Danny Brown v. State of Ohio
Court of Appeals No. L-18-1044
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
October 25, 2019
[Cite as Brown v. State, 2019-Ohio-4376.]
MAYLE, P.J.
Trial Court No. CI0201501714; Appellant/Cross-Appellee: Danny Brown; Appellee/Cross-Appellant: State of Ohio
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: October 25, 2019
Patrick M. Quinn, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Thomas E. Madden, Assistant Attorney General, Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
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MAYLE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant/cross-appellee, Danny Brown, appeals the February 9, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to appellee/cross-appellant, the state of Ohio, and dismissing Brown‘s complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background and Facts
{¶ 2} In 1982, Brown was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life in prison. In 2000, DNA testing of semen found in the victim‘s body definitively excluded Brown as the source of the semen. Based on this evidence, Brown moved for a new trial, which the trial court granted. In response, the state moved to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court also granted. Consequently, in 2001, Brown was released from prison.
{¶ 3} In 2002, following his release from prison, Brown filed a complaint in the trial court (the “2002 case“) seeking a declaration under
{¶ 4} Brown appealed the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment in the 2002 case, and we affirmed. Brown v. State, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1050, 2006-Ohio-1393 (”Brown I“). In Brown I, we noted that, in its motion for summary judgment, the state presented evidence that Brown was still a suspect in the victim‘s murder and that Brown had failed to
{¶ 5} In 2003, while the 2002 case was pending, the legislature amended the definition of “wrongfully imprisoned individual” to apply when “subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release * * *” from prison. Former
{¶ 6} Over a decade later, in 2015, Brown filed the complaint underlying this appeal (the “2015 case“), in which he once again sought to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual. This time, he alleged both that he did not commit the murder and that an error in procedure resulted in his release from prison. The state again moved for summary judgment, this time arguing that (1) res judicata barred Brown‘s claims; (2) he could not show that criminal charges could not or would not be brought related to the murder, as required to satisfy
{¶ 7} Following a hearing, the trial court, on February 9, 2018, granted the state‘s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. In doing so, the trial court found that res judicata barred Brown‘s claim based on actual innocence. The court noted that Brown conceded that the 2015 case and the 2002 case involved the same parties and arose from the same transaction or occurrence. Then, without directly addressing Brown‘s jurisdictional argument, the court determined that the judgment in the 2002 case was a valid, final judgment on the merits, and that res judicata applied to Brown‘s claims because the alleged change in circumstances was not the type that permits a party to avoid application of res judicata. The court went on to determine that Brown‘s actual-innocence claim had been litigated in the 2002 case, so it was barred by res judicata. However, the trial court found, because the error-in-procedure portion of
{¶ 8} Brown appeals the trial court‘s decision, raising one assignment of error:
The trial court erred in finding Appellant‘s actual innocence claim barred by res judicata because the dismissal of his prior action was based upon grounds demonstrating a want of subject matter jurisdiction. (Italics sic.)
{¶ 9} The state filed a cross-appeal, also raising one assignment of error:
The trial court erred in refusing to apply res judicata to bar Appellant‘s error-in-procedure claim.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 10} In his assignment of error, Brown argues that res judicata did not bar his wrongful imprisonment claim based on actual innocence. He claims that the trial court in the 2002 case did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the version of
{¶ 11} The state counters that the trial court in the 2002 case had jurisdiction to decide Brown‘s case because the requirements of
{¶ 12} In its cross-appeal, the state contends that, rather than being barred by the statute of limitations, Brown‘s wrongful-imprisonment claim based on an error in procedure is barred by res judicata. The state argues that Brown could have amended his 2002 complaint to include an error-in-procedure claim when
{¶ 13} Because the assignments of error both relate to the trial court‘s application of the doctrine of res judicata, we address them together.
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 14} We review summary judgment de novo, employing the same standard as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). A court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the moving party demonstrates:
(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978); Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶ 15} The party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate
B. Wrongful Imprisonment
{¶ 16} Ohio has a two-step process that allows a person claiming that he was wrongfully imprisoned to sue the state for damages.
{¶ 17} When Brown filed this case in 2015,
{¶ 18} In addition, when Brown filed this case in 2015, the first step of a wrongful imprisonment claim—i.e., seeking a factual determination from the common pleas court that the person was a “wrongfully imprisoned individual,” as defined by
{¶ 19} The version of
C. Res Judicata
{¶ 20} Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), syllabus. Application of res judicata requires four things: “(1) there was a prior valid judgment on the merits; (2) the second action involved the same parties as the first action; (3) the present action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) both actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” Reasoner v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-800, 2005-Ohio-468, ¶ 5.
{¶ 21} Here, the parties agree that this action involves the same parties and arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the 2002 case. Thus, to determine whether res judicata applied to Brown‘s claims in the 2015 case, we must determine whether the judgment in the 2002 case was valid and whether the claims were or could have been litigated in the 2002 case.
