71 Ind. 470 | Ind. | 1880
The appellant, together with Louisa Parrott and Joseph Greer, was indicted in the court below, for the murder of Joseph W. Brown.
The appellant, Willard Brown, was put separately upon trial, and convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to imprisonment in the state-prison for the period of fourteen years. Motion for a new trial; judgment and exception.
It appears by a hill of exceptions, that on the trial of the cause the State introduced as a witness one John Howard. The bill of exceptions sets out as follows : “ ‘ The prisoner, sitting at the table there, is Willard Brown.
The same point is reserved in reference to the testimony of other witnesses.
It is provided by statute, that “ The confession of a defendant made under inducement with all the circumstances may be given in evidence against him, except when made under the influence of fear produced by threats ; but a confession made under inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction, without corroborating testimony.” 2 R. S. 1876, p. 896, sec. 98.
Under this statute, confessions made under inducement may be divided into two classes, the first embracing all those made under inducement, except those made under the influence of fear produced by threats; and the second all those made under the influence of fear produced by threats. Confessions of the first class may be given in evidence, with all the ■ circumstances. Those of the second class are not competent to be given in evidence at all. It is with confessions of the second class that we have to deal in this ease. It is a general if not a universal rule of the law, that it is for the court to determine the competency of evidence. And the competency should be determined before the evidence goes to the jury, because, if incompetent, it should not go to the jury at all. When the competency of evidence depends upon extrinsic facts, as in this case upon the question whether the confessions were made under the influence of fear produced by threats, how can the court determine the question of competency without hearing the evidence offered on that subject? Doubtless, confessions of the defendant are prima facie competent; but when objection is made b}r the defendant to their competency, and evidence is offered by him.in support of the objection, the court can not determine the question without hearing the evidence; nor
A recent case in Massachusetts is exactly in point. Commonwealth v. Culver, 126 Mass. 464. There, on the trial of the defendants, on a charge of shop-breaking with intent to steal, the government offered to prove confessions made by the defendants, who objected to their admission on the ground that they were made in consequence of offers of favor made to the defendants by the officer who arrested them and had them in custody; that these offers were carried ' to the defendants by request of the officer before the confessions were made, and that the confessions were induced by the offer.
At the suggestion of the judge, the government called as a witness the officer who made the arrest, who denied having made the offers mentioned. The defendants then offered to call five different witnesses to prove the truth of their claim, and asked the judge to hear them, and first to determine whether the confessions ought to be received. The judge declined to admit the evidence at that stage of the case, but admitted the confessions. Oonviction.
The court said: “ We are aware that it is not an uncommon practice in the trial of criminal causes, when confessions of a defendant are offered in evidence, and objected to upon the-ground that they were improperly obtained, for the presiding judge to allow the confessions, and all the evidence bearing upon the manner in which they were obtained, to be submitted to the jury, either to be rejected by the jury wholly, or to be allowed such
There is also another recent case exactly in point in principle. The State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 486; S. C., 2 Am. Crim. Rep. 322. There, the defendant was on trial for the murder of John "W. Bold. The State introduced á surgeon who had been called to attend Bold. The witness testified as to Bold’s condition and his belief that his dissolution was approaching. The witness was then asked to state what Bold said in regard to who shot him, or who inflicted the wound on him. The defendant objected and then offered to prove to the court by competent testimony, that at the time of making the declaration the deceased did not believe that he was about to die, but expected to
It may be gathei’ed from the case of Bartlett v. Smith, 11 M. & W. 488, that, in all cases, whether civil or criminal, where objection is made to the competency of evidence offered, and the question depends upon facts that may be proved or disproved, it is the duty of the court to hear all proper evidence offered on either side touching the question of competency, before letting the challenged evidence go to the jury; and that it is error to do otherwise. See, also, Regina v. Garner, 2 C. & K. 920, and note.
Another point made by the appellant relates to the admission of parol evidence of what he testified to before the coroner upon an inquest held upon the body of the deceased. It appears by a bill of exceptions, that the State offered in evidence the record of the testimony taken before the coroner; but this was properly rejected, at the instance of the appellant, because the testimony of the witnesses had not been signed by them as required by
The appellant has discussed some other questions in the cause, but, as they may not arise upon another trial, we pass them. The judgment will have to be reversed on the ground already stated.
The judgment below is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
The clerk will give the proper notice for the return of the prisoner.