119 Minn. 491 | Minn. | 1912
Appeal by William H. McGrath, James E. McGrath and Eobert W. McGarry from an order of the district court for Crow Wing-county, denying their application for leave to answer in the matter of the application of Thomas H. Brown to have registered the title to certain lands therein, under the provisions of E. L. 1905, c. 65.
The motion was presented solely upon affidavits and documentary evidence, from which it appears, without controversy, that the applicant was on March 10, 1911, the record owner of the lands in question, and on that day fthed an application for the registration thereof. The matter was duly referred to the examiner, who, on-March 28, reported that the land was vacant and unoccupied, and whthe the applicant’s title was proper for registration, yet certain-parties not concerned in the present litigation should be joined as-parties to the proceedings. Neither Ered Hagadorn, under whom the appellants claim, nor the appellants were mentioned therein. On-April 7, the summons issued in the proceedings, and was served on-all of the parties mentioned in the report of the examiner, and on June 8 all parties defendant, except those mentioned as not being-material, were in default. On August 4, 1911, the appellants and Fred T. Hagadorn entered into a contract, reciting substantially that he was the owner of the land which is the subject of this action, but that his title was being attacked and litigation thereof was-threatened by certain parties claiming pretended title thereto, and he was desirous of obtaining money and legal assistance to defend his title, if required so to do, and therefore he sold and agreed to convey to appellants by warranty deed an undivided two-thirds of the prem
“And the party of the first part [Hagadorn] consents and directs that judgment be entered adjudging that he has no right, title or interest in said land, and that title be adjudged in the party of the second part [Brown] in those certain proceedings now pending in the district court of said Crow Wing county brought by the second party to register the title to said land.”
On March 16, 1912, the application of the appellants to answer in the said proceedings in their own behalf was made, the proposed answer alleging that Hagadorn obtained title to the property by adverse possession and conveyed the same to them by his deed delivered November 2, 1911, and from the order denying such motion this appeal was taken. Appellant James E. McGrath is a brother of William H. McGrath, and appellant Robert W. McGarry was a business associate of both, especially in land transactions.
In addition to the undisputed facts appearing as recited above, affidavits were presented on the part of the moving parties tending to show that Hagadorn acquired title by adverse possession. The showing in this regard, however, was meager, and it appeared from the affidavits offered in opposition, and it was undenied, that Hagadorn had never paid any taxes on the land, that he never had color of title thereto, and, further, that on August 10, 1910, he wrote applicant requesting permission to act as his agent in the sale of the land or in the drilling thereon. The affidavits were also conflicting concerning Brown’s knowledge of either the contract or the deed between Hagadorn and the appellants. '■
1. Coming now to the merits of the appeal, the appellant contends that his application miist be considered on the theory that James E. McGrath and Robert W. McGarry had no notice of the registration proceedings until after Brown obtained the deed from Haga
2. The appellants contend that they were entitled to answer as a matter of right. This claim is predicated, as we understand it, upon the ground that R. L. 1905, § 3396, provides a six month’s limitation for the bringing of an action questioning a decree of registration, and that they had the right to answer within such six months. This contention cannot be sustained. It is in contravention of R. L. 1905, §§ 3394, 3395, the latter section providing that, where any interest in the land sought to be registered is acquired subsequently to the filing of a copy of the application to register with the register of deeds, and prior to the entry of decree, the party so acquiring such interest shall “at once” appear and answer as a party defendant. The moving parties have not brought themselves within the provisions of this section. Even if the expression “at once” be construed as meaning within a reasonable time, under the circumstances of the case, as contended by the appellants, still the moving parties did not comply with the requirement of the statute; for it must be held that they had notice of the registration proceedings more than six months before making their application to answer, and after acquiring their alleged interest in the land. Section 3395 does not prohibit the acquisition of interest in lands pending proceedings to register, and prior to the entry of decree therein; but in such event the person so acquiring the interest must appear and answer as a party defendant “at once,” so that the decree shall adjudge the interest of such person. We hold that the moving parties were not entitled to answer as a matter of right.
3. The question remains, however, as to whether the court abused
Several other and interesting questions have been raised and discussed on this appeal, but the conclusion reached, as above announced, dispenses with the necessity of their consideration.
Order affirmed.