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Brown v. Hovatter
561 F.3d 357
4th Cir.
2009
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*3 SHEDD, Cirсuit Judges. dormant Commerce Clause. support its dormant Commerce Clause ruling, part Affirmed part by reversed in court said that the “corporate Act’s [own- published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER ership] prohibition severely limits the abili- opinion, wrote the Judge ty of out-of-state businesses from opening joined. TRAXLER Judge SHEDD wrote Maryland.” home The parties separate concurring opinion. filed cross-appeals. follow, For the reasons that we affirm OPINION the district court’s respect conclusions with NIEMEYER, Judge: Circuit Equal to the Protection Clause and the Brown, Jenkins, Joseph Charles Brian Due Process Clause for substantially the Chisholm, Manuel, and Gail who refer same given by reasons the district court. themselves as “funeral and cemetеry en- Maryland’s And licensing because require- trepreneurs,” commenced this action to unjustifiably ments do not burden inter- strike as Mary- down unconstitutional the state we reverse the district land Morticians and Funeral Act Directors court’s dormant Commerce ruling. Clause of 3 of Currently, the stock Morti- its owners. bottom, conclude we

At the hands remains in corporations of the the 58 to each as constitutional Act is cians owners, stock of 30 and the original challenges. plaintiffs’ by out-of- held corporations those I national public individuals requires Act The Morticians it can claim The plaintiffs chains. mortuary science “practice who wish $250,000 the stock to purchase toup cost Mary- licensed [Maryland],” to be to hold grandfathered corporation aof Md. Board of Morticians. land State license. 7-301(a). qualify To § Health Occ.Code *4 good oper- be of and license, must wish to plaintiffs an individual own for a The four an completed character; through must have funeral establishments moral ate edu- specified individually being must have a without apprenticeship; form must have background; Maryland and resident cational is a Brown licensed. Maryland examina- and Ma- cemetery Hagerstown, national passed a who owns 303(b). § that tions. Id. a home funeral ryland, and who built 7— his Because operated by son. is now any individual who requires Act also under the Morticians not licensed Brown is to license a establishment” owns “funeral home he Act, the funeral he cannot own structure, ie., establishment, “building, a through built, like to do so he but would of which business from premises or corporation. conducted.” mortuary science is practicing 7-101(h). 7-310, indi- §§ Unlicensed Id. is Maryland who is a resident Jenkins establish- a funeral may not own viduals super- He is the as a mortician. licensed of executors ment, spouses and except a funeral establishment vising mortician §§ '7- individuals. Id. deceased licensed Maryland, County, George’s in Prince 7-308, 310(c)(2), 7-308.1. family. He indi- by his was built grandfa- except those Corporations, own like to own his would cates he 1945, licensed may not be corpora- thered as a through funeral establishment directors, §id. 7- or funeral morticians as afford to that he cannot He asserts tion. establish- may not own a funeral and corpora- grandfathered of a buy the stock ment, grandfa- § Under the 7-310. see id. going a license because tion that owns 1945, corporation, clause, a enacted ther $250,000.” “up rate is 1, 1945, that on that held a license June Maryland resident a former Chisholm is renewed, may own continually has been licensed in Florida. isHe who now resides funeral a establishment operate owns a a mortician and by Maryland as corpora- long so as as continue to do in Timoni- funeral establishment licensed exists, “any practice provided tion relocating to Florida um, Maryland. Since for the that is conducted mortuary science has business that his he statеs by a licensed indi- practiced corporation is ... as by a operated “subcontractor been 7-309(b), (d). parties § Id. vidual.” like would mortician.” He supervising corporations there are agree Maryland funeral expand his business 309(b), § that are under grandfathered 7— “ordinary corporation.” business as pro- in the business engage licensed to who, Maryland is a resident Manuel directing or embalm- “funeral fession of cemetery in owns corporation, a a through operate own and allowing them to ing,” not a Although she is Waldorf, Maryland. establishments, the stock of funeral mortician, like Manuel would by licensed freely is transferable corporations these operate, through own a corporatiоn, they are not currently pur- on grounds establishment suing because of the restriction[s]. This cemetery her “owning because a business substantial barrier to entry into Mary- through corporation way is the best to land funeral home industry imposes an states, operate.” however, She that her undue on burden interstate commerce in plans paying cannot include the “exorbi- comparison legitimate with the local inter- $250,000,” tant price, as much as for the protected law, ests by the which in fact are grandfathered stock of a corporation. none” and that therefore the restrictions on corporate and unlicensed individual short, plaintiffs each of the wants to ownership violate the dormant Commerce engage in the practice mortuary science Clause. through corporation, and two to do wish becoming