1. Prior Valid Judgment
{¶ 22} Brown argues that the judgment in the 2002 case was not valid because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
{¶ 23} Brown claims that the wording of
{¶ 24} The state responds that Brown‘s interpretation of
{¶ 25} We agree that Brown‘s argument conflates the separate, legally-distinct concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction and standing.
{¶ 26} Subject-matter jurisdiction is “‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.‘” (Emphasis added.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11, quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). It is determined without regard to the rights of the parties involved in the case. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. A judgment entered without subject-matter
{¶ 27} Courts of common pleas in Ohio have “original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” Article IV, Section 4(B),
{¶ 28} Standing, on the other hand, “is defined at its most basic as ‘[a] party‘s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.‘” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1442. And, while standing is jurisdictional in the sense that lack of standing is “certainly a fundamental flaw that would require a court to dismiss the action * * *” and would subject a decision to reversal on appeal, “a particular party‘s standing, or lack thereof, does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court * * *.” Kuchta at ¶ 23. This is because standing implicates a court‘s jurisdiction over a particular case. Id. at ¶ 22. A court‘s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court‘s ability to rule on a given case that is within the court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction. Pratts at ¶ 12. Determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular case requires consideration of the rights of the parties. Kuchta at ¶ 19. “If a court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the invocation or exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case causes a judgment to be voidable rather than void.” Id., citing Pratts at ¶ 12. Moreover, “lack of standing is an issue that is cognizable on appeal, and therefore it cannot be used to collaterally attack a judgment.” Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶ 29} The wording of former
{¶ 30} We also note that the 2012 amendment to
{¶ 31} Because the “individual who satisfies” requirement in former
2. Claims Were or Could Have Been Litigated
{¶ 32} In its cross-appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred by failing to find that Brown‘s error-in-procedure claim was barred by res judicata because the error-in-procedure claim could have been litigated in the 2002 case. We agree.
{¶ 33} Res judicata encompasses two related concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. O‘Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 6. Claim preclusion is the only concept relevant here. Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions by the same parties based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action. Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 692 N.E.2d 140 (1998). “Where a claim could have been litigated in the previous suit, claim preclusion also bars subsequent actions on that matter.” (Emphasis added.) O‘Nesti at ¶ 6, citing Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 382, 653 N.E.2d 226. Put another way, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.” Grava at 382, quoting Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990).
{¶ 34} While the 2002 case was pending,
{¶ 35} Here, Brown‘s 2002 action was pending at the time that the error-in-procedure amendment went into effect. Even so, he did not attempt to amend his
D. Res Judicata Bars Brown‘s Claims in this Case
{¶ 36} Having determined that all four elements of res judicata—i.e., a prior valid judgment on the merits, the same parties, the same underlying transaction or occurrence, and claims that were or could have been raised in the prior action—are present in this case, we conclude that Brown‘s wrongful-imprisonment claim is barred by res judicata and the trial court properly dismissed the case.
{¶ 37} Despite the apparent applicability of res judicata, Brown argues that he should be allowed to go forward with his wrongful-imprisonment claim because “[f]airness and justice would not support imparting the dismissal of the prior action with binding effect here.” We disagree.
{¶ 38} Although it is true that, in some limited circumstances, courts have held that res judicata does not apply to bar subsequent actions, see, e.g., Builders Dev. Group, LLC v. Smith, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23846, 2010-Ohio-4151 (res judicata did not apply when LLC member mistakenly brought LLC‘s claims in his own name and trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, thus precluding the LLC from refiling in its own name), it is equally true that “[a]bsent changed circumstances, refusing to allow [a plaintiff] to use an alternate legal theory overlooked in the previous proceedings does not work an injustice.” Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 383, 653 N.E.2d 226. “Changed circumstances” exist when “a change in the facts * * * raises a new material issue, or * * * would have been relevant to the resolution of a material issue involved in the earlier action * * *.” State ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon, 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 45, 399 N.E.2d 81 (1980).
{¶ 39} Here, Brown has not pointed to any changed circumstances or another “injustice” that would allow us to disregard the application of res judicata to his 2015 wrongful-imprisonment claim. Put succinctly, “[t]here is no injustice in requiring a plaintiff to ‘avail himself of all available grounds for relief in the first proceeding.‘” McCory v. Clements, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19043, 2002 WL 857721, *4 (Apr. 26, 2002), quoting Grava at 383.
{¶ 40} In sum, because we find that the 2002 judgment was a valid, final judgment, we conclude that Brown‘s 2015 actual-innocence claim is barred by res judicata. The trial court did not err in finding that res judicata applied, and, therefore, Brown‘s assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 41} Additionally, because Brown could have raised the error-in-procedure claim in the 2002 case, but did not, we agree with the state that the trial court erred by finding that res judicata did not bar the 2015 error-in-procedure claim. Regardless, an appellate court only has jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse lower court judgments that are based on the lower court‘s commission of prejudicial errors.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, the February 9, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. The parties are ordered to divide the costs of this appeal equally pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.