OPINION
Opinion By
Kenneth Mark Brown appeals his conviction for capital murder. After the jury found appellant guilty, the trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant brings six points of error contending the evidence is legally insufficient and that the trial court erred by: (a) admitting appellant’s oral statement; (b) overruling appellant’s motions for mistrial; and (c) incorrectly charging the jury. We affirm appellant’s conviction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March 2000, appellant was separated from his wife, Katrina, who had custody of their young daughter, Courtney. Appellant knew Katrina was dating a fireman, Theron Gray, and that she was pregnant with Gray’s child. On March 28, 2000, after work, appellant and some friends from work went to a strip club. After hearing that bad weather was ravaging the Dallas/Fort Worth area, including a tornado in Fort Worth, the men called home to see that their families were safe. Appellant called Katrina and learned that Gray was in her apartment with her. When appellant returned to the table, he told his friends that he thought someone was at his wife’s house, and he said, “I can’t believe this, it sucks, this is B.S.” After a period of time, appellant said goodbye to his friends and left the club.
Appellant went to his apartment, opened the door so violently that he damaged it, and went to his bedroom without saying a word to his roommate, Chris Morrow. After a few minutes, appellant left without speaking to Morrow. Morrow went to appellant’s room and noticed that appellant’s gun was missing. Morrow telephoned appellant’s father, and they decided they should go to Katrina’s apartment and tell her about appellant. Morrow got to Katrina’s apartment about an hour after appellant had left his apartment. Morrow asked Katrina if appellant was there, and she told him he was not there. She told *659 Morrow she was all right, and she would not allow him into her apartment. Morrow did not think appellant would actually use the gun, so he left without warning Katrina that appellant might be armed.
Meanwhile, appellant had crashed his vehicle on the way to Katrina’s apartment. He abandoned the vehicle and began walking down the highway. A passing motorist, William Orender, stopped and gave appellant a ride to a gas station near Katrina’s apartment. Orender testified appellant seemed preoccupied during the trip but that he was very calm and not upset. Appellant arrived at Katrina’s door a few minutes after Morrow had left. Appellant knocked on Katrina’s door. Katrina thought Morrow had returned, and she opened the door slightly to tell him to go away. When she opened the door, appellant put his arm and leg in the doorway and tried to force his way in. Katrina screamed for help, and Gray came to the door and helped her try to prevent appellant from entering. Appellant said, “Are you ready to die?” and Katrina ran upstairs to call the police, leaving Gray to push the door closed. As she ran up the stairs, she heard a gunshot and saw Gray fall to the floor. Appellant’s shot went through the door and then passed through Gray’s head, rendering him immediately unconscious and quickly killing him.
Katrina’s neighbor, Chris Daigle, heard the gunshot and then heard appellant say, “How does it feel to know you’re about to die?” After appellant fired the gunshot through the door, Katrina called 911, and she heard two more gunshots. The telephone line went dead, and she saw appellant standing over her with the telephone cord pulled out of the wall. Katrina ran downstairs to check on Gray and saw that he was still breathing but that blood was coming from his nose and mouth. Appellant ordered Katrina upstairs and yelled at her, asking her why she chose Gray over him and why she could not love him. Appellant looked down the stairs at Gray’s body lying by the door and yelled at him, “You’re not going to raise my daughter, you fucking ... shit hole.” Appellant told Katrina he was going to kill himself, he put the gun in his mouth, and he pulled the trigger twice; however, the gun did not fire. Appellant said, “Oh, shit,” and he started to unload the gun. Katrina went into Courtney’s bedroom, opened the window, pushed out the screen, and lowered Courtney and herself to the policemen standing below the window.
A few minutes later, the officer stationed at the front door of the apartment saw the door open a few inches and appellant standing in the doorway. The officer shouted for appellant to show his hands, and appellant put his hands and arms, holding the gun in his right hand, out the door. The officer had to shout several times to drop the gun before appellant complied and threw the gun out the door. Appellant came outside and was taken into custody. As the police handcuffed him, he told them, “I’m not going to hurt you guys. I’ve already killed everyone I wanted to kill.”
