*1 SIQ VIII
Phyllis Paige BROWN, Appellant, NICHOLSON, Pate, Suzanne Glenda obligation The revaluation is not debt. Spears, Appellees. and Ken explicit law-imposed It is an command that duty pay. creates a Its terms are enforce- No. 86855. implied-in-law promise. sans able There is Supreme Court of Oklahoma. statutory jurisprudential no or warrant for transforming statutory an mandate into implied-in-law promise subject that is made 10, 26, §
to the axe of Art. Okl. Const. To-
day’s Muskogee abandonment of the collec- quasi-contractual
tion method in favor of a impermissibly
solution exonerates school dis- offending
tricts as well their officials of
any duty obligation to tender the revaluation budget
for inclusion in the district’s annual any non-, responsibility
and of for their mis- malperformanee they for which should be civilly
made accountable. opinion’s prospec-
There is no need for the
tive required today reach. All that is tois
decide the school districts’ in this prudential
case. The bar of mili- restraint against gratuitously casting
tates a constitu-
tional post-Muskogee legislative cloud on the contemplate payment
enactments which delinquent unbudgeted revaluation costs sinking
from funds.
I Muskogee’s would reaffirm all of school- liability teachings
district and make offend-
ing school district officials hable failure
timely to obligation tender the revaluation budget.
for inclusion the annual For their impose
dereliction of that I would
very penalty applies same as that which
county provisions officials under
§ 2943. *2 Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Wilson,
Donald R. Moon, City, appellee for Reneau & Oklahoma Spears. Ken ALA, OP Justice. today to decide whether the
We are asked by tendered defendants material summary judg- support the trial court’s to undisputed proof provides ment in their favor 1) she plaintiffs status as a licensee when of: injured upon prem- in a fall defendants’ was 2) ises, open and obvious character of and defect, defendants premises’ which the negative. in the urge. We answer (Brown) Phyllis Paige Brown sued Su- Nicholson, Pate, and Ken zanne Glenda Spears, of a downtown Oklahoma the owners (owners), building alleging that City office in negligent owners were their maintenance building’s parking ramp. While walk- ing get to to her office at the down that fell, level, slipped, and broke street Brown sought leg. her Owners and secured sum- Appeals mary judgment. The Court of Civil appeal affirmed. The issue framed was upon prop- as an entrant Brown’s status erty. appellate court concluded her sta- The that of a who had tus was licensee dangers posed park and was aware of the ramp, had no of which owners status-based, Upon warn. this classification court affirmed the owners’ sum- certiorari, mary sought judgment. Brown claiming property. invitee status We hold that Brown’s status as a licensee vel presents fact, does invitee actionability alleged of the defect on the parking ramp.
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION August Between November 1993 and secretary employed legal as a for Brown was City lawyer Ken Nicholson. She Oklahoma employer park was told on the roof building co-owned Nicholson’s wife of a Gayle A. Breshears and Freeman Randall Suzanne, along with Glenda Pate and Ken Monnet, Bullís, Cook, Hayes, Thompson & Spears. clearly The record does not estab- Edwards, City, appellant. Oklahoma for ownership lish the of the east and west sides Nichols, Garrison, Looney, building question. apparent- It was F. John- Edwin ly rooftop Hayes, City, appellees its east side that contained the son & Oklahoma daily parked there Pate. area. Suzanne Nicholson Glenda mined, law, steep ramp on foot a to the as a matter that then descended she was a who “took level licensee as she found street below. them,” summary judgment. and affirmed the months after Brown was Two to three certiorari, On Brown claims she was an invi- Nicholson, by Ken his wife Suzanne hired tee, higher duty to a entitled of care from working started her husband’s offices. disposition owners. Because the trial court’s *3 parked Nicholson also on the roof- Suzanne by summary judgment, was effected the is- top building, personally of her “reaffirm- sues on review stand before us for de novo ed” to Brown her husband’s examination.1 park there. Brown received these WHETHER OWNER OF PREMISES privileges slipped without cost. She on a few PROPER EXERCISED DUTY OF CARE occasions before the event in contest while TO VISITOR PERMITTED WHO WAS going ramp, up personally and down the THE AND TO USE PREMISES WHOSE asphalt observed one woman fall on the slick BEEN AN- PRESENCE SHOULD HAVE surface. Owners were aware that several A TICIPATED PRESENTS DISPUTED reported falling ramp. women had on the FACT; ISSUE OF WHERE FACTS ARE ramp’s Brown mentioned the condition “half DISPUTED, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION a dozen times” to her boss and two other IS INAPPROPRIATE. employees Weather-strip- of the law firm. ping placed ramp, devices had been on the A negli landowner’s precau- but the record is unclear when this gence person’s injury premises for a strips partially tion was installed. The had varies with the entrant’s status.2 Brown’s 31, away by
