*1138SUMMARY
In 1890, the California Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a "vaccination act" that required schools to exclude any child who had not been vaccinated against small-pox. ( Abeel v. Clark (1890)
More than 125 years have passed since Abeel , during which many federal and state cases, beginning with the high court's decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905)
We affirm the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' challenge to an amendment to California law that eliminated the previously existing "personal beliefs" exemption from mandatory immunization requirements for school children.
FACTS
Plaintiffs Sharon Brown, Sarah Lucas, Dawnielle Selden, Serge Eustache, Tricia Eustache, and Nikki Jencen filed this lawsuit, seeking to invalidate *1139amendments to California's public health laws governing immunization requirements against childhood diseases. These legislative changes were made by Senate Bill No. 277, approved by the Governor on June 30, 2015, effective January 1, 2016. (Stats. 2015, ch. 35.)
Senate Bill No. 277 eliminated the personal beliefs exemption from the requirement that children receive vaccines for specified infectious diseases before being admitted to any public or private elementary or secondary school, day care center *221or the like.
The legislative history of Senate Bill No. 277 includes an extensive analysis of the bill, the reasons the authors gave for proposing the bill, the diseases that vaccines prevent and their health risks to children, the legal considerations, and the support for and opposition to the bill. (E.g., Assem. Com. on Health, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 277 (2015-2016 *1140Reg. Sess.) as amended May 7, 2015, pp. 1-16; id. at p. 4 ["All of the diseases for which California requires school vaccinations are very serious conditions that pose very real health risks to children."].)
Among many other things, the report from the Assembly Committee on Health discusses the protective effect of community immunity, which "wanes as large numbers of children do not receive some or all of the required vaccinations, resulting in the reemergence of vaccine preventable diseases in the U.S." (Assem. Com. on Health, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 277, supra , p. 5.) The report explains that the vaccination rate in various communities "varies widely across the state," and some areas "become more susceptible to an outbreak than the state's overall vaccination levels may suggest," making it "difficult to control the spread of disease and mak[ing] us vulnerable to having the virus re-establish itself." (Ibid .) Further, studies have found that "when belief exemptions to vaccination guidelines are permitted, vaccination rates decrease," and one analysis "found that more than a quarter of schools in California have measles-immunization *222rates below the 92-94% recommended by the CDC [ (Center for Disease Control) ]." (Ibid. ) The report describes the December 2014 outbreak of measles linked to Disneyland (131 confirmed cases); states that according to the CDC, "measles is one of the first diseases to reappear when vaccination coverage rates fall"; and states that in 2014, 600 cases were reported to the CDC, the highest in many years. (Ibid .)
As indicated above, Senate Bill No. 277 was approved in June 2015 and became effective January 1, 2016. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 22, 2016. The operative second amended complaint sought to "halt enforcement" of Senate Bill No. 277. The complaint alleged Senate Bill No. 277 violated four provisions of the California Constitution: the free exercise of religion (art. I, § 4); the right to attend school (art. IX, § 5); equal protection (art. I, § 7) (alleging "discrimination based on vaccination status"); and due process (art. I, § 7) (alleging Senate Bill No. 277 was "void for vagueness"). The complaint also alleged a violation of section 24175, subdivision (a) (requiring informed consent for medical experiments).
The complaint described the plaintiffs, all of whom are parents with "sincerely held philosophic, conscientious, and religious objections to state-mandated immunization." (Italics omitted.) The defendant named in the operative complaint is Karen Smith, sued in her capacity as director of the California Department of Public Health. The 38-page complaint consists principally of argument, alleging, for example, that plaintiffs "dispute the central hypothesis that drives vaccine theory," which "has never been proven and Plaintiffs are eager *1141to disprove it"; that "[v]accines kill and maim children"; and that Senate Bill No. 277 "is a totalitarian mandate that expects parents to merrily sacrifice their children for the greater good." We will describe the complaint's allegations further as necessary in our discussion of plaintiffs' contentions on appeal.
Defendants demurred to the complaint, plaintiffs opposed, and the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. The court entered an order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed.
A month after filing plaintiffs' opening brief, counsel filed a letter asking us to consider as "new authority[ ]" ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.254 ) the addition in July 2017 of a chemical to California's list of chemicals known to cause cancer. Plaintiffs contend they have "seen evidence" that the chemical contaminates vaccines. We deny the request, as it is both untimely and irrelevant to any issue on appeal.
