146 So. 332 | La. Ct. App. | 1933
On September 15th, a traumatic cataract had begun to form. On October 13th, the date of his last visit to the eye specialist, he could see a moving light, but could not distinguish objects. He had no practical sight in the eye. That was his condition at the time of trial. His physician would not advise an operation, which would serve no useful purpose.
At the time of the accident plaintiff held what is termed an "Industrial Travel and Pedestrian Policy" with the Life Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. This policy provides that the holder is insured against bodily injuries received strictly in the manner stated in the policy subject to all the limitations in it contained. That:
"The premium charged in this policy has been adjusted to the liability assumed by placing therein various conditions, exceptions and limitations, and it is the intention of the parties that each of these limitations, exceptions, and conditions are to be literally construed, that none of them are to be stricken out or ignored or disregarded in its interpretation, either on the ground that they are ambiguous or wholly or partially or substantially repugnant or for any other reason, but each is to be given its full and literal meaning, it being further understood by the parties that the premium will buy only such protection as the terms of the policy literally show."
The premium paid was five cents weekly. Among other things insured against, we find the following:
"If insured shall be struck by actually coming in physical contact with a vehicle itself, and not by coming in contact with some object struck and propelled against the person by said vehicle."
The policy allows $500 for the total and irrecoverable loss of the entire sight of one eye. It provides that no indemnity will be paid unless the loss of eyesight occurs within thirty days from the date of accident.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the lower court rejecting his demand.
Because of the very liberal construction given insurance contracts by many courts, the first question is more troublesome.
It seems, from an examination of previous decisions involving this same defendant, that until recently the word "itself" did not appear after vehicle, in the policies of the company; neither did they contain the clause concerning objects propelled against insured by a vehicle, or the clause as to the literal construction of the policy. It is reasonable to assume, as counsel for plaintiff in his brief suggests, that these additions are due to two late decisions against it; that of Manness v. Life Cas. Ins. Co., decided by its own Tennessee court in 1930, and reported in
In both these cases the policy read "vehicle" without the restricting word "itself," and apparently did not contain the provision quoted supra as to the literal construction of the contract.
Other cases cited by plaintiff are not directly in point. In Kennedy v. Maryland Casualty Co. (D. C.)
In Union Indemnity Co. v. Storm,
To the contrary, the ruling in Gant v. Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co.,
"If the language of the policy is uncertain or ambiguous, and is susceptible to more than one construction, the court will adopt and apply that construction which is most favorable *334 to the insured. If, however, there is no uncertainty or ambiguity in the language of the policy there is no occasion for judicial construction; the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined in accordance with the plain, ordinary, and popular sense of the language which they have used in their contract."
In a Georgia case, that of Harley v. Life Casualty Ins. Co.,
So, in Inman v. Life Cas. Ins. Co.,
Counsel for plaintiff contends that insurer by adding after the words "vehicle itself" the further clause, "and not by coming in physical contact with some object struck and propelled against the person by said vehicle," enlarged the first clause to make the contract include all cases not excepted by the second clause.
We think the Manness Case, cited, supra, caused the insertion of this second provision; that it was intended only to recite a specific instance excepted, and not to enlarge the term "vehicle itself." This construction is made more reasonable by the clause in the policy, quoted supra, which exactly and definitely provides for a literal construction of the terms of the contract.
The premium paid on this policy was five cents per week. The policy says "the premium will buy only such protection as the terms of the policy literally show." While it is true the amount of the premium cannot affect the plain terms of the contract, it is a fact to be taken into consideration in construing doubtful clauses in the policy. Manuel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (La.App.)
Though the parties are not supposed to intend a contract of insurance so limited in scope as to be valueless, such a situation does not confront us here. The usual injury from an automobile results from being struck and run down by the vehicle itself. This is insured against. All that is excluded is the freak or unforeseen accident such as that occurring in the present case. This is not unreasonable, considering the premium paid and the other natural contingencies covered by the policy.
We are thoroughly familiar with and approve of the rule that ambiguities and doubtful clauses in insurance policies should be strongly construed against the insuring company which draws and prepares the contract. Corporation of Roman Catholic Church of Eunice v. Royal Ins. Co.,
It is also the rule in this state that when a provision of a policy is plain, it is the legal contract of the parties, and is the law of the case. Manuel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (La.App.)
