Brown v. PeopleBrown v. People
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The plaintiffs in error were at the May term., 1897, of the circuit court of Williamson county, adjudged guilty of embezzlement under the act approved June 4, 1879, entitled “An act for the protection of bank depositors,” and condemned to pay a fine of 8410 and to be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the term of one year. The provision of the statute under which the conviction was had is as follows: “That if any banker or broker, or person or persons doing a banking- business, or any officer of any banking- company or incorporated bank doing business in this State, shall receive from any person or persons, firm, company or corporation, or from any agent thereof, not indebted to said banker, broker, banking company or incorporated bank, any money, check, draft, bill of exchange, stocks, bonds or other valuable thing which is transferable by delivery, when, at the time of receiving such deposit, said banker, broker, banking company or incorporated bank is insolvent, whereby the deposit so made shall be lost to the depositor, said banker, broker or officer so receiving such deposit shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum double
This statute was held to be constitutional and a valid act by this court in Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, and, indeed, many of the questions raised by counsel in their able and elaborate arguments were in that case decided adversely to the contentions here made on behalf of these plaintiffs in error.
In the case at bar it is urged that there was error in the refusal of the court to quash the indictment. It will be sufficient here to notice only the second count, which is the least objectionable of the two. It was in substance as follows: “That the said William R. Brown and William P. Bruner, late, etc., on the 25th day of May, A. D. 1895, at, etc., then and there doing a banking business, did then and there unlawfully, fraudulently and feloniously receive on deposit from one William H. Kraper the sum of $380.50 in money, the said William H. Kraper not then and there being indebted to the said William R. Brown and William P. Bruner. The said William R. Brown and William P. Bruner, at the time of receiving the said deposit, the said sum of $380.50 in money, were insolvent, whereby the said deposit, the said sum of $380.50 in money, was lost to the said William H. Kraper, depositor, contrary,” etc. The principal objection urged to this count is, that it neither gives any description of the money embezzled nor states its value.
■ In indictments for larceny, or for embezzlement constituting larceny under the statute and punished as such, it
McDaniels v. People, 118 Ill. 301, is not in conflict with the views we have expressed, for, as there held, the statute made the crime of embezzlement of a railroad ticket complete, and prescribed the punishment without regard to the value of the ticket. So in many other cases mentioned by counsel. So far as Murphy v. People, 19 Ill. App. 125, mentioned by counsel for the People, may affect the question, it appears that the objection there urg‘ed to the indictment was, that there was no allegation of a fraudulent intent or knowledge of his insolvency on the part of the defendant. It does not appear from the case as reported that the question here involved was raised at all.
Nor is it a sufficient statement of value to allege that the property embezzled was so maujr dollars in money. In the case at bar the money was not alleged to be current or lawful money of the United States, but only that it was money. Proof that the money was Mexican dollars would have sustained the indictment, yet it would not have been sufficient proof of value to enable the jury to fix the fine. The proof was, in fact, that it was current money of the United States; but such proof could not aid the defect in the indictment, nor, of course, cure the error of the court in refusing to quash the indictment. The authorities are nearly uniform that where any part of the punishment depends on the value of the property such value should be alleged in the indictment, and the allegation that it was a certain number of dollars in money is not sufficient. 1 Bishop on Crim. Proc. (3d ed.) 338; Wharton on Crim. Pl. & Pr. secs. 213-218; Bork v. People, 16 Hun, 476; Reside v. State, 10 Tex. App. 675; Grant v. State, 35 Fla. 581; State v. Thompson, 42 Ark. 517; Stale v. Denton, 74 Md. 517; People v. Donald, 48 Mich. 491.
The cases cited by counsel for the People do not sustain their contention that the indictment is sufficient. They cite Goodhue v. People, 94. Ill. 37, but it clearly appears that in that case the value of the money was alleged in the indictment. And in Gage v. State, 83 Ala. 51, where the allegation was that the money was “currency of the United States of America,” it was held that this was a sufficient averment of value.
What we have said is not in conflict with what was said in Keating v. People, 160 Ill. 480, where there was a conviction for larceny. The indictment in that case, as the record shows, was in the usual form, not only in
The judgment is erroneous and must be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to quash the indictment and to discharge the defendants therein.
Reversed and remanded.