Brown v. SimmonsBrown v. Simmons
George Brown, Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals the judgment of the Pemiscot County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for asserting a claim precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court’s dismissal misapplied the law and improperly determined that the prior dismissal of Appellant’s federal case for failure to pay the filing fee as ordered by that court operated to preclude any further claims arising out of the same circumstances. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant was incarcerated in the Pem-iscot County Justice Center in Caruthers-ville, Missouri, from January 19, 2006, through November 17, 2006, and during this time was under the supervision and care of Bob Simmons, Danny Dodson, Janet Thomas, and Rob Sharp (“Respondents”). In September, 2006, Appellant filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (“federal case”) alleging that, during his incarceration in Pemiscot County, Respondents willfully refused him adequate and prescribed medical care, denied him the freedom of religion, and inflicted upon him cruel and unusual punishment by feeding Appellant a food to which he was allergic. The following August, the federal court issued an order requiring Appellant to pay the statutory filing fee. 1 When Appellant failed to comply with that order, the court dismissed his claim pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a Court order.” Appellant filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which apparently issued a show cause order directed to Appellant in November of 2007. Appellant did not respond to the show cause order, and the Eighth Circuit dismissed his appeal for failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, on November 5, 2007, Appellant filed a petition in the Pemiscot County Circuit Court alleging the same underlying events (“state case”). Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the state case on February 19, 2008. Appellant filed his objections to Respondents’ motion to dismiss. The trial court sustained Respondents’ motion to dismiss and entered a judgment dismissing Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
Ordinarily, we review
de novo
a trial court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss.
Moynihan v. Gunn,
“Where, however, the parties introduce evidence beyond the pleadings, a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment.” Rule 55.27(a);
ADP Dealer Servs. Group v. Carroll Motor Co,
In their motion to dismiss, in the case at bar, Respondents asserted the existence of and attached copies of the complaint, the order of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b) and the judgment and mandate dismissing the appeal, which were all filed in the federal case. Respondents asserted to the trial court that: “Because the [federal case] was dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the court’s orders, said dismissal was an adjudication on the merits and [Appellant’s] claim in state court should be dismissed because of res judicata.” Although Appellant did not introduce any other evidence outside of his pleading, his response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss referenced and relied upon the documents in the federal case as asserted in Respondent’s motion, and his argument responded solely to Respondents’ asserted res judicata defense. Additionally, Appellant did not raise any objection to the trial court’s consideration of these documents in ruling on Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, Appellant acquiesced to the trial court’s treatment of the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.
Our review of a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment is
de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp.,
Discussion
Appellant presents three points relied on for our review; we need only address the first, however, as its resolution renders the remaining points moot. Appellant contends that the trial court incorrectly relied on
DeNardo v. Barmns,
Federal Rule 41(b) states, in pertinent part:
*512 (b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule — except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 — operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Rule 41(b). The initial issue before us, then, is what claim-preclusive effect the phrase “adjudication on the merits” has as it is used in Rule 41(b). Semtek answers that question.
In
Semtek,
the plaintiffs original California state claim was removed to federal court by the defendant on diversity grounds.
Semtek,
The United States Supreme Court held that a Rule 41(b) dismissal does not automatically preclude the claim from being brought in another venue. Specifically, the Court stated:
We think the key to a more reasonable interpretation of the meaning of “operates as an adjudication upon the merits” in Rule 41(b) is to be found in Rule 41(a), which, in discussing the effect of voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff, makes clear that an “adjudication upon the merits” is the opposite of a “dismissal without prejudice!)]”
Id.
at 505,
The primary meaning of “dismissal without prejudice,” we think, is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim. That will also ordinarily (though not always) have the consequence of not barring the claim from other courts, but its primary meaning relates to the dismissing court itself.
Id.
at 506,
We are thus left with determining when a federal claim dismissed under Rule 41(b), as occurred here, invokes claim preclusion beyond the particular federal court issuing the dismissal, and
Semtek
guides us here, as well. The Court in
Semtek
acknowledged “that no federal textual provision addresses the claim-preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment in a federal-question case, yet we have long held that States cannot give those judgments merely whatever effect they would give their own judgments, but must accord them the effect that this Court prescribes.”
Id.
at 507,
Federal law requires that four elements be satisfied to support a decree of
res judicata,
and the burden rests on the party asserting the doctrine: “(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the bar is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.”
Bd. Of Trs. Of Trucking Employees of No. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra,
In determining whether a party has had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question,” federal interpretation “often [focuses] on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.”
Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation,
Our position is bolstered by the long-held notion that
res judicata
operates to bar subsequent claims when the claim has been dismissed under Rule 41(b) and “the defendant [has incurred] the inconvenience of preparing to meet the merits [of the underlying action] because there is no initial bar to the Court’s reaching them,”
Costello v. U.S.,
Finally, the cases Respondents rely on in their brief — in particular their distinguishing factors — and the case relied on by the trial court provide both guidance and support for our decision. In
Andes v. Paden, Welch, Martin & Albano, P.C.,
Muza v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services,
Finally,
DeNardo,
Decision
As discussed above, the dismissal of Appellant’s claim pursuant to Rule 41(b) in the federal case did not constitute an “adjudication on the merits” for purposes of claim preclusion in the state case. Consequently, Respondents were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Notes
. Nothing in the record before this court indicates why the filing fee was not paid at the time the complaint was filed or why at this point in time the trial court ordered Appellant to pay it.