Aрpellants’ daughter was killed when the car in which she was a passenger collided with a tractor-trailer truck. Appellants instituted separate civil actions against appellees, who are the drivers of the two vehicles and certain others who were alleged to be vicariously liable. A consolidated trial was held, and a jury found in favor of all appellees. Appellants’ motion for new trial was denied, and appellants appeal.
1. -Appellants enumerate as error the trial court’s instructions to the jury on the following issues: a guest passenger’s duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury; and the duty of a guest passenger to take affirmative action. It appears from the transcript that appellants did not object to these charges at trial. Aсcordingly, their propriety in the context of this case will not be reviewed.
Hightower v. McIntyre,
2. After giving its instructions to the jury, the trial court inquired *244 whether there were any exceptions tо the charge. At that time, appellants did object to the charges on assumption of risk and comparative negligence, and the giving of those chargеs is now enumerated as error. However, appellees contend that appellants’ objections were untimely because they were not raised during a previous charge conference.
An objection to an instruction which is made during a charge conference, but which is not made or reiterated following the giving of the charge, fails to preserve the matter for review by an appellate court.
Hurst v. J. P. Colley Contractors,
3. Appellants assert that the trial court’s charge on assumption of risk was not authorized by the evidenсe.
“It is a well established rule that an instruction is not inapplicable where there is any evidence, however slight, on which to predicate it. [Cit.] It is not even necessary [that] there should be direct evidence going to that point; it is enough if there be something from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to it. [Cit.]”
Lockard v. Davis,
*245
“The necessary elements of аssumption of risk by [a guest passenger] have been clearly defined as follows: first, there must be a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the guest; second, the guest must have a knowledge and appreciation of the hazards; and third, there must be acquiescence or willingness on the part of the guest to proceed in the face of danger. [Cits.] Thus, it will be seen that the basis of the doctrine of assumption of risk is that a party assumes the risk of danger which he knows and apprеciates or that the law will hold that he does know and appreciate.”
Roberts v. King,
Appellees contend that there was some evidеnce that appellants’ daughter had notice of the hazard created by Ms. Sims’ driving, and that she knowingly acquiesced therein. It is true that there was evidence from which a jury could infer that appellants’ daughter was aware that Ms. Sims did not follow the directions provided by the gas station attendant, and that Ms. Sims proceedеd northbound in a southbound lane of traffic. There was also evidence that appellants’ daughter never voiced any objections to Ms. Sims’ conduct. Howеver, there was no evidence that appellants’ daughter had actual knowledge that Ms. Sims did not intend to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic. In fact, the only reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that Ms. Sims actually intended so to yield, but that she failed to observe the approaсhing truck. “ ‘[E]ven when there is knowledge and appreciation of a [particular] risk, the plaintiff[s] may not be barred from recovery, where the injuries are not caused by the negligence of the defendant which is assumed by the plaintiff[s’ decedent]. The fact that the plaintiff [s’ decedent] is fully aware of one risk, such as the sрeed [or the direction] at which the car is being driven, does not mean that she automatically assumes another risk of which she is unaware, such as the failure оf the driver to watch the road.’ ”
Thompson v. Dempsey,
There was no evidence that appellants’ daughter was aware of the oncoming truck or the hazard created by Ms. Sims’ fаilure to yield the right-of-way, or that she had an opportunity to take any affirmative action with regard thereto. Accordingly, a charge on assumption of risk was not authorized by the evidence and was erroneously given in the instant case.
King v. Parson,
supra;
Browning v. Kahle,
supra;
Hanley v. Ford Motor Co.,
4. Appellants also enumerate as error the trial court’s charge on сomparative negligence, asserting that there was no evidence of any negligence on their daughter’s part. Contrary to this assertion, there was some indirect evidence from which a jury might infer that appellants’ daughter obscured Ms. Sims’ vision when she leaned forward to adjust the tape player in the car. Such conduct by appellants’ daughter would constitute a violation of OCGA § 40-6-242 (b) (former Code Ann. § 68A-1104 (b)), which prohibits passengers from riding “in such position as to interfere with the driver’s view ahead or to the sides. . . .” Even though there was no direct testimony, there was some slight evidence to suggest that appellants’ daughter may have been negligent in this regard. Applying the standard set forth in
Lockard v. Davis,
supra, we find that the charge on comparative negligence was adequately supported by the evidence in the case. See
Vaughn v. American Freight System,
5. For the reason discussed in Division 3, the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for new trial.
Judgment reversed.