so without licensed. individually On cross-motions for summary judg- ment, each challenging Maryland’s Therefore rejected district court the plain- right to bar from li- being tiffs’ challenges the Morticians Act un- censed as morticians and owning licensed der the Equal Protection and Due Process *5 funeral Clauses, establishments and to require the concluding that “the Maryland owner of a funeral establishment to be a General Assembly could rationally have “licensed individual.” health, determined public’s that the safety and welfare are by furthered requiring The plaintiffs commenced this action that a licensеd mortician own the funeral against Maryland the State Board of Mor- home mortuary where science is prac- ticians and Funeral (“Mary- Directors court, however, ticed.” The sustained the land”) to declare the restrictions unconsti- plaintiffs’ challenge to the Act’s corporate enjoin tutional and to their enforcement. ownership prohibition under the dormant complaint, their plaintiffs the allege that Clause, Commerce concluding that it is “a they have been equal protection denied of protectionist piece legislation” of law, in violation Equal of the Protec- “clearly anti-competitive.” The court rea- tion Amendment, Clause of the Fourteenth soned: because there is no rational why reason The corporate prohibition severely limits they are not permitted to own funeral of ability out-of-state businesses homes through either a corporate form from opening a funeral home in Mary- grandfathered when corporations can do land. if Even one of the fifty-eight li- so or unlicensed as individuals when sur- available, censes does become a prospec- viving spouses and executors can do so. tive purchaser out-of-state pay must an They also contend that the Act price inflated for the license. un- The denies right them the “to earn honest disputed record in this case indicates living in the occupation of their choice that these burdens are intolerable imposing restrictions on ownership of clearly excessive in any relation to bene- funeral rationally homes are not relat- fits proffered by [Maryland]. ed to legitimate public purpose,” in violation the Due Process Clause The district court also held that the Morti- Fourteenth Amendment. they al- Finally, requirement cians Act’s that funeral estab- lege but for Maryland’s restrictions lishments be owned licensed individuals on corporate unlicensed individual was not properly challenged under ownership homes, of funeral persons and dormant Mary- Commerce Clause and that companies outside of the State pur- land could require corporations “would wishing to sue home funeral business opportunities in own funeral establishments to be them- benefits,” of the dor- in violation public directors by licensed owned

