed terms of office can be removed by the authority which appointed them. (See Scully v. State of California (1942) 20 Cal.2d 178, 180; Brennan v. Riley (1935) 3 Cal.2d 736, 740; Sponogle v. Curnow (1902) 136 Cal. 580, 585; Patton v. Board of Health (1899) 127 Cal. 388, 399; Kenyon v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1893) 100 Cal. 454, 457; Oxley v. County of Orange (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 620, 621.)
Thus if no fixed term of office is provided by law,
As we noted previously, no express provision of the act establishes a fixed term of office for any member of a regional commission. In Boyd v. Huntington (1932) 215 Cal. 473, 479, however, we declared that “a term of office may be fixed by law, although not so stated in express terms by the statute, where such a result is properly inferred from the construction of the statute as a whole.” We direct our inquiry, therefore, to the question whether the language and objectives of the initiative act impliedly establish a fixed term of office for members of regional commissions.
Mayfield points out that a commissioner‘s term of office necessarily terminates on January 1, 1977, when the act by its terms stands repealed (
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act expires on January 1, 1977, because the commissions it creates should have completed their task of preparing a coastal zone plan before that date. (See
The Mendocino County Superior Court based its conclusion that the voters intended public members of regional commissions to serve a fixed term upon the act‘s provision for removal of local government representatives and upon the statutory objective of creating a state coastal plan. Noting that
These inferences are not logically compelling. The fact that the act provided for automatic removal of commissioners who no longer fulfil the statutory requisites for membership has little bearing on the question whether qualified commissioners are immune from removal by the person or body who appointed them. And the fact that the act does provide for automatic removal of local government representatives when their local term of office expires demonstrates that the voters did not believe total continuity of membership was essential to effective regional planning.
Mayfield finally argues that the letter appointing him to the North Coast Regional Commission stated that his term “will expire as prescribed by law;” in contrast, when he earlier served as Deputy Director of the Department of Conservation his letter of appointment said his term was “at the pleasure” of the appointing authority. The language of the letter of appointment, however, is irrelevant; the appointing authority cannot confer a right to a fixed term of office when the underlying statute creates no such term. (Scully v. State of California, supra, 20 Cal.2d 178, 180.)
In summary, we find nothing in the language or purpose of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 from which to infer that the voters intended to grant members of regional commissions a fixed term of office. Under these circumstances the language of
Wright, C. J., Mosk, J., Sullivan, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.
CLARK, J.-I dissent.
As the majority concedes, a fixed term of office may be inferred from the statute creating the appointment. (Boyd v. Huntington (1932) 215 Cal. 473, 479.) The history, purpose, and language of the Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 clearly show that the public commissioners serve for the brief term of the act rather than for the shorter-termed pleasure of the sovereign.
The people could have chosen “to establish a commission composed of politically responsive members subject to removal by elected officials.” (Ante, at p. 56.) But the citizenry was understandably reluctant to entrust this planning project to their elected representatives, inasmuch as similar legislation repeatedly had failed to make safe passage through the legislative rapids. (Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Election (Nov. 7, 1972) p. 53.) Consequently, the act provided that fully half the commission‘s members come from outside government, that three agencies equally appoint them, and that the Senate confirm the Governor‘s nominees. Although those serving must be “exceptionally well qualified to analyze and interpret environmental trends and information, to appraise resource uses in light of the policies [of the act], [and] to be responsive to the scientific, social, esthetic, recreational, and cultural needs of the state” (
Manifestly neither the proponents of the initiative nor the people adopting it wanted the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, or the Speaker of the Assembly to control the commission‘s important work.1 The commission‘s public members were intended to be both highly
In Humphrey‘s Executor v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 602, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question whether the President had the authority to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission at his whim. The court rejected the contention, enunciating the principles which are controlling here: “The Commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.... [T]he language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation . . . all combine to demonstrate the congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of service-a body which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government.” (Id., at pp. 624, 625-626, original italics.)
Were our new commissioners only to implement an established policy, the majority holding would be unfortunate enough, since it necessarily imports that all 45 public members serve merely at the pleasure of those appointing them. But since the commissioners themselves must formulate future policy, the possibility of their wholesale replacement without notice or cause becomes even more disturbing. By transforming the apolitical into the political, this court creates an ominous potential for mischief.
McComb, J., concurred.