Brown v. Seaboard Lumber & Supply Co.
142 S.E.2d 842
Ga.
1965
Check Treatment

BROWN v. SEABOARD LUMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. et al.

22922

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 7, 1965

221 Ga. 35

ARGUED APRIL 13, 1965

evidenced by the fact that more than two-thirds of his customers were negroes. He had built this good will over a number of years, which must have required his good will toward them. The single incident, whether caused by plaintiff firing the boy or whipping him—whichever is true—and the evidence as to what occurred is inconclusive, would not justify the conclusion that the boy‘s race had anything to do with it. There is no evidence that what happened occurred because he was a negro. It could as well have happened to a white boy. This is obviously not a case of peaceful picketing to protest racial discrimination.

Special ground 16 complains that the charge set out above in the ruling on Special ground 15 that if the picketing by the N.A.A.C.P. incited others to join in and commit acts against plaintiff‘s business, that the act of the pickets would be the proximate cause of the injury deprived the Savannah Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. of freedom of association in violation of the 1st and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. The ground does not show that it violates defendant‘s rights of freedom of association, as contended.

Judgment reversed as to the defendant Georgia State Conference of Branches of the N.A.A.C.P. Judgment affirmed as to all other defendants. All the Justices concur.

Robert A. Carpenter, A. Tate Conyers, for plaintiff in error.

Long, Weinberg & Ansley, Ben Weinberg, Jr., Hurt, Hill & Richardson, James C. Hill, Arnold Wright, Jr., contra.

QUILLIAN, Justice. In

, it was held that under a provision in an automobile liability insurance policy which authorized the insurer to “make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient” the insured gives express authority to the insurer and constitutes it the insured‘s agent for the purpose of effecting settlement of claims and that a settlement so obtained by the insurer was binding upon the insured without regard to whether the insured had knowledge of the settlement, consented to it or subsequently ratified it. While the effect of this ruling has been abrogated by statute, Ga. L. 1963, p. 643, the release in question was executed on June 8, 1961, and it is conceded by the parties at interest that the Brooks case is applicable.

Here the insured in an action against the insurer and alleged third party tortfeasors attempts to set aside such a release. The basis of her contention is that, conceding the insurer was her agent under express authority of the contract (as held in

, and the Brooks case, supra): (1) the insurer acted fraudulently and for its own benefit; (2) the insurer and the other defendants conspired together in making the settlement. While it is generally alleged that the settlement was the result of the disloyal and fraudulent acts of Northern and that because of the concurrent and conspiring acts of the defendants the plaintiff was deprived of her right of action against Hill and Seaboard, the specific allegations failed to show fraud or conspiracy. Thus, the rule is applicable: “No cause of action is stated in a petition which states mere legal conclusions of conspiracy, collusion and fraud with no facts alleged upon which to base them except general and loose allegations consisting of statements without facts upon which the conclusions are based.”
;
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Furthermore, the insurer is not shown to have acted in bad faith, as contended by plaintiff‘s counsel in his brief to this court, merely by settling the claim which resulted in the insured being bound, since the rule of law pronounced by our appellate courts at that time (1961) was that the insured would not be bound by such settlement.

;
. Under former Code § 56-706 (now Code § 56-1206; Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 502, Ga. L. 1962, p. 712), this court has consistently held that no “bad faith” exists where there is a doubtful question of law involved.
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.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Quillian, J., who dissents.

QUILLIAN, Justice, dissenting. The above opinion expresses the view of the majority of the court. I have profound respect for the opinions of my learned colleagues, but as stated in the dissent in

, I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached in this case.