31 Ind. App. 517 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1903
Action by appellant against appellee to quiet title to real estate. Trial by court. Finding and judgment against appellant. Appellant moved for a.new trial for the reasons: (1) That the decision of the court was not sustained by sufficient evidence; and (2) that the decision of the court was contrary to law — and this motion was overruled. Such ruling is the only error assigned. Appellant claims title by virtue of a tax sale, and deed thereunder.
Thus, in Becker v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 17 Ind. App. 324, it was held in a street improvement case that “tract of land, north side, between Eront street and O. & M. R. R.” did not describe any tract of land, and that it did not furnish any data from which its true description might be ascertained. And in Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v.
The rule, as indicated by the authorities above cited and the statute just quoted, obtains in other jurisdictions, as illustrated by the following cases: Wallace v. Brown, 22 Ark. 118, 76 Am. Dec. 421; Bidwell v. Webb, 10 Minn. 59, 88 Am. Dec. 56; Jackson v. Sloman, 117 Mich. 126, 75 N. W. 282; Upton v. People, ex rel., 176 Ill. 632, 52 N. E. 358; Turner v. Hand County, 11 S. D. 348, 77 N. W. 589; Van Cise v. Carter, 9 S. D. 234, 68 N. W. 539; Black, Tax Titles, §112; Power v. Larabee, 2 N. D. 141, 49 N. W. 724; Woods v. Freeman, 1 Wall. 398, 17 L. Ed. 543; Tidd v. Rines, 26 Minn. 201, 2 N. W. 497; Lawrence v. Fast, 20 Ill. 338, 71 Am. Dec. 274.
Another reason why the sale for taxes is invalid in this case, is because the lot was not advertised for sale in the
Appellee obtained title to the real éstate through a sale and subsequent conveyance under a partition proceeding, and there was nothing of record to indicate that it had been-sold for taxes, because the attempted description in the notice of sale and register of sales was no description at all, and therefore it was not notice to it. The court below held that the sale was invalid, and did not convey title, but that the lien of the State' was transferred to appellant, and gave him a first lien for the amount he paid, together with penalties and interest, including subsequent payments. The amount was ascertained by the court, for which judgment was rendered, and declared to be a first lien. This result is in harmony with the statute and decided cases. §8632 Burns 1901; Sloan v. Sewell, 81 Ind. 180; Reed v. Earhart, 88 Ind. 159 ; Peckham v. Millikan, 99 Ind. 352; Scott v. Millikan, 104 Ind. 75; State, ex rel., v. Casteel, supra; Travellers Ins. Co. v. Martin, 131 Ind. 155; Scarry v. Lewis, 133 Ind. 96.
The abbreviations, purporting to be a description of the real estate disclosed by the notice of sale have no fixed meaning. “Col.” does not stand for nor signify Columbus, “W.” does not stand for “wheel” and “M. T. R.” does not stand for “1VL T. Reeves.” Our conclusion is that the sale was invalid, and the subsequent conveyance under it did not convey title, because of a failure properly to describe the real estate in the notice of sale.
Appellant urges upon us the proposition that a tax deed is prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale, and of the title in the holder. This is both statutory and adjudicated law, and there is no contention to the contrary. §8621 Burns 1901; Richard v. Carrie, 145 Ind. 49; Doren v. Lupton, 154 Ind. 396. But appellant’s prima facie case as made by his tax deed is overthrown by the facts disclosed by the record, and about which there is no
There is no reversible error in the record. Judgment affirmed.