| Mich. | Dec 6, 1898
(after stating the facts). It is con
1. It is urged that our statute makes no provision for the appointment of an executor unless actually named in the will. This point was raised in Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N.Y. 346" court="NY" date_filed="1875-04-13" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hartnett-v--wandell-3595104?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3595104">60 N. Y. 346 (19 Am. Rep. 194). It was held that the statute of that State did not abrogate the common-law power to delegate the appointment. There is nothing in our statute which shows any intention to abrogate it. There is no difficulty in carrying out the will of the testator in such case, and the probate court contains all the machinery necessary for the purpose. There may be good reasons in the mind of a testator for not making the designation himself. The person appointed by the will, might die before the probate of the will, and for this reason he might choose to repose the power in some prudent person, as the judge of the court having authority in such matters. Such right cannot be held to be abrogated except by express enactment or by necessary implication. Neither is found in our statute.
2. We’are of the opinion that the will conferred upon the judge of probate the power of appointment. One of the definitions of the word “leave” is “to confide, commit, or refer.” Cent. Diet. We find no case involving a provision identical with this. The case, In re Goods of Cringan, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 548, contained the following provision: “It is left to the legatees mutually to appoint two intelligent and trustworthy persons to execute this deed. ” The power to thus appoint was sustained. See, also, State v. Rogers, 1 Houst. 570.
It is, however, urged that the language of the will was used with reference to the statute, which provides that administration of the estate of a person dying intestate shall be granted to the widow or next of kin, or both, or
3. Counsel also contends that the real parties attempting to sustain the appointment of Mr. Brown are the heirs of Mrs. Merrifield, and that, she having died first, the personal property bequeathed to her is intestate, and therefore they have no interest in the estate. In support of this, counsel cites Allison v. Smith, 16 Mich. 405" court="Mich." date_filed="1868-04-14" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/allison-v-smith-6634057?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6634057">16 Mich. 405. In that case a college was the residuary legatee. The statute required such wills to be executed at least two months prior to the death of the testator. The question was whether the will was executed in accordance with the statute. It was held that this question properly arose upon the hearing for the probate of the will, and not upon the distribution of the property under it. No such question is here presented. All concede that this will was properly executed, and should be probated. The sole question is, Who is entitled to execute a valid will? The property rights under it will arise for determination during its execution, but cannot be litigated in this proceeding. In re Nugent's Estate, 77 Mich. 503.
A further reply to this contention is that Mr. Brown is entitled to defend his right of appointment; and, while the same attorneys who appear for the heirs of Mrs. Merrifield appear also for him, there is nothing to indicate that he is acting in collusion with them, or that he is not in a legitimate manner seeking to defend his own right. An executor, whether named in the will or by delegated power, has the right to defend in the courts his authority to act.
The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed, and the order of the probate court appointing Mr. Brown affirmed. Let it be so certified to the probate court.