selves Clause. mant Commerce morticians. that the restrictions Maryland responds portion of from the appeal plaintiffs individual and unlicensed corporate on judgment upholding the district court’s com- not burden ownership do against equal Act Maryland Morticians [they] greater merce, result[] if “even challenges, as process due protection compa- certain costs or inefficiencies consider the refusal to the court’s well as between that “differences nies.” It notes ownership requirement licensed individual concededly ‘even handed’ and Maryland’s Clause. Commerce under dormant licensure stat- nondiscriminatory corporate portion from Maryland appeals And are to laws of other be ute and the states ruling that judgment mistaken for a should not be expected, and Act the Morticians ownership restriction Mary- commerce.” on interstate ‘burden’ Clause. Commerce the dormant violates the restrictions on funeral argues that land down court struck Because the district rationally jus- are ownership establishment Com- under the dormant Morticians Act the use tified because Clause, analysis by begin our we merce by peo- owned “causes such business be addressing that issue. anything know about” ple who do not fos- becаuse the restrictions business and II accountability greater degree ter regulators. It claims that following sup- claim the plaintiffs *6 Assembly had a basis for rational General that the port argument their “limiting home li- believing that funeral Unli- and on Act’s restrictions would foster to licensed individuals censes of funeral es- ownership censed individual accountability regu- to degree of greater Com- violate the dormant tablishments licensing the than would continued lators (1) the that result of as a merce Clause: inherently de- which are corporations, of in- restrictions, rate of “the out-of-state responsibility personal signed limit industry Maryland funeral vestment judg- legislative rational That of owners. ab- than would be significantly lower it is yield reаsonably expected be ment could (2) restrictions”; that challenged sent allowing the by [Morti- putative benefits effectively out-of- the restrictions exclude ‘protect the health Board to better cians’] industry “from entrepreneurs funeral state ” (Quoting public.’ Md. of welfare market, their despite funeral 7-103). § ‍‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍Health Occ.Code it,” “the because strong to enter desire states, Clause inves- The Commerce way for out-of-state only practical have Power ... Congress shall To Maryland is “The homes in tors to own funeral (3) among ... the several regulate Commerce ownership”; through corporate Const, I, 8, 3, § cl. States,” art. U.S. industry insiders “Maryland that this affirmative it is well-established a decade to indefatigably for ovеr fought “negative” authority implies a or grant of Assembly from elimi- prevent General power of on the suppress “dormant” constraint nating restrictions these legislation that interferes industry to enact States supply [in competition interstate commerce. See They profits.” with burdens Maryland] windfall with 447, 439, 111 498 Higgins, Dennis v. U.S. the restric- ways these conclude that (1991) (“It 865, L.Ed.2d 969 inter- S.Ct. 112 on “impose significant tions burdens however, clear, the Commerce countervailing also commerce without state

363 does more than confer power Clause on to economic protectionism, “discriminato- Government; it ry Federal is also a sub law is virtually per Davis, se invalid.” (internal permissible stantive restriction on 128 S.Ct. at 1808 quotation marks (inter regulation omitted); of interstate and citation commerce” see also Yamaha quotation omitted)); Corp., nal marks and citation Motor U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., Inst., 560, (4th Cir.2005). Healy 324, 1, v. 401 Beer 491 U.S. n. F.3d 567 If 2491, (1989) discrimination, there is no S.Ct. 105 L.Ed.2d 275 a court will (“This consider on long recognized Court has the second tier that this whether the state laws grant authority “unjustifiably affirmative of ... Congress burden the interstate flow of encompasses also articles of implicit or ‘dormant’ commerce.” Oregon Sys., Waste Inc. v. Dep’t limitation on the authority of the States to Envtl. of Quality Oregon, 93, 98, legislation enact 511 U.S. affecting com interstate 1345, S.Ct. merce”). (1994); 128 L.Ed.2d 13 Supreme recently As the Court see also Yamaha, observed, 401 F.3d at 567. In addressing “The modern law of what has whether a state law unjustifiаbly come to be called the dormant burdens Commerce commerce, interstate by the courts generally Clause is driven concern about econom apply test, is, ic so-called Pike protectionism under regulatory meas —that challenged law “will designed upheld ures be benefit in-state economic unless the burden imposed on interests com- burdening out-of-state com [interstate] merce is clearly excessive in petitors.” Dep’t relation to Ky. Revenue v. —Davis, putative local U.S. -, -, benefits.” Pike v. Bruce 128 S.Ct. Church, Inc., 1808, 170 (2008) (internal 137, 142, L.Ed.2d 685 90 S.Ct. quo (1970). omitted). 25 L.Ed.2d 174 tation marks and citation dormant Commerce Clause walks narrow case, In this no contention is made path leading attempts courts to “rebuff[] the Morticians Act discriminates to advance their states own commercial against and the dis interests curtailing the movement trict court concluded that there was no *7 commerce, articles of either into or out of any evidence of discriminatory purpose. state, generally the while supporting their Rather, presented the issue is whether the right ‍‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍impose to even regula burdensome individual licensure restric tions in the interest of local health and in tions the Morticians Act burden inter safety.” Sons, H.P. Hood & Inc. v. Du commerce, and, so, state if whether the Mond, 525, 535, 657, 336 U.S. 69 93 S.Ct. burden “clearly justi is excessive” and not (1949). Thus, L.Ed. not all economic fied putative local begin benefits. We harms or anticompetitive choices are inquiry by identifying the commerce remedied through application the implicated and how the Morticians Act Clause, dormant Commerce but rather purportedly it. burdens only those that unjustifiably burden inter The regulates Act prac- the state commerce. tice of mortuary science in Maryland, analysis

