(Aftеr stating the foregoing facts.) The plaintiffs in error seek reversal of the judgment of the trial court on the theory that the plaintiff was a mere licensee on the premises, and that the defendants did not wilfully and wantonly injure him. The defendant in error contends, on the other hand, that he was clearly an invitee to whom the defendants owed ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. The Code, § 105-401, provides: “Where the owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upоn his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and аpproaches safe.” The Code, § 105-402, provides: “A licensee is a person who is neither a customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does not stand in any contractuаl relation with the owner of the premises, and who is permitted expressly or impliedly to go thеreon merely for his own interest, convenience or gratification. The owner of such рremises is liable to a licensee only for wilful or wanton injury.” In
Cook
v.
Southern Railway Co.,
53
Ga. App.
723, 725 (
It is urged by the plaintiffs in error that the sole purpose of the visit of the plaintiff and his friend was to buy an automobile from Pirkle, and that the other interest was only incidental. We can not subscribe to that view. The petition alleges that in response to an express invitation from Pirkle, “who was in charge of running the business for the defendants,” the plaintiff and one Maddox went upon the prеmises for two purposes: 1. “To sample the products of manufacture and to inspeсt the machinery, equipment and operation of the plant.” 2. “At the same time to discuss with him [Pirkle] the proposed sale of an automobile which the defendant Pirkle was attempting to sell the plaintiff and his business partner, one Maddox, who was with the plaintiff at the time.” If it be true that they went upon the premises to sample the products of manufacture, a soft drink, the fact that they were also interested in purchasing an automobile from Pirkle would not nullify the first named purрose or the status of the plaintiff. Hence, the question arises: Was the plaintiff an invitee in thе process of entering upon the premises to sample the product in responsе to the invitation? To sample the “soft drink under the name and style of Mil-Kay Bottling Company” might readily be conceived as something of interest to the plaintiff. It is common knowledge that the public generally enjoys the consumption of soft drinks, and that sampling of a product often inducеs one to become its devotee. It requires no stretch of the imagination to suggest that аssociated with the generosity of the donor here was the hope, expectatiоn and interest that the sampling would produce some benefit to it in the way of good will and customers. Thus the allegations here show facts and circumstances which would authorize the jury to find that the visit of the plaintiff was one of mutual benefit to him and the defendants and constituted *882 him an inviteе. It is further shown that a portion of the building in proximity to that into which the plaintiff was conducted had been improperly and dangerously constructed, with the result that the overloaded platform fell upon the ceiling of the office into which the plaintiff had been led, and that the cеiling collapsed, and it, the platform, debris, bottles and crates, which had been stored upon the platform, fell upon and injured the plaintiff as described in the petition. The petition as amended set forth a cause of action against the defendants, and the court did not err in overruling all grounds of demurrer.
Judgment affirmed.