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sixth point of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because, appellant argues, when the State alleges capital murder in the course of committing burglary, the State may not use the same murder as the felony supporting the burglary and the charged murder. The court of criminal appeals has rejected this argument, and this Court is bound by the court of criminal appeals’ holding.
See Homan v. State,
ORAL STATEMENT
In Ms first point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admission of appellant’s statement to the officers that he had killed everyone he wanted to kill. In
Guzman v. State,
Appellant objected to admission of his statement to the officers because it was unrecorded, it was a product of custodial interrogation, and it was made before appellant had received the mandatory admonishments. See Tex.Code CRiM. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2003). The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the statement. Lieutenant Harry Manmng testified he was patting down appellant when appellant made the statement and that the statement was not in response to a question. Officer Michael Glisch testified appellant made the statement in response to Manning’s question, “Do you have anything in your pockets?” After originally sustaining appellant’s objection to the admissibility of the statement, the trial court later changed its ruling and overruled appellant’s objection.
Article 38.22, section 3(a) prohibits the admission of oral statements by a defendant unless (1) a visual recording is made of appellant making the statement; (2) the defendant is given the
Miranda
warnings; (3) the recording equipment is operating, the operator is competent, and the recording is accurate and has not been altered; and (4) all material voices are identified.
Id.
Article 38.22, section 5 permits the admission of an unrecorded oral statement by the defendant when the statement “is the res gestae of the arrest.”
Id.
art. 38.22, § 5 (Vernon 1979). Clearly, appellant’s statement, as he was lying on the ground being handcuffed and searched, was res gestae of his arrest.
Bryant v. State,
We conclude the trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s objection to the admission of this statement. We overrule appellant’s first point of error.
THOMAS GRAY’S STATEMENT
In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. Thomas Gray, Theron Gray’s father, was the last witness to testify. After Thomas Gray had answered the prosecutor’s last question, the following occurred:
[Prosecutor]: Thank you, Mr. Gray. We’re going to go ahead and pass this witness, Your Honor.
[Defense Counsel]: No questions.
The Court: Thank you, sir.
The Witness: Give my son justice, please.
[Defense Counsel]: I object to the—
The Court: Mr. Gray, unfortunately, that’s out of line. All right, call your next witness.
[Defense Counsel]: I’ll ask the jury be instructed] to disregard.
The Court: The jury will disregard.
[Defense Counsel]: Move for a mistrial.
The Court: Overruled.
Appellant presented evidence that Thomas Gray, also a firefighter, wore his dress fireman’s uniform when he testified and that he cried and sobbed during his testimony. He made the statement, “Give my son justice, please,” while looking at the jury, and it was “a forceful statement.”
Appellant never stated the grounds for either his original objection or for his motion for mistrial. Therefore, appellant has not preserved any error from the denial of the motion for mistrial for our review. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1). However, in the interest of justice, we consider appellant’s arguments on appeal.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard.
See Ladd v. State,
Appellant argues that this case is similar to that in Stahl v. State. In that case, a murder trial, a mother had to identify her dead son from a morgue photograph. Id. at 828. Before she testified, the trial court admonished her not to show any emotion when identifying her son. She told the trial court she would try not to show emotion, but “I can’t say what’s going to happen.” Id. While testifying, the prosecutor asked her to identify the person depicted in an exhibit, and she *662 cried out, “Oh, my God. My baby. My God.” Id. The defense attorney asked to have the jury removed, but before the jury left the courtroom, the woman said, “May he rest in hell. May he burn in hell. Oh, my baby.” Id. During the hearing following the witness’s outburst, it became apparent the prosecutor expected the witness to have some type of emotional response in front of the jury. Id. at 829-30. The court of criminal appeals noted that during jury argument, the prosecutor “sought to exacerbate its impact on the jury.” Id. at 830. The court of criminal appeals held that the witness’s outburst, together with the prosecutorial misconduct, was harmful error and warranted a new trial. Id. at 831.
