62 N.Y.S. 663 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
The plaintiffs bring this action to recover the purchase price of two sealskin garments which it is contended were purchased of the plaintiffs by the defendant’s daughters and duly authorized agents.
Upon the trial the plaintiffs’ right to recover was sharply contested upon the ground, among others, that the garments were not of the quality and character guaranteed by the plaintiffs when the contract for their manufacture was entered into. That issue, however, was decided adversely to the defendant’s contention upon conflicting evidence, and for that reason, probably, it has been abandoned
It is not denied that the plaintiffs, in the first instance, negotiated with and gave credit to the daughters in their individual capacity, nor that they subsequently brought suit and obtained a judgment against each- of .them, and made diligent effort to collect the same. Neither is it claimed that the defendant’s liability grows out of any parental obligation, for, although his daughters lived with and were supported by him, it is conceded that they were both of full age, to the knowledge of the plaintiffs at the time when the garments were purchased; but this action is sought to be maintained upon the theory that the purchase of the garments in question was expressly authorized by'the father, which fact was not discovered by the plaintiffs until after they had exhausted their remedy against the daughters.
It seems that Mrs. Brown, one of the plaintiffs, had some acquaintance with the defendant and his daughters. At least she knew that they were reputed to be people of some considerable means, and during the preliminary negotiations which led up to the ordering of the garments one of the daughters informed her that the father had told her and her sister that if they would select two sealskin coats which suited them, he would give his check "for the cost, thereof. The information thus imparted to the plaintiffs was not necessarily of such character as to warrant them in assuming that the daughters were authorized to purchase the coats upon the credit of their father; for it was, at the most, but the declaration of a third party, and as such was not binding upon the alleged principal.. The-plaintiffs, consequently, treated the daughters as their debtors,-and, when the latter refused to pay for the coats, brought two separate actions, which, after a trial in the Municipal Court, resulted, as before stated, in favor of the plaintiffs. In the meantime, each of the young women had affixed her name, by means of paint or some other indelible substance,.in four or five different places, to the inside of
This evidence, which was read upon the trial of the present action, when taken in connection with the defendant’s subsequent acts and declarations, was sufficient, we think, to sustain the conclusion reached by the trial court, that not only had the defendant authorized his daughters to purchase the garments in question, but that he had ratified their action after learning that the purchase had been made, and that his instructions had not been literally followed. (Bliss v. Sherrill, 24 App. Div. 280 ; Bliven v. Lydecker, 130 N. Y. 102.)
This being the case, the relation of principal and agent becomes established; and when it is further made to appear, as it is by the plaintiffs’ testimony, that the existence of this relation was not fully disclosed until after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have elected to rely solely upon the responsibility of the agents, nor that they were concluded by reason of the actions which were brought against such agents
The views above expressed lead to the conclusion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
All concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.