135 P. 993 | Mont. | 1913
delivered the opinion of the court.
Yictor M. Foster having been declared elected alderman from the second ward of Clyde Park, this proceeding was instituted to contest his right to the office upon the ground that at the time of the election he had not been a resident of the town of Clyde Park, or of the second ward thereof, or of the territory embraced within either for two years immediately preceding his election. Upon the trial the court found these charges to be sustained and concluded that the contestee was ineligible to the office. A judgment was rendered and entered ousting him and canceling his certificate of election. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The election was the first after the incorporation of the town of Clyde Park, and this appeal raises but a single question, viz.: Does section 3228, Revised Codes, apply to officers elected at such an election? The section reads as follows: “No person is eligible to any municipal office, elective or appointive, who is not a citizen of the United States, and who has not resided in the town or city for at least two years immediately preceding his election or appointment, and is not a qualified elector thereof.”
The history of a -statute frequently furnishes the very best key to its interpretation. Prior to 1887 there were not any general municipal laws in the territory of Montana. Cities were incorporated and governed by special Acts, and the provisions of these several special statutes were not at all harmonious.- In one city the qualifications of an alderman were much more exacting than in another. In an Act entitled “An Act relating to the
In its plan the general Municipal Aet of 1887 was a single bill having 126 sections. When codified, it was treated as one chapter (Chapter 22, Fifth Div., Comp. Stats., above). The Code Commissioners arranged their proposed Codes in Parts, Titles, Chapters, Articles, etc., and their .proposed municipal statutes were all under Title 3, Part 4, of the Political Code. The proposed statute upon the subject, “Organization and government of cities and towns,” was found in Chapter 3, and this Chapter was subdivided into Articles. These provisions thus arranged were all adopted without substantial change. Article 1 of Chapter 3 is entitled “Proceedings for the organization of a city or town and adding contiguous territory.” Article 2 is entitled “Officers and elections.” The first four sections of Article 1 deal with the incorporation of cities and towns and the election .of the first complement of officers. In their preparation the Code Commissioners simply borrowed sections 315, 316 and 318 of the Compiled Statutes above, with their amendments. There is not a single substantial change, even in verbiage. The remaining sections of Article 1 deal with additions and are substantially copied from sections 319, 321, and 322 of the Compiled Statutes. In the remaining Articles of-Chapter 3 the commissioners departed somewhat more generally from the Municipal Act of 1887 with its amendments, but covered every subject in the same general way.
The Municipal Act of 1887 was a comprehensive whole. Its language throughout forbids the assertion that the qualifications prescribed for mayor and alderman did not apply to those chosen at a first election after incorporation, as well as to like officers chosen at subsequent elections. Throughout all the amendments
Counsel for appellant contend, however, that, since section 3228 is found in Article 2 of Chapter 3, it ought not to be construed as applicable to officers whose election is provided for in Article 1 of that Chapter. They insist that “these two Articles are absolutely independent of each other.” But, if they are independent of each other for any purpose, they are for all purposes, and counsel’s argument pursued to its legitimate conclusion, if adopted, would lead to this result: That between a first election after incorporation and the next annual municipal election the newly incorporated city or town would have a full quota of officers, but they would be without authority to act and could not receive any salaries or other compensation, for the provisions for salaries are found in Article 2, while the statutory delegation of powers is found in other Articles of Chapter 3. This absurd conclusion only emphasizes the fallacy of the argument and serves to impress the idea that the entire Municipal Code, comprising all of Title 3 (sections 3202-3549), is to be treated as one statute whose provisions are interdependent.
But appellant’s position is untenable for another reason. In the absence of any statutory rule we would be required to construe the two Articles together, if possible, for they are
From its legislative history and its obvious meaning, when viewed in the light of the elementary rules of construction, our conclusion is that section 3228, above, is of general application in the Municipal Code and controls aldermanic candidates who aspire to office at a first election after incorporation, as well as to those who seek like honors at subsequent elections, and that the trial court’s conclusion from the undisputed facts is correct.
The judgment is affirmed.
■Affirmed.