The facts of this case are not analogous to those in Stahl. In this case, the improper statement was not in response to a question from the prosecutor but occurred after the witness had been excused from the witness stand. Although the witness was crying during his testimony, he answered the questions appropriately, and appellant’s only objection to his testimony was that one of the answers was in narrative form. Unlike the prosecutor in Stahl, nothing in the record shows the prosecutor in this case expected the witness to make the improper statement after the witness was excused from the witness stand. The witness’s improper statement, “Give my son justice, please,” although forceful, was not the powerful personal attack on the defendant like that of the mother in Stahl, “May he burn in hell.” Id. at 828. Finally, unlike the prosecutor in Stahl, the prosecutor in this case did not seek “to exacerbate its impact on the jury.” Id. at 830. We conclude Stahl is distinguishable from this case and does not show the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial.
Appellant argues Thomas Gray’s testimony was unnecessary to the State’s case. Appellant never objected at trial to the testimony on this ground. Even if any error were preserved, the relevance of the testimony does not affect the issue before us: whether Thomas Gray’s statement after the completion of his testimony “interfered with the jury’s verdict.”
Id.
at 829 (quoting
Landry,
Appellant also argues the trial court’s instruction to disregard was too perfunctory to cure the harm from Thomas Gray’s inappropriate statement. We disagree. The trial court’s instruction to disregard was immediate and instructed the jury to disregard. Appellant did not request any further instruction to the jury. We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instruction to disregard.
Wesbrook v. State,
Appellant also argues the trial court’s use of the word “unfortunately” in reprimanding Thomas Gray compounded the harm by suggesting the court believed the law should permit a parent of the deceased to make a personal plea to the jury for justice. Even assuming counsel’s interpretation of the trial court’s use of the word “unfortunately” were correct, appellant would have had to object to the trial court’s comment to preserve error for our review.
See Blue v. State,
After reviewing the record, we conclude the record does not show Thomas Gray’s statement to the jury asking for justice for his son affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we hold appellant has not preserved any error for review, and, even if any error were preserved, appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. We overrule appellant’s second point of error.
JURY CHARGE
In his third point of error, appellant contends the trial court commented on the weight of the evidence by instructing the jury that it could infer appellant’s intent from his acts done and words spoken. In
Cain v. State,
In
Browning v. State,
The jury was instructed that though they were not bound to so find, they could find appellant’s intent to commit theft by finding only that he had entered the home at night, a fact appellant did not dispute. The jury was instructed, in other words, that they could ignore appellant’s defensive evidence altogether. In giving such an instruction the trial court improperly commented on the weight to be given each party’s evidence.
Id.
at 507-08. One month later, in
Mercado v. State,
In
Peterson v. State,
the Texarkana court considered whether the jury instruction, “Knowledge, or lack of knowledge, may be inferred from the facts and circumstances,” constituted a comment on the weight of the evidence. The Texarkana court discussed
Browning
and noted that in
Garcia,
the court of criminal appeals had assumed the instruction in
Garcia
was error.
Peterson,
In
Lam v. State,
the trial court instructed the jury “that intent may be inferred from acts done, if any, or words spoken, if any.”
Lam,
In
Ward v. State,
the trial court instructed the jury, “A person’s mental state may be inferred from words spoken and acts done.”
Ward,
Thus, while the court of criminal appeals has not held that the precise instruction challenged in the case now before us constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence, we nevertheless find that it is sufficiently similar to the language that the court has held to be erroneous to cause concern. Taken in the context in which it was given, the instruction improperly tells the jury how to consider certain evidence before it. While it is indeed permissible for a jury to infer mental culpability from an accused’s acts, words, and conduct, the trial court may not instruct the jury that it may apply such an inference.
Id. at 418.
We respectfully disagree with these three courts of appeals that an instruction to the jurors that they may infer a defendant’s intent from his acts done and words spoken comments on the weight of the evidence. These three courts rely on
Browning
and its progeny, and the Texar-kana and San Antonio courts also rely on
Garcia.
As the Fort Worth court observed, the court of criminal appeals in
Garcia
did not hold, expressly or implicitly, that such an instruction comments on the weight of the evidence.
See Ward,
*665
The instructions in
Browning
and
Mercado,
that the jury may presume intent to commit theft from breaking and entering a building at nighttime, or it may presume intent to kill from use of a deadly weapon, were comments on the weight of the evidence because they instructed the jurors that if they found a specific set of facts, they could presume the State had met its burden of proof as to one of the elements regardless of the rest of the evidence.
