49 Ga. App. 99 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Lead Opinion
G. E. Brown filed a claim with the Department of Industrial Relations against the Southern G. F. Company with Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company as insurance carrier, contending that he sustained a compensable injury while in the employ of the defendant company. The commissioner awarded the injured employee compensation, and on appeal to the superior court the award was set aside. This action of the superior court judge is made the subject of exceptions to this court.
Counsel for plaintiff in error insists that the judgment should be reversed and the award of the Department of Industrial Relations affirmed for the reason that there was some evidence to support the award. It is true, by many decisions of this court and of our Supreme Court, that findings of facts by the industrial commission, now the Department of Industrial Relations, in the absence of fraud, where supported by any evidence, are conclusive and can not be reviewed by any court. That body has been made the sole arbiter of facts presented before it, in the same sense that findings of facts
The evidence shows that the claimant was employed by the defendant company as a laborer, and that on the 22d day of November, while standing on a scaffold wrecking pans, he leaned over to pick up a tool that lay on the scaffold, and that something happened in his knee which caused him to suffer pain when walking and required medical attention some week or ten days thereafter. He did not report the injury to his employer until December 1, at which timé the company authorized him to seek medical attention. The insurance carrier, after deducting seven-days waiting period, paid him compensation until the 23d of December, when, upon a more thorough investigation, it discontinued payments and denied that the claimant had suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The- question is raised by defendant in error as to whether the injury received arose “out of” the employment of the claimant. The authorities cited in support of their contention that the injury did not arise “out of” the claimant’s employment have failed to convince us. It is true that the employee merely leaned over to pick up a tool; that he did not slip, and that nothing unusual happened, such as some outside physical force which caused the injury. The nature of the injury remains a mystery. There was no medical testimony adduced before the director hearing the case, and nothing to show why in leaning over in the normal way the injury happened. The defendant in error, in this connection, contends that doubtless the claimant bends over-to tie and untie his shoes and do many other things unrelated to his work, each day, and that therefore it can not be said that his -bending over to pick up a tool from which injury ensued arose “out of” Ms employment. We do not think the position of counsel is sound. The same might be said of many accidents that are compensable under this act. A laborer may doubtless pick up many heavy objects while not in the course of his employment, and may perhaps in doing so assume awkward posi
The important question that arises in this case is whether there must actually be some accident, in the technical sense of that word; that is, some unforeseen outside physical force which causes the injury, or whether, as in cases of this character, the injury itself, which is unforeseen and unexpected, is an accident, within the meaning of that word as used in the workmen’s compensation act. To conceive a correct construction of the word “accident” as used in the workmen’s compensation act it is necessary that we consider the nature of the act itself; for what purpose it was passed; what were the evils it was intended to obviate and the scope of its operation. The workmen’s compensation act arose, as does most public legislation, from a public demand. The law attempts to solve certain pressing problems which have arisen out of the changed industrial conditions of our time. The legislature has endeavored by this law to provide means by which employer and employee may, if they so choose, escape entirely from that very troublesome factor known as “personal injury litigation.” The means is a system by which every employee not guilty of wilful misconduct may obtain at once a reasonable recompense for injuries accidentally received in his employment, without lawsuit and without friction. The act was adopted to protect workingmen and their dependents from want in case of injury, on the theory that contributory negligence, the doctrine of fellow-servant negligence, and assumption of risk are inapplicable. It is based on the broad economical theory that the compensation is properly chargeable as a part of the cost of industrial activity and production. It is founded on the basic principle that industry should be made to bear the financial losses sustained by the workmen engaged therein through personal injuries, and its purpose is to furnish a remedy that will reach every injury sustained by a workman engaged in that industry. Thus compensation is awarded without reference to the fault of the employer or the care of the employee. It has therefore been held that although the statute is in derogation of the common law, due to its
In Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771 (180 Pac. 793), where the same question as in the case at bar was involved, it was said: “In the case of Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Limited, Appeal Cases (1903), p. 443, the House of Lords considered and disposed of the question. A workman employed to turn the wheel of a machine felt something which he described as a ‘tear in his inside,’ and examination disclosed a rupture. There was no evidence of any slip or wrench or sudden jerk. The injury occurred while the man was engaged in his ordinary work, and in doing, or trying to do, the very thing he aimed to accomplish. . . In the judgment delivered by Lord MacNaghten, reversing the court of appeal and directing an award of compensation, it was said: ‘If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to move something not easily moved, were to strain a muscle, or rick his back, or rupture himself, the mishap
Judgment reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurs in the judgment but not in all the rulings set out in the opinion.