The for determining operation which includes the of funeral whether a state establishments, law violates the dormant preparation the of dead proceeds Commerce Clause on two tiers. bodies for disposition, and the arrange- tier, inquires On the first it whether the disposition ment for final of dead bodies. state against law discriminates interstate §§ See Md. 7-301(a), Health Occ.Code 7- 302, commercе. Unless discrimination is de 7-101(p),(q). practice of mortu- monstrably justified by a factor unrelated ary inherently science is profession, a local by the Morticians imposed tions that are to have the by relatives used

typically education, expe- professional to Act relate prepared family members dead of bodies Thus, entry accountability. rience, and pro- disposition or other for burial market Maryland funeral services into the visitation, mourning, and facility for vide a the indi- choices of only by the is limited providing Indeed, than other services. his or her allocate to how best to vidual as caskets, are not out-of-state Act, the time and resources. the Morticians way regulated оf through practice the provided service Clause The dormant Commerce within and ends begins mortuary science placed on by burdens implicated flow the State. goods, flow of interstate commerce—the of es- and the profession licensing commerce materials, articles of and other practiced, it is at which tablishments Sys., Oregon Waste lines. across state See purport not Act does Maryland Morticians (stating that at 114 S.Ct. 1345 Maryland, activity outside regulate “denies Clause the dormant Commerce provid- the services only on and it focuses to discrimi unjustifiably power States a funeral establishment ed flow the interstate against or burden nate regulation Maryland. Importantly, commerce”); v. Alex Hughes of articles affect, address, thereby nor does not 794, 803, 96 Corp., 426 U.S. Scrap andria of commerce any goods or articles flow (1976) (noting L.Ed.2d 220 S.Ct. regulation con- across lines. history by the established that it is “well of ser- provision only cerns itself with Clause, this Nation is the Commerce in the establishment physical from a vices cannot state lines market which common Act Thus, purports the Morticians State. flow of both to the free be made barriers inherently industry that is regulate goods in re raw materials finished interstate, local, in nature. not supply to the economic laws sponse demand”). it a trade barrier to And is Moreover, Act does not the Morticians materials, and other goods, flow of any differ- free out-of-state persons from treat across state lines articles of commerce Any person— in-state. ently persons than Clause. the dormant Commerce a li- violates may obtain or out-of-state in-state — or to restrict purport does not The Clause mortuary science and practice cense protect nor limit intrastate establishment in operate a funeral own and intrastate participants limit on is no Maryland, and there way markets, participants’ chosen may nor the State of licenses number *8 Corp. v. See Exxon Likewise, doing business. respect to the 58 with issue. Md., 98 U.S. 437 owning licens- Governor grandfathered (“We (1978) 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d out-of-state S.Ct. es, corporation, or any person underlying aсcept appellants’ ... Indeed, cannot in-state, the stock. may or own protects Clause that the Commerce corpo- notion grandfathered one-half of the over op methods of or particular structure by out-of- publicly-held are rations owned “particular or in a retail market” eration corporations. state firms”). sum, may practice In individual struc- Yet, particular precisely fu- it is Maryland, own a mortuary in science Mary- in the of operation ture or methods Maryland, in or own neral establishment funeral services market land retail corporation grandfathered the stock of in this case com- plaintiffs about which operate a Maryland license to hоlding a on the flow of a burden plain, not about only restric- establishment. funeral regulated articles of commerce across lines. state the State. Their complaints complaints regulation Their about the cen- do not placed involve burdens on the inter- pre- ter around either the inconveniences state movement of goods, materials, or personally sented to them or the restric- other articles of and the mat- they tions on how prefer would to run ters of they complain manner —the their when operating Mary- businesses of professional practice Maryland —are land. not matters protected by the dormant Commerce Clause. As Supreme Court They assert corрorate ownership Exxon, stated in “We cannot ... accept funeral establishments would fi- facilitate appellants’ underlying notion nancing, would them from protect personal Commerce protects Clause particular liability, and would enable pass them to structure or methods of operation in a others, particularly business on to fam- retail market.... protects [T]he Clause ily addition, they members. In state that market, the interstate not particular inter- operating through a corporation would firms, prohibitive from or burden- simply preferable be a way doing busi- Exxon, some regulations.” 437 U.S. at states, ness. Brown “I want to own and 127-28, 98 S.Ct. 2207. operate a establishment on the grounds of Cemetery, Rest Havеn Ibut do Exxon, a Maryland provided statute not want to become licensed mortician.” producers or petroleum refiners of states, Jenkins “It is no coincidence that products, Shell, such as Exxon and could largest funeral establishments Ma- operate not retail service stations within ryland ... up through are spe- set the 58 Maryland. Exxon and petroleum other cial corporate licenses ‘grandfa- under the producers and refiners challenged the stat- simply ther’ clause. I want to be able to ute on constitutional grounds, including do what the law allows those businesses Clause, the dormant Commerce pointing to and businesspeople Chisholm, to do.” who evidence that the statute’s divesture re- ais mortician in Maryland licensed but quirements would cause at least three re- Florida, states, who lives chal- “[T]he finers to stop selling gasoline Maryland, lenges of running Maryland business depriving competition consumers of Florida, from particularly with respect to special even certain services. Supreme financing liability, make rejected argument, Court noting that ownership essential if I expand am to subjected commerce is “interstate not Chisholm according Funeral Services impermissible an burden simply because my plans.” And Manuel states: “Neither regulation otherwise valid causes some my husband I nor want to devote the time business from to shift one interstate sup- money becoming licensed funeral anоther,” plier to even if it “change will directors ... Ideally, morticians. we market structure weakening inde- want to own operate proposed our Exxon, pendent refiners.” U.S. funeral home an ordinary as business cor- 127, 98 2207. The explained: S.Ct. Court *9 poration ... plans [but] [o]ur do not allow protects [T]he Clause the interstate pay us to price, the exorbitant as much as market, particular firms, not ‍‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍interstate $250,000, that ‘grandfather’ one these from prohibitive or regula- burdensome corporations cost.” may tions. It be true that the consum- short,

In plaintiffs the challenging are ing public injured by will be the loss of way the Maryland authorizes them to do high-volume, low-priced the op- stations business within profession the State in. a independent refiners, erated the but the exist- by giving Harley-Davidson, the wis- and relates to argument that