After briefing was complete, counsel filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record for plaintiffs, citing failure to pay fees and an irreparable breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. We granted the motion. Other counsel substituted in as counsel of record.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. For purposes of review, we accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters that may be judicially noticed. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm." ( *1142Blank v. Kirwan, supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 318,
2. Contentions and Conclusions
a. Judicial notice
Along with their respondents' brief, defendants filed a motion requesting judicial notice of several categories of documents. These include documents from the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 277; documents published by the World Health Organization, the CDC, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the United States Department of Health and Human Services, plus other materials addressing the safety and effectiveness of vaccinations ; and federal and state trial court decisions rejecting challenges to Senate Bill No. 277. In addition, defendants requested we take judicial notice "of the safety and effectiveness of vaccinations in preventing the spread of dangerous communicable diseases, a fact that is commonly known and accepted in the scientific community and the general public."
We grant defendants' request for judicial notice.
Plaintiffs do not object to the legislative history materials, but object to the materials on vaccination as hearsay, inadmissible opinion evidence, and "government propaganda." Plaintiffs further argue that we cannot take judicial notice of the safety and effectiveness of vaccines. They contend the proposition that " 'protection of school children against crippling and deadly diseases by vaccinations is done effectively and safely' " is not common knowledge, and is the subject of reasonable dispute. But they cite no authority that supports their contention. The authorities are to the contrary.
More than 90 years ago, a California court observed that: "Where the issue pertains to medical or surgical treatment, the nature, effect, and result of which are the subjects of common knowledge, such matters are within the rule of judicial knowledge. As for instance, the court will take judicial notice of the nature, purpose, and effects of vaccination." ( Southern California Edison Co. v. Industrial Accident Com. (1925)
Our courts have also pointed out we may take judicial notice of scientific facts. (See McAllister v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (1968)
b. The merits of plaintiffs' legal claims
Plaintiffs repeatedly cite and mischaracterize the holding of Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC (2011)
Plaintiffs are, of course, quite wrong. No doubt injuries and deaths have been caused by vaccines, and no doubt there are cases of "unavoidable, adverse side effects." ( Bruesewitz,
In short, it has been settled since 1905 in Jacobson,
We address plaintiffs' causes of action in the order asserted in the complaint.
i. The free exercise of religion ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 4 )
Plaintiffs cite no pertinent authority for their assertion that Senate Bill No. 277 "violates freedom of religion." It does not.
As a preliminary matter, we note that three of the six plaintiffs describe themselves as Christians, two of whom are opposed to the use of fetal cells in vaccines; the third has children who have had most of the recommended vaccinations. The other three plaintiffs allege nothing about any religious basis for their objection to vaccination. A belief that is "philosophical and personal rather than religious ... does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses." ( *225Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)
Setting that point aside, in Phillips v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2015)
Phillips relied on the high court's "persuasive dictum" in Prince v. Massachusetts (1944)
Even if we were to assume that laws requiring vaccination substantially burden the free exercise of religion and therefore merit strict scrutiny, plaintiffs' claim fails. ( Workman v. Mingo County Board of Education (4th Cir. 2011)
We agree with these authorities, and plaintiffs point to no pertinent authority to the contrary. Plaintiffs cite Yoder,
ii. The right to attend school ( Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5 )
The California Constitution provides for "a system of common schools by *226which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district ...." ( Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5.) While education is not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution, our Supreme Court has held that education is a " 'fundamental interest.' " ( Serrano v. Priest (1971)
Plaintiffs cite Serrano to support their claim that Senate Bill No. 277 violates their constitutional right to attend school, but fail to explain its application here. There is no "suspect classification" underlying Senate Bill No. 277. But even if we assume the strict scrutiny test should be applied to any law affecting the fundamental interest in education, Senate Bill No. 277 would pass that test. One court has already so held, and we agree with its analysis. ( Whitlow v. Cal. Dept. of Education (S.D.Cal. 2016)
As Whitlow points out, federal and state courts, beginning with Abeel , have held "either explicitly or implicitly" that "society has a compelling interest in fighting the spread of contagious diseases through mandatory vaccination of school-aged children." ( Whitlow,
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Senate Bill No. 277 is not narrowly tailored to meet the state's interest, because there are less restrictive alternatives (such as alternative means (unspecified) of immunization, and quarantine in the event of an outbreak of disease). This argument fails, of course, as compulsory immunization has long been recognized as the gold standard for preventing the spread of contagious diseases. As is noted in the legislative history, studies have found that "when belief exemptions to vaccination guidelines are permitted, vaccination rates decrease," and community immunity wanes if large numbers of children do not receive required vaccinations. (Assem. Com. on Health, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 277, supra , p. 5.)
