77 So. 3d 587 | Ala. Civ. App. | 2009
In August 2006, Lana T. Brown ("the employee") sued, along with several fictitiously named defendants, Patsy Patton, an individual doing business under the name "Korner Store" ("the employer"), in the Bibb Circuit Court. The *2
employee alleged in her complaint that on or about August 3, 2004, she tripped and fell while in the line and scope of her employment, suffering a disabling left-wrist injury for which, she said, the employer should be responsible for providing compensation and medical benefits under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, §
In January 2008, the employee filed a motion for a partial summary judgment as to the issue of the employer's liability; that motion was supported by the employee's affidavit, her responses to the employer's interrogatories, and various medical records. The employer filed a cross-motion for a summary judgment in her favor, supported by excerpts from the transcript of the employee's deposition; the employee filed a response in opposition to the employer's summary-judgment motion. A videographic recording of the fall, obtained from the employer's closed-circuit-television system, was also submitted into evidence. After a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the *3
employer on the authority of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan,
Sartin v. Madden,"`[An appellate court] reviews a summary judgment de novo. We seek to determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and has demonstrated that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a summary judgment, [an appellate court] review[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that he is entitled to a summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce "substantial evidence" creating a genuine issue of material fact. "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."'"
The record reflects the following undisputed facts. The employee, who was approximately 60 years old at the time of *4 her injury, worked for the employer as a store cashier, a job that occasionally entailed performing duties such as stocking coolers on the store premises. The employee was required to work a full eight-hour shift without rest breaks, but she was allowed to drink cups of coffee while working at the cash register in the store. On August 3, 2004, the employee had left the area of the cash register to obtain some coffee when she noticed that a customer nearby was moving towards the cash register, intending to make a purchase. The videographic record of the event shows that the employee, after noticing that customer, turned around, took several quick steps toward the cash register, tripped, and fell to the floor; the impact caused her to break her left wrist. The employee had noticed no hazardous material on the floor of the store where she fell at the time of her fall, nor is any such material apparent from the videographic recording of the fall, and she testified that she did not know why she fell. The employee's injured wrist was later placed in a cast, and she returned to work the following day; she continued to work normally for the employer until leaving her employment in January 2005 to care for her *5 grandchild, and the employee admitted that she did not believe that she was disabled from working should she choose to do so.
Under §§
The principal "fault line" that has been revealed by the application of the "arising out of" requirement by Alabama *6
courts is the distinction between accidents that are at least partially attributable to an affirmative employment contribution and those that are attributable solely to what are called "idiopathic" factors, a term that "refers to an employee's preexisting physical weakness or disease" that is "`peculiar to the individual'" employee. Ex partePatterson,
In Morgan, this court reversed a judgment that had been entered in favor of a retail cashier seeking benefits under the Act under factual circumstances similar to those present in this case. After citing various cases in which this court had considered the "arising out of" element of compensability, we concluded in Morgan that because the cashier did not know what had caused her to lose her balance and had admitted that the workplace probably had nothing to do with the accident in which she was injured, no substantial evidence supported the proposition that the cashier's injury arose out of her employment.
We need not address whether Morgan is due to be overruled by this court, however. Just over two years after Morgan was decided, the Alabama Supreme Court issued its decision in Ex parte Byrom,
That Byrom has significantly altered the post-Morgan legal landscape is a fact that has not been lost upon at least one judge of this court, whose special opinion in Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Muilenburg,
"In this case, as in Byrom, the employee is claiming that he was injured in an `accident.' The record contains various versions of how this `accident' happened, but it is undisputed that while working the employee unexpectedly fell, immediately and severely injuring his left leg. Having proven that he had sustained an `accident' while working, the employee, according to Byrom, did not need to *9 prove any additional facts in order to satisfy the `arising-out-of-the-employment' requirement.
"I fully recognize that Byrom did not involve an injury caused by a fall. However, the holding of Byrom is phrased so broadly that I can conclude only that the supreme court intended that it would apply to all `accidental' injuries. I am also fully aware that a line of decisions from this court that were issued before Byrom rejected a legal test similar to the one adopted in Byrom when determining whether an injury suffered as the result of a fall is compensable. See Casteel ex rel. Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
860 So. 2d 348 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003); Pittsburg Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Rubley,882 So. 2d 335 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (accord); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan,830 So. 2d 741 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002); and Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin,417 So. 2d 199 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981), writ quashed, Ex parte Martin,417 So. 2d 203 (Ala. 1982) (declining to use `but-for' test to determine compensability of fall at work). Although I agree totally with the reasoning in those cases, and although I disagree totally with the analysis used in Byrom, unless and until our supreme court overrules it, this court must follow Byrom. See Ala. Code 1975, §12-3-16 ."
After viewing the evidentiary record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant employee, as Sartin requires, we *10 conclude that the employee adduced substantial evidence indicating that after having proceeded slowly from her assigned station at the cash-register counter of the store to another part of the store to obtain coffee, she then turned and more quickly moved back across the floor of the store in order to return to the cash register and to assist a customer who apparently was ready to present items for purchase before falling on the floor of the store. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence was presented tending to show that the employee's accident was one that arose out of her employment. It follows, then, that the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the employer, which was based upon that court's determination that the employee had not adduced substantial evidence of the "arising out of" prong of legal causation under the Act, was erroneous and warrants reversal. We remand the cause for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Bryan, Thomas, and Moore, JJ., concur.
Thompson, P.J., concurs in the result, without writing. *1