again cre- protest statute, ing right on dealers not to its burden of the dom pro- a dealership through a ation of new commerce. resolve,” years to that “could take cess 127-28, 2207. 98 S.Ct. Id. at Yam- were “frivolous.” protest if the even us, the Mor- case before in the Likewise (internal quotation aha, at 571 401 F.3d the flow of prohibit Act “does not ticians omitted). Moreover, a and citation marks upon added costs place goods, interstate of a appointment protest could dealer and in-state them, distinguish between dealership if the new even new dealer mar- in the retail companies out-of-stаte State, 500 miles some across were Exxon, 98 S.Ct. at ket.” U.S. the rele- indisputably outside of away and con- fact, funeral home large In 2207. for protesting dealer market of the vant Mary- in the presence a have glomerates Yamaha, an out- motorcycles. Id. selling market, not as albeit land services and distributor manufacturer of-state that But the like. fact large they would as under challenged the statute motorcycles, regu- permissible of this the burden Clause, arguing Commerce the dormant may that have on lation falls unjust- created Virginia statute that the itself, not, by “does operations interstate on interstate commerce ifiable burden the dormant Com- a [violation establish ability to distribute burdening Yamaha’s Id. Clause].” merce Agreeing with motorcycles Virginia. in Further, companies the oil just like claim, concluded the Vir- Yamaha’s we Exxon, complain that plaintiffs signifi- indeed ginia “ereate[ ] statute did Maryland consumers Act hurts Morticians entry ... because cant barrier market The up the of funerals. and drives costs certainty protest of a when- virtual however, falls on regulation, of this burden authorize attempts to a manufacturer ever consumers, not on interstate Maryland (internal quotation dealership.” Id. a new bur- complaint about this and omitted). Because the marks citations [Mary- wisdom den “relates increasing face of in costs in the delay statute, on [inter- not to its burden land] motorcycles caused Virginia demand Exxon, at state] commerce.” forego Harley-Davidson to Yamaha added). (emphasis 98 S.Ct. dealers, we establishing new concluded heavily on deci- rely our plaintiffs “heavy imposed Virginia that the statute v. Corp., U.S.A. Yamaha sion in Motor in- on out-of-state predominantly burdens (4th Inc., 401 F.3d 560 Motorcycle, Jim’s com- “unduly thus burden[ed] terests” Cir.2005), claim their support at Id. 573. merce.” the dormant Com- Act violates Morticians Yamaha, They assert merce Clause. Thus, Yamaha invalidated statute un- Virginia statute struck down a of motor- aimed at the interstate was flow Clause, is “di- dormant Commerce der the Yamaha, cycles Virginia. into Unlike legal basis provided rectly on-point Act is however, Morticians clause commercе district court’s for the goods, flow of interstate not aimed in this case. ruling” materials, or articles of commerce. of a regulation Act is a local Yamaha, issue Virginia statute at are where services profession localized motorcycle existing protection to provided entirely Maryland. for clients performed the creation Virginia against dealers at the flow than aiming Rather motorcycle manufac- dealerships by *10 new aimed commerce, Act is the Morticians of such as Yamaha turers and distributors making morticians and principles funeral directors apply this case to support Maryland directly accountable clients “the notion that ownership of Maryland whо come to them in provide may be limited in highly occupa- skilled funeral at their services funeral establish- licensing tions where required, is such as Maryland. ments in Yamaha does not ad- mortuary science.” vance plaintiffs’ argument the the Maryland “limiting asserts that Act imposes unjustified Morticians bur- home licenses to licensed individuals [will] den on interstate commerce. greater foster a degree of accountability to