See Browning,
We hold the trial court did not err in instructing the jurors that they could infer appellant’s intent from his acts done and words spoken. We overrule appellant’s third point of error.
JURY ARGUMENT
In his fourth point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying a mistrial after the prosecutor commented on appellant’s failure to testify. The defendant’s state and federal constitutional and statutory right not to be a witness against himself prohibits the State from commenting on the defendant’s failure to testify.
See
U.S. Const, amend. Y; Tex. Const, art. I, § 10; Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1979);
Montoya v. State,
During the prosecutor’s jury argument, the following occurred:
[Prosecutor]: Murder is defined ... as, “intentionally or knowingly causes the *666 death of an individual.” There is no disputing here that this man, Kenneth Mark Brown, intentionally caused the death of an individual, specifically, Theron Gray, the victim in this case.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, object to [sic] as being a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.
The Court: Well, the jury’s been instructed on that already. Just don’t make any comment about that.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, could we have a ruling on my objection, please?
The Court: I’ll sustain the objection as to not making any more references to it.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, ask for an instruction to disregard the last statement.
The Court: The jury will disregard the last statement.
[Defense Counsel]: Ask for a mistrial. The Court: Overruled.
Appellant argues the prosecutor’s argument, “there is no disputing ... Brown intentionally caused the death of ... Theron Gray,” commented on appellant’s failure to testify because it asserted appellant’s intent was undisputed and appellant was the only person who could counter the State’s evidence of his intent. 2
Appellant cites four cases in which prosecutors’ statements that evidence was undisputed were held to be comments on the appellants’ failure to testify.
See United States v. Cotnam,
Unlike the cases cited by appellant, the prosecutor’s argument in this
*667
case did not draw the jury’s attention to an absence of evidence that could have been supplied only by the defendant. It is true that only appellant could have offered direct evidence of his intent, but this is the case in every criminal prosecution. Only the defendant knows for certain what is in his own mind. As a result, our system relies routinely upon circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s intent.
See e.g.,' Maldonado v. State,
In this case, many witnesses testified about appellant’s words and actions from the time he learned Gray was at Katrina’s apartment until the time he was taken into custody. All of this testimony is evidence of appellant’s intent. Indeed, appellant’s intent to kill Gray was evidenced by his shouting, “Are you ready to die,” and shooting through the door knowing Gray was on the other side of the door trying to push it closed. Appellant’s intent was also evidenced by his saying to Gray, “How does it feel to know you’re going to die,” shooting Gray two more times, and telling the arresting officer he had killed everyone he wanted to kill. The prosecutor’s argument that there “is no disputing” appellant intentionally killed Gray was a reasonable deduction from the testimony of appellant’s co-workers, Morrow, Oren-der, Daigle, Katrina, Manning, and Glisch about appellant’s words and actions. Viewing the argument from the jury’s perspective, we conclude the argument drew the jury’s attention to the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s intent to kill Gray and not to an absence of evidence that only appellant could have supplied. Thus, from the jury’s perspective, the objected-to argument was not manifestly intended or of such a character that the jury would necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on appellant’s failure to testify.
Moreover, the unusual posture of the defense in this ease also supports the conclusion that the objected-to argument was not an inappropriate comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. Throughout the trial, appellant’s counsel’s efforts were directed toward obtaining a verdict of murder as opposed to capital murder for appellant. Appellant’s counsel made potential jurors aware in voir dire that to find appellant guilty of capital murder, they had to find appellant had the specific intent to kill Gray. 4 Similarly, during the opening statement, appellant’s counsel conceded, “there will be no question” appellant fired the shot that killed Gray. However, appellant’s counsel closed his opening statement by stating, “Nowhere is it legally going to be proven by the State that a capital murder occurred,” ie., there will be no evidence appellant specifically intended to kill Gray. During closing argument, appellant’s counsel summarized the evidence during the trial and argued, “No specific intent to kill.... And that’s what makes this case murder as opposed to capital murder.” When the prosecutor recited the definition of murder and then echoed its language in her argument that “[t]here is no disputing here that this man, Kenneth Mark Brown, intentionally caused the death of an individual, specifically, Theron Gray, the victim in this case,” she was making reasonable deductions from the ev *668 idence that appellant’s counsel had made a number of times. Read in the context of the trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s statement was not intended to comment on appellant’s failure to testify any more than appellant’s counsel’s own statements commented on appellant’s failure to testify. 5
We conclude the prosecutor’s argument was not a comment on appellant’s failure to testify. Accordingly, we hold appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial.
