The plaintiff in error-filed, at the April term, 1901, of Carroll superior court, a motion for a new trial. The recitals of fact in this motion were approved as true by the judge, and an order was passed on April 26, requiring the respondents to show cause, at an adjourned term to be held in June, why the motion should not be granted; it being provided in this order that the movant should “ have until the final hearing of this motion to pre
The order passed in April gave the movant until the “ final hearing ” to prepare and present his brief of evidence. This final hearing was to be had some time during the adjourned term of the ■court in June; just what day in that term was to be left for future determination. Inasmuch as the motion was called for a hearing •on June 10, during the adjourned term, the natural conclusion would be that that date had been fixed upon for the final hearing. But the hearing was further continued on that day until June 14. Had the judge on the 10th passed an order simply continuing the hearing without more, this order, construed in the light of the order passed in April, giving until the final hearing to present a brief ■of the evidence, would have given the movant the right to tender for approval his brief of evidence on June 14¡ But the order of the 10th contained this language: “with all rights reserved which the parties now have.” If this language meant to preserve the right of the movant to present his brief of evidence, it was entirely unnecessary, as this right would have resulted without the addition of this clause to the order. The language of the clause is ambiguous. It reserves the rights of the parties, but fails to tell what those
Affirmed.