Because the Morticians Act regulators does not than would the continued licens- place a barrier or burden on the flow of ing corporations, inherently are commerce, it violate designed does not the personal to limit the responsibili- dormant Commerce Clause. But if ty even it of owners. That legislative rational place was considered to an incidental bur- judgment could reasonably be expected to den on yield incidental burden putative by allowing benefits would not in light be excessive of the Board to ‘protect [Morticians’] better ” putative from regulation. benefits the Act’s health and welfare of public.’ (Quot- 7-103). ing § Md. Health Occ.Code And Maryland While does not have extensive position State’s is by indeed advanced Act, explaining purpose records complaint in this case and the affida- Supreme recognized Court has plaintiffs vits of the they where assert that promoting familiarity between an owner they desire to use the corporate form be- and his business in a regulat licensed and cause they “want to be insulated from industry legitimate ed is a local interest. personal liability for ... negligence.” See North Dakota State Bd. Pharmacy This is precisely the kind of personal re- Stores, Snyder’s Inc., v. Drug 414 U.S. sponsibility that the Morticians Act wishes 156, 166-67, 407, 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 379 Indeed, to maintain. State (1973); see also Supreme v. Goldfarb Board of expressed this con- Va., (4th 859, Court 766 F.2d Cir. cern, claiming that unlicensed individuals 1985) (recognizing that a exempt state law and corporations would be less accounta- ing from lawyers examination licensed out Thus, ble. provides Morticians Act of state Virginia who moved into prac liability individual and therefore more di- full provides tice time a putative local ben rect accountability for owners of funeral efit practice because “the full-time require plaintiffs establishments while the desire promotes ment familiarity with Virginia liability. less individual This is the type of among law attorneys who passed have not legislative decisionmaking into which examination”); the state bar (recogniz id. courts should avoid inserting themselves. ing power the “broad [of States] estab See, Harris, e.g., v. Powers 379 F.3d lish standards for licensing practitioners (10th Cir.2004) (“While the creation and regulating practice professions” of such a libertarian paradise may be a (internal quotation marks and citation worthy goal, Plaintiffs must turn to the omitted)). broadly, More a State “has a us”). institution, ... electorate for its not substantiаl interest in preventing the cor porate form becoming short, from a shield for we conclude that the Morti- unfair dealing.” business Corp. CTS v. cians Act’s incidental burden on interstate Dynamics Am., Corp. 69, 93, justified commerce not excessive and is (1987). 107 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d 67 very protecting real benefits of district recognized court ‍‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍very health, these public safety, and welfare en-

368 in good by registered pharmacists a the owner of owned familiarity of

couraging day-to-day in the day-to-day standing work- who are active with funeral business creating account- association. ings corporation of that business affairs Ac- to clients. ability regulators corpo on upholding In those restrictions the district court’s reverse cordingly, we ex ownership, Supreme Court rate the dor- the Act violates conclusion relationship a rational exists plained that mant Clause. Commerce ownership restricting corporate between quoting approval Ill with professions, and the in dissenting opinion Holmes’ Justice Due Pro addressing plaintiffs’ In Liggett Baldridge, K. Co. v. Louis argu Equal Protection Clause cess and 57, 105, 114-15, L.Ed. 204 49 S.Ct. 73 ments, court’s agree with the district we (1928) (Holmes, dissenting): J. Be rejecting arguments. these reasoning Act is an economic cause the Morticians criticism of the use of cor- standing “A un may