44 Minn. 322 | Minn. | 1890
This is an appeal from a refusal of the district court to set aside and vacate an order made by it bearing date and filed January 5, 1888, relating to an order of the same court made September 12, 1887, directing the sale of the assets of a certain insolvent estate then in the hands of a receiver, and relating also to an order confirming the sale of these assets of date November 12th, of tire same year. The orders last mentioned — for a sale and confirming the same — were both considered in Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 41 Minn. 256, (43 N. W. Rep. 180.) The order dated
The object of the main suit, in which a receiver was appointed,— properly denominated a “special proceeding,” (State v. Severance, 29 Minn. 269; 13 N. W. Rep. 48,) — was to marshal the insolvent’s assets, to distribute the proceeds among such creditors as might establish a right to participate therein, and, finally, to obtain a judgment determining the rights and obligations of the corporation, and closing up its business affairs. In aid of this, in the course of administration, was the order made appointing a receiver, that directing a sale of the assets, and the one confirming the sale to respondent, all ap-pealable under the decisions of this court. State v. Severance, supra; In re Graeff, 30 Minn. 358, (16 N. W. Rep. 395;) Hospes' Case, supra. But that of January 5th was a common and ordinary interlocutory order of an administrative character made by the court relative to
The appellant urges, however, that his rights have been substantially affected by that part of the order which permits the respondent to retain in its hands a portion of the purchase-money, his position being that the payment of a dividend is thereby postponed. Under the order of January 5th, the respondent retains and holds a part óf the price, subject to the summary demand of the district court, just as would the receiver, or a designated depositary. When required for dividend purposes, the money must be forthcoming immediately. We fail to see how the formal' payment of this money into the court, or into the hands of its receiver, would promote a determination of the charge made by appellant that some of the claims against the insolvent, filed with the receiver, are fictitious and fraudulent, or how it would hasten the distribution of the assets among genuine creditors. The declaration of a dividend, as well as its size, depends not upon an actual delivery of the money to the court or to its receiver, but, in this case, more upon a final decision respecting the merits of the disputed claims; not upon a payment over of the money which may be used for distributing the percentage, but upon
Appeal dismissed.
ÍTote. a motion for a reargument of this case was denied October 16,1890.
Gilflllan, G. J., took no part in this decision.