worn 1994 when Brown that of an status is either invitee or a licen ramp leg. fell on the and broke her She was premises see. Licensees are those who enter wearing then low-heeled shoes to assist her pleasure of another for their own benefit or negotiation of the incline. At the time of the by express implied permission of the owne fall, standing she was on “what was remain- r.3 Those considered licensees are to be ing” strips. Claiming of the weather duty accorded the owner a of care which maintained, negligently was jurisprudence “ordinary extant terms care.4” sued owners. licensee, The owner owes to the at a mini sought summary judgment, urging mum, duty dangerous
Owners to disclose defects (or her) Brown could not recover because she was a known to him which are but are premises unlikely licensee and owners had no to be discovered the licensee.5 duty ramp’s to warn her of the condition invitee, hand, personal knowledge had An
because she of its on the other is steep prior premises nature and of the The one who uses the accident. considered agreed position. purpose trial court with owners’ The of another for the of a common Appeals, noting advantage.6 Court of Civil Brown had interest and mutual The owner care,7” possible danger, been aware of the owes the invitee a of “reasonable deter- 3, supra. 1. of law are a de Issues reviewable novo 4. See note standard. An court claims for itself plenary, independent and author- non-deferential Harris, 5. Construction Co. v. ity legal rulings. to re-examine a trial court’s 531; Asher, Okl., Byford v. Town 874 Okl., Hospital Authority, Kluver v. Weatherford 45, (1994) J., (Opala. concurring). P.2d 51 1081, (1993); Regi- 859 P.2d 1083 See also Salve Russell, 225, 231, College na U.S. v. 499 111 1217, 1221, (1991). Inc., Hospital, S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d v. 190 6. Sutherland Saint Francis 781; Henryetta pra, note 2 at Construction Co. v. Inc., Okl., Hospital, 2. Sutherland v. Francis Saint supra, note 2 at Julian v. Sinclair 780, (1979); Henryetta 595 P.2d 781 Construc- Co., supra, note at Oil & Gas 3 33. Harris, Okl., 522, (1965); tion Co. v. 408 P.2d 531 Hitz, 369, 274, Paubel v. 339 Mo. 96 S.W.2d 373 Hennessee, Okl., 1033, Rogers 7. 602 P.2d 1034 (1936). (1979); Okl., Jack Linen Service v. Whan, Okl., 911, (1959); P.2d Good 335 913 924, (1967). 434 P.2d 926 Co., Julian v. Sinclair Oil & Gas 168 Okl. (1934). P.2d upon and an invitee who is business visitor is settled as a matter of law based record before us. to that care which would make the entitled reception.8 for his safe The materials do not eliminate key but questions tender of fact. The first “ordinary care” the licensee can The parking space issue centers Brown’s se- expect care” the and the “reasonable invitee employer’s cured from her wife. Brown was enjoy upon particular dependent can paying may not rental but this have been upon premises,9 frequency visitor’s inter-spousal attributable the Nicholsons’ premise knowledge of the conditions arrangement. The fact that the owner-wife s,10 permission grant and the extent approved parHng arrangement raises the Thus, “ordinary by the owner.11 care” or ed agency, employer’s and Brown’s guideline negli as a “reasonable care” agent. entry role as Brown’s status —wheth- gence meaning. actions does not have a fixed er that of licensee or invitee —can be shown *4 concept, It is a variable to be viewed as by either owner’s or that of shifting the of with circumstances each agent, the owner’s authorized who her em- ployer may case.12 have been.13 Because Brown’s
parking convenience could be deduced to court, According to the employer, have of mutual been benefit to her park might Brown awas licensee who entered the her status be elevated to that of a ing for her own business visitor —an invitee. All area benefit. This conclu these cir- present cumstances are sufficient to appears sion to rest on the notion that Brown’s Brown disputed question fact, status aas and required pay employer’s not was not wife of one of law.14 space. Heavy the use of the placed familiarity reliance is on Brown’s with Regardless precise entry of Brown’s status the ramp hazardous nature of the and knowl premises, on the owners owed her a edge previous of another woman’s fall. This keep exercise care to the reason- appears information to have been viewed as ably snares, dangers, traps, safe from hidden exculpating legal liability. owners from We familiarity and the like.15 Her with the con- reject appellate analysis the Nei dition of the is not fatal to her recov- flawed. ther Brown’s status as an entrant on owners’ ery,16 foreknowledge and whether her should hazard, property nor the any nature the if prevented have the harm is to be measured of incline, ramp’s she objective encountered can a reasonable and standard.17 Harris, totally 8. Henryetta partially supra, or obscured from vision or with- Construction Co. v. sight; note 2 at 530. generally, phrase drawn from most is presenting decep- used to denote a condition a tively appearance safety innocent of which cloaks Whan, supra, 9. Good v. note 3 at 914. reality danger.” a of Byford See also v. Town of 51; Asher, Hennessee, note 5 at supra, Rogers v. Hennessee, 1033; 10. 