not strike it down regulation, we it in business is that causes porations arbitrary, without “wholly it is less by people to be owned such business Inc. v. in reason.” Guardian Plans basis it. Ar- anything do not know about who Cir.1989) (4th F.2d Teague, 870 supposed to be gument has not been (internal marks and citation quotation necessary in that the di- order show omitted). words, such In other to survive power of control and vorce between only Act need be “rational challenges, the selling of knowledge is an evil. The interest.” legitimate to a ly related in knowledge calls for drugs poisons Id. after en- high degree, a and [the State] already recognized has Our court safeguards has acting a series of other “legitimate interest that a State has that in that matter the divorce provided health, safety and welfare protecting course, not- not be allowed. Of shall of the funer through regulation its citizens withstanding requirement Plans, F.2d profession.” al Guardian formed all the corporations hereafter may “ration legislature at 126. A State’s pharma- shall licensed stockholders be arrange ally keeping determine[ ] cists, for a possible it still would be of funerals in the hands of licensed ment to content himself with stockholder would benefit professionals and to take no hand drawing dividends in funeral public by ensuring competence obviously affairs. But company’s arrangement. inquiry Our [under likely be more to observe he would Due Process Claus Equal Protection and intelligent eye than a with business ends here.” Id. es] only casual investor who looked to the Moreover, there is a rational basis standing of the stock in the market. corporate and unlicensed individu- restrict it a The Constitution does not make ownership professional al businesses. that it preventive legislation condition of Bd., 414 Pharmacy See North Dakota U.S. It perfect work a cure. should 166-67, Dakota 94 S.Ct. 407. North a mani- enough questioned if the act has Board, Pharmacy legis- the North Dakota or at least to make tendency fest to cure required lature order to obtain the evil less.” permit operate pharmacy, appli- Bd., 414 at 166— North Dakota State U.S. registered pharmacist cant had to be a rationality 407. The same S.Ct. good standing corporation or a or associa- on tion, upholding the restrictions majority of stock must be exists whose *12 unlicensed individual owner- ship in the Morticians Act. lаw need not every [T]he be in respect rationality restricting corporate The logically consistent with its aims to be Act ownership the Morticians is not enough constitutional. It is that there is by exemptions contained in undermined correction, evil at hand for and that it Act, long exemptions so as the too are might thought be particular leg- rationally Goldfarb, based. See 766 F.2d islative measure way was rational at (finding exemption 862-63 rational an correct it. from a state bar exam for out-of-state day The is gone when this Court uses lawyers Virginia practice who moved to the Due Process Clause of the Four- full time though applicants gener- even bar teenth Amendment to strike down state ally being must takе the bar exam before laws, regulatory of business and indus- licensed). conditions, trial they may because be Act, In the unwise, improvident, or out harmony historically held licenses in the funeral with a particular school of thought.... business were allowed to continue to hold protection For against by legisla- abuses licenses because the Assembly General people tures the polls, must resort to the protect wanted to reliance interests of not to the courts. family reason, For a members. similar Okla., Williamson Optical Inc., v. Lee spouses of exempt- deceased licensees are 483, 487-88, 75 S.Ct. being spouse, ed from licensed to allow the (1955) (internal L.Ed. 563 quotation marks presumably already who was involved in omitted). and citations business, the affairs of the to continue the provides business. The Act also an ex- IV emption licensees, for executors of allow- We conclude that the Morticians Act