Our Revised Civil Code provides as follows for the construction of contracts in general:
Article 1901. "Effect in general. — Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on those who have formed them.
"They cannot be revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties, or for causes acknowledged by law. They must be performed with good faith."
Article 1945. "Abrogation or modification — Constructionaccording to intention of parties. — Legal agreements having the effects of law upon the parties, none but the parties can abrogate or modify them. Upon this principle are established the following rules:
"First — That no general or special legislative act can be so construed as to avoid or modify a legal contract previously made;
"Second — That courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts according to the true intent of all the parties;
"Third — That the intent is to be determined by the words of the contract, when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences;
"Fourth — That it is the common intent of the parties — that is, the intention of all — that is to be sought for; if there was a difference in this intent, there was no common consent and, consequently, no contract."
The law of insurance is the same in Louisiana as in other states. Barry v. La. Ins. Co., 12 Mart. (O. S.) 493; Brooke v. La. Ins. Co., 5 Mart. (N.S.) 530, 542.
Like other contracts the cardinal rule is to give effect if possible to every part of the agreement. Wallace v. Ins. Co.,
A contract of insurance, like every other contract, is the law between the parties, and every stipulation therein must be construed as written. Dorsett v. Thomas,
The intention of the parties must be sought in the instrument itself. Bradley v. Nashville Ins. Co., 3 La. Ann. 708, 48 Am.Dec. 465; Collins v. Life Casualty Co. of Tenn.,
In the last-cited case, in holding that a motorcycle is not a motor-driven car, this *335 court said that a policy which "provides indemnity for loss * * * as herein limited * * *" is plain notice to the public that the liability is restricted to accidents "incurred only under the particular circumstances and conditions stated in the policy." In construing the policy, it took into consideration the premium of the "negligible sum of 50 cents per year."
We find the same rule for the construction of insurance policies followed by the United States Supreme Court. The intention of the parties is gathered from the policy alone. Home Ins. Co. v. Balt. Warehouse Co.,
The rules established for the construction of written instruments apply to contracts of insurance equally with other contracts. Liverpool London Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132,
Effect must be given to an insurance policy according to the fair meaning of the words used. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey,
The canon of construction that where the terms of an insurance policy are of doubtful meaning, construction favorable to the insured will be adopted, furnishes no warrant for avoiding hard consequences by importing into contracts an ambiguity which otherwise would not exist, or, under the guise of construction, forcing from plain words unusual and unnatural meanings.
Contracts of insurance must be construed according to the forms which the parties have used, to be taken and understood, in the absence of ambiguity, in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co.,
The same rules have been adopted in the common-law states generally. Corpus Juris, Vol. 32, p. 1147, et seq.; R. C. L., Vol. 14, p. 925, § 102, et seq.
In the last-cited authority we find:
"Courts have sometimes been too astute in their search for reasons to maintain the liability of insurance companies in the face of conditions limiting such liability. And yet a contract of insurance, in this regard, is no different from other contracts; and the function of courts is to construe them, not to make them."
An examination of the authorities discloses that the rules laid down for the liberal construction of insurance policies in favor of the insured apply with the same force to all contracts.
In the present case, if the wire which struck plaintiff had been attached to the automobile and used to secure the pipe to the truck, it would come under the reasoning, which we think was correct, in the Gilbert Case, supra. But it was not attached to or in any way an accessory to the truck. It was fastened around the end of some small pipe to hold them together for handling and shipment. The wire then was only a part of the load, and was not an accessory to or part of the truck.
Is the load carried by a truck a part of the truck itself?
The load is that which is deposited when the destination is reached. The vehicle is what comes back. It is not conceivable that a load of watermelons or chickens could, except by a most strained construction, be regarded as a part of the truck itself. If one having purchased a truck, upon going to get it, found it loaded with brick, would it ever occur to him that the brick were included in the purchase? If a driver was told to ascertain the weight of a vehicle, would any, but an imbecile, drive the loaded truck upon the scale? If, in other connections, the load is not considered by ordinary reasonable persons a part of the vehicle, it cannot be so considered in insurance policies, which we have been at some pains to show are construed as are other contracts. The distinction between the load carried and the vehicle itself is too plain and obvious to admit of ambiguity or doubt. That being true, under the rules of construction laid down above and the plain terms of this policy, plaintiff cannot recover.
The judgment rejecting plaintiff's demand is affirmed.
DREW, J., dissents.