7 Rogers supra, note at v. 1034; supra, note at Sutherland v. Saint Fran- Asher, Byford supra, note 5 at 53. v. Town of 783; Inc., Hospital, note 2 at supra, cis Jack Travis, Healey note 7 supra, Linen Service Co. v. 3, Co., 11. Julian v. Sinclair Oil & Gas note supra, at 927. at 33. 53; Asher, 16. Byford note 5 at supra, v. Town 209, Drake, 12. City 69 Okl. v. 171 P. Shawnee Travis, Healey supra, note 7 Jack Linen Service v. 727, 730(1918). at 927. Texas, McCarroll, 13. Ry. 80 Okl. O. & E. Co. v. Asher, 17. See Byford note 5 at supra v. Town 282, 139, (1920). 195 P. 51, where it is stated: “Whether harm from an open depends and obvious defect actionable Harris, Henryetta supra, Construction Co. v. i.e., objective standard of due whether care— 525; note 2 at Healey Jack Linen Service v. Tra- ordinary under similar or like circumstances an vis, supra, note 7 at 927. prudent person would have been able see the being injured.” defect in time to avoid See also Harris, 15. See Henryetta Construction Co. note supra, Construction Co. v. pra, where it is stated: “A hidden at Jack Service Linen Co. danger within this rule of need not be note 7 at 927. conflicting indicates a timetable TRIAL The record COURT’S JUDG- REVERSED, concerning weather-stripping devices MENT AND THE CAUSE IS (The placed ramp. fact that such REMANDED on the FOR FURTHER PRO- precaution might was taken at all indicate CEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS nature.) inherently ramp’s dangerous PRONOUNCEMENT. deposition testimony indicates the Brown’s strips shortly KAUGER, C.J., LAVENDER, were installed her acci- and before HARGRAVE, OPALA,
dent and after that of someone else. Own- ALMA and WILSON interrogatories WATT, JJ., concur; ers’ answers to estimate the strips placed possibly years were there two SUMMERS, V.C.J., part in concurs and equally It is uncertain before fell. in part; dissents fall, standing whether Brown’s while strips, remnants of the was caused SIMMS, JJ., and HODGES dissent. strips’ disintegrated hidden snare due to the SUMMERS, Justice, Vice Chief form, existing or whether some other defect concurring part dissenting in part. danger or contributed to her fall. This un- certainty summary judgment inappro- makes only part opinion I dissent from that priate. open Whether the defect was requiring jury to make the licensee/invi- whether, approach- obvious as Brown was tee status determination. ing quo, offending locus condition *5 deceptively appearance pres- had a innocent question jury.18
ents a for the
By material in the record
owners did not establish that Brown was appropriate either a licensee or invitee. The OKLAHOMA, N.A., Appellee, BANK IV standard care cannot be determined until entry status is settled. The condition of SOUTHWESTERN BANK & TRUST presents disputed ques- a also COMPANY, Banking an Oklahoma tion of fact cannot a which be decided as Corporation, Appellant. adjudication. summary matter of law via a If, remand, these issues continue to be No. 86910. facts, pressed disputed questions- both Supreme Court of Oklahoma. jury’s should be submitted for the consider- 1) ation. The triers would then have to: determine a Brown’s status as licensee or 2)
invitee; applicable be instructed on the
degree guidelines given of care under in this 3)
pronouncement; finally decide wheth-
er owners met the standard of care due one
in Brown’s status.
ON CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY
GRANTED, THE COURT OF CIVIL AP- VACATED, THE
PEALS’ OPINION IS mg may 18. See Construction Co. inferences be drawn from the facts and pra, note 3 at See also Jack Linen circumstances in evidence as to whether the of- fending 'deceptively Service Co. v. where hazard did have a innocent general physical appearance’ ed, anticipat- it is stated: “While the condi- could not be its extent actor, might particular may tion be familiar to the neither the court nor this court trial nevertheless, peril apparent risk from the known defect could declare that the was obvious and occasion, given recovery precluded under the circumstances of a and that as a matter of If, here, incapable appreciation. jury.” conflict- law. The is one for the