189 A.D. 158 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1919
Richmond Levering & Company, Inc., prior to June 27, 1917, owned all the issued stock of the Island Oil and Transportation Corporation of the par value of $22,500,000. The latter corporation owned or controlled valuable oil properties in the Republic of Mexico, including an oil well therein known as “ Tepetate No. 9 ” and a concession for building a pipe line for the transportation of oil from the well to the seacoast for shipment. This well was of great intrinsic value producing from 70,000 to 100,000 barrels of oil a day. The Island Oil and Transportation Corporation did not have the money necessary to properly develop its oil properties, build the pipe line and proper buildings and tanks for the storage of the oil, and also was obligated to make certain payments on the purchase of its property and for concessions held by it. Prior to June 1, 1917, Richmond Levering, the president of Richmond Levering & Company, Inc., called on the plaintiff and explained to him, the situation of the company and its need for immediate financial assistance. The plaintiff loaned to Richmond Levering & Company, Inc., the sum of $9,000 and a further sum of $10,000 for the purpose of protecting its properties and rights, and had procured a further sum of $15,000 by indorsing and securing the discount of its note. The plaintiff suggested a scheme for financing the Island Oil and Transportation Corporation, and secured from Levering
After several interviews the parties arrived at an agreement which was reduced to writing and signed on the 27th day of June, 1917. The agreement is quite lengthy but may be summarized as follows: It was between Richmond Levering & Company, Inc., party of the first part, and A. B. Leach & Co. and the plaintiff, parties of the second part. The parties of the second part agreed to advance to the party of the first part $50,000 upon receipt of a note of the Island Oil and Transportation Corporation for $300,000 in favor of the party of the first part and to be indorsed by it and Richmond Levering individually, payable in sixty days with interest at five per cent, and to be secured by fifty-one per cent of the stock of the Island Oil and Transportation Corporation and $160,000 face value of the debentures of said corporation. Within thirty days the parties of the second part were to advance the further sum of $250,000, or such' part thereof as the directors of such corporation might require. The parties of the second part to have the privilege of sending to Mexico their representatives to investigate and test the
The plaintiff and Leach agreed to indorse and discount the $300,000 note. Leach was to sell the securities of the corporation and thus secure the money to pay the note and furnish the $1,000,000 called for by the contract. The profits of the transaction were to be divided between them, A. B. Leach & Co. receiving two-thirds and the plaintiff one-third. It was thus contemplated that the corporation could be financed without the furnishing of cash by the Leach firm or the plaintiff in excess of the initial payments made by each of them. Plaintiff experienced difficulty in arranging the discounting of the $300,000 note. Leach proposed that instead of one note for $300,000, there should be two notes, one for $200,000, which he would take and advance the money,
A. B. Leach & Co. became joint adventurers with the plaintiff in the enterprise, and A. B. Leach & Co. could not exclude the plaintiff from the enterprise for the purpose of securing the entire benefit of the profits to itself. A joint adventure is subject to the same rules as a technical partnership. Where the partnership has for its object the completion of a specified piece of work, or the effecting of a specified result, it will be presumed that the parties intended the relation to continue until the object has been accomplished. Until that time arrives one partner cannot terminate the partnership and continue the enterprise for his own benefit, nor can one partner exclude the other without his consent. It may be terminated at any time by consent, but the consent must be mutual.
Leach first attempted to put the plaintiff in default by refusing to indorse the note for $100,000, and then demanding that plaintiff advance the $100,000, then notifying the plaintiff that he refused to exercise the option and significantly stating that either party could continue the matter; then Levering by representing that Leach was definitely out of the matter and that he must take up the matter with other parties which was impossible while the agreement with plaintiff was outstanding, obtained from plaintiff a release therefrom. We find Levering as soon as he could locate Leach resuming negotiations. Not content to await Leach’s return to the city, Levering follows him to his golf club, on Sunday, and exhibits to him the release that he has induced the plaintiff to sign and then resumes the enterprise with the understanding that Leach alone should receive the profit.
It is a well-settled rule that copartners and joint adventurers owe the duty of utmost good faith to their copartners and coadventurers, and that until the copartnership is terminated or joint adventure is abandoned a copartner or joint adventurer cannot act for himself. If he does and thereby obtains for himself the benefits that otherwise would accrue to the partnership or joint adventurers, he will he held liable in equity to account to his copartner or coadventurers. (May v. Hettrick Brothers Co., 181 App. Div. 3, 13; Stem v. Warren, 185 id. 823, 831.)
It is my opinion that A. B. Leach did not observe that good faith with the plaintiff that the law requires of coadventurers, and that with full knowledge of the conditions and with the sole design of excluding the plaintiff from participation in the profits of the enterprise, which the report of the engineer showed to be reasonably certain, he ostensibly withdrew from the enterprise, knowing full well not alone that without his
Clarke, P. J., Dowling, Smith and Philbin, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, with costs, and interlocutory judgment directed to be entered as stated in opinion. Order to be settled on notice.