However, even if the argument were a comment on appellant’s failure to testify, we would still conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial because the trial court’s prompt instruction to disregard cured any error. As the court of criminal appeals has stated, “the ... presumption that an instruction [to disregard] generally will not cure [a] comment on [the] failure of the accused to testify ... has been eroded to the point that it applies only to the most blatant examples. Otherwise, the Court has tended to find the instruction to have force.”
Moore v. State,
In determining whether the State’s jury argument contributed to appellant’s conviction, we review the entire record in a neutral light and not in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Hernandez v. State,
The jurors were aware that appellant had not testified. In addition, the trial court read them the jury charge before arguments began. Included in the jury charge was the following instruction:
Our law provides that a defendant may testify in his own behalf if he elects to do so. This, however, is a privilege accorded a defendant, and, in the event he elects not to testify, that fact cannot *669 be taken as a circumstance against him. In this case, the defendant has elected not to testify, and you are instructed that you cannot and must not refer or allude to that fact throughout your deliberations or take it into consideration for any purpose whatsoever as a circumstance against the defendant.
(Emphasis added.) After sustaining appellant’s objection to the argument, the trial court instructed the jurors to disregard the prosecutor’s statement. 6 “This Court has faith in the jury’s ability to recognize, upon instruction, the potential for prejudice and to discount any prejudice during deliberations.” Carrillo, 821 5.W.2d at 699. 7
The prosecutor’s statement also concerned the state of the evidence of appellant’s intent to kill Gray. The evidence of appellant’s intent to kill Gray was -overwhelming. Although appellant could not see Gray when he fired the fatal shot, he knew precisely where Gray was because he knew Gray was behind the door and he knew Gray was trying to push the door closed. Just before firing the fatal shot, appellant said, “Are you ready to die.” When he was being handcuffed, he told the officers he had already killed everyone he wanted to kill. Thus, the jury had appellant’s own statements at the time of the offense clearly showing his intent to kill Gray. No evidence, direct or circumstantial, indicates appellant did not intend to kill Gray when he fired the fatal shot.
Having reviewed the entire record, including the effect of the trial court’s instructions in the charge and the court’s instruction to disregard the prosecutor’s erroneous argument, as well as the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s intent, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s objected-to argument did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. We overrule appellant’s fourth point of error.
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS
In his fifth point of error, appellant contends “the cumulative effect of the errors committed requires a new trial.” Appellant’s point of error is premised on our finding the trial court erred under his previous points of error. However, as discussed above, the trial court did not err. Accordingly, appellant’s argument lacks merit. We overrule appellant’s fifth point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. At the outset, we note that appellant’s objection at trial was not nearly as specific as his complaint on appeal. Appellee has not raised this concern, and the trial court did sustain the objection (at least "as to not making any more references to it”), so we resolve this issue on substantive grounds. However, we note our concern with the lack of specificity of the trial objection.
. Appellant also cites
Norton v. State,
. Counsel spoke to the panel "hypothetically” about a defendant who fired through a door when explaining to them the requirement of specific intent to commit a crime.
. We note that the prosecutor did not read the definition of felony murder to the jury, which would have been more appropriate in this instance. However, appellant did not object to that portion of the closing argument.
. Additionally, the jurors were told during voir dire they could not consider the defendant’s failure to testify against him, and they indicated by their silence they could follow that proposition of law.
. In
Carrillo,
this Court reversed appellant’s conviction because, during jury argument, the prosecutor commented on the defendant’s failure to testify. Although the trial court instructed the jurors to disregard the argument, we did not discuss the effect of the instruction on the error or conduct a harmless error analysis.
See Carrillo,