ing operation the temporary of the funeral does not violate the dormant Commerce to wind establishment down the affairs of Clause, accordingly we reverse the the business. The fact that the General district judgment court’s in that regard. Assembly created exemp- these rational alsoWe conclude that the Act does not tions does not undermine the overall ra- violate the Equal either Protection Clause tionality of the Morticians Act based on its Clause, or the Due accоrding- Process relationship legitimate government to a ly we affirm the district court in that re- purpose. Goldfarb, See 766 F.2d 862- gard. 63. plaintiffs’ position boils down to a judgment of the district court is

disagreement Assembly’s with the General therefore judgment in refusing to authorize a differ- AFFIRMED IN PART AND RE- ent structure for practicing mortuary sci- IN PART. VERSED in Maryland. ence disagreement, This however, is not a basis on which to render SHEDD, Judge, Circuit concurring: the Morticians Act unconstitutional. may needless, law exact a

[A] wasteful I judgment concur reached requirement many majority. eases. But it is for As to the dormant Commerce legislature, courts, issue, not the to balance Clause I concur to the extent advantages ‍‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍and disadvantages of the we find “that the Morticians Act’s inciden- ... requirement. tal burden on interstate commerce is not very real by the justified excessive health, public protecting

benefits *13 encouraging famil- welfare

safety, and a funeral business owner of

iarity of the that busi- workings of day-to-day

with regu- accountability to creating

ness Op. at Majority clients.” See

lators and to

367-68. America, STATES

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MADRIGAL-VALADEZ,

Eliazer

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-4681. Appeals, States Court

United Circuit.

Fourth 29, 2009.

Argued: Jan. April 2009.

Decided:

Case Details

Case Name: Brown v. Hovatter
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 27, 2009
Citation: 561 F.3d 357
Docket Number: 08-1121, 08-1125
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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