In short, as we have already pointed out, states may impose vaccination requirements without providing religious exemptions. We agree with Whitlow 's conclusion: "The right of education, fundamental as it may be, is no more sacred than any of the other fundamental rights that have readily given way to a State's interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and *1147particularly, school children," and "removal of the [personal beliefs exemption] is necessary or narrowly drawn to serve the compelling objective of SB 277." ( Whitlow, supra, 203 F.Supp.3d at p. 1091.)
iii. Equal protection ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 7 )
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged Senate Bill No. 277 violates the equal protection clause by discriminating "based on *227vaccination status." On appeal, plaintiffs tell us Senate Bill No. 277 also discriminates based on multiple other classifications, such as "home-based vs. classroom-based students," "medically exempt students vs. students without medical exemptions," children with individualized education plans and those without, and so on. Plaintiffs cite no authority suggesting that any of these classifications gives rise to equal protection concerns, and we are aware of none.
Consequently, we confine ourselves to pointing out that in 1904, our Supreme Court rejected a 14th Amendment challenge to the state's mandatory vaccination law, finding in it "no element of class legislation." ( French v. Davidson, supra, 143 Cal. at p. 662,
The statutory classifications and exemptions plaintiffs dispute do not involve similarly situated children, or are otherwise entirely rational classifications. For a discussion delineating, and rejecting, equal protection claims based on these categories, see Whitlow,
iv. Due process ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 7 )
Next, plaintiffs contend Senate Bill No. 277 is void for vagueness under California's due process clause. Their argument is that the Legislature's goal-"[a] means for the eventual achievement of total immunization of appropriate age groups" against the specified childhood diseases-is unconstitutionally vague because "nobody knows what it means." Plaintiffs also contend the medical exemption requirements are unconstitutionally vague and "violative of due process."
*1148We have no difficulty perceiving the legislative goal. Indeed, it is nothing new-the goal of "total immunization" has been stated in section 120325 since its passage in 1995, when the Legislature reorganized and clarified portions of the Health and Safety Code. (Sen. Bill No. 1360, Stats. 1995, ch. 415.) As for the claim of vagueness in the medical exemption, plaintiffs make no argument at all, simply stating in a single sentence that the requirements are vague. That does not constitute a proper appellate argument. Moreover, plaintiffs offer no authorities describing the principles of vagueness in constitutional law, much less how those principles could apply to their claims. They do not. "A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applications." ( Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments, Inc. (2007)
v. Section 24175, subdivision (a)
Finally, plaintiffs alleged a violation of section 24175, subdivision (a). That statute provides that no one may be subjected to a medical experiment without his or her informed consent. (§ 24175, subd. (a).) A medical experiment includes "[t]he ... penetration ... of tissues of a human subject ... in the practice ... of medicine in a manner not reasonably related to *228maintaining or improving the health of the subject or otherwise directly benefiting the subject." (§ 24174, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs tell us that "all vaccines are 'medical experiments.' "
This claim is patently erroneous. The applicable authorities-legal and scientific-clearly show that immunization is reasonably related to maintaining the health of the subject of the immunization as well as the public health.
c. No leave to amend
Plaintiffs state-in their reply brief-that they should be granted leave to amend. That request is untimely as it was not made in their opening brief, but in any event plaintiffs do not explain how they could amend the complaint to cure its defects. The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
*1149DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P.J.
ROGAN, J.
Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
The childhood diseases specified are diphtheria, hepatitis B, haemophilus influenzae type b, measles, mumps, pertussis (whooping cough ), poliomyelitis, rubella, tetanus, and varicella (chickenpox ). (Health & Saf. Code, § 120325, subd. (a)(1)-(10).) The list also includes "[a]ny other disease deemed appropriate by the department, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Academy of Family Physicians." (Id., subd. (a)(11).) As to the last item, immunization may be mandated before a pupil's first admission to any school or child care center only if exemptions are allowed for both medical reasons and personal beliefs. (§ 120338.)
The medical exemption, as amended by Senate Bill No. 277, states: "If the parent or guardian files with the governing authority a written statement by a licensed physician to the effect that the physical condition of the child is such, or medical circumstances relating to the child are such, that immunization is not considered safe, indicating the specific nature and probable duration of the medical condition or circumstances, including, but not limited to, family medical history, for which the physician does not recommend immunization, that child shall be exempt from the [immunization ] requirements ... to the extent indicated by the physician's statement." (§ 120370, subd. (a).)
Further statutory citations are to the Health and Safety Code, unless otherwise specified.
Our ruling likewise disposes of plaintiffs' first claim in their opening brief: that the trial court erred by not "presuming the truth" of plaintiffs' allegation "that all vaccines are unavoidably unsafe." As we have observed in the text, courts may disregard allegations that are contrary to judicially noticed facts.