253 F. 15 | 2d Cir. | 1918
Lead Opinion
(after stating the facts as above). That the defendant Braker is an incompetent spendthrift, of no judgment whatever, may be quite true. His father’s opinion of his wisdom is
In 231 Fed. 92, 145 C. C. A. 280, this court had not Braker before it; he was not then served. When he was brought in the Surrogate’s decree was years old, and upon the trial of this case he proved a chain of connections between Burr, who was to all intents the New York Finance Company, and these plaintiffs, which convince us that Brown et al. are not bona fide pruchasers of or lienors upon anything the New York Finance Company had from or through Braker; on the other hand, they are hut the cloak or cover for Burr, who from the beginning has been and still is in control of this litigation. There were not even purchasers “pendente lite,” as was supposed ; they are not purchasers at all, but tools of ■ Burr. This is a finding of fact on the evidence now before us.
The second matter deemed important is that the assignment or document of transfer, after vesting in Rabe as fully as words could do it Braker’s rights in and to the fund in question, continues thus:
“I do by these presents, for myself, my heirs and executors and administrators, covenant, grant, and agree to and with the said Frank L. Rabe, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, that he, the said Frank L. Rabe, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, shall and will as hereinbefore declared and set forth receive the net sum of [$17,500] when and as soon as [the fund of which the amount in suit is a part] shall become due and payable under and by virtue of the provisions [of Braker, Sr.’s, will], to have and to hold the .same unto the said Frank L. Rabe, his heirs,” etc.
Thusi (first) by insurance at Braker’s expense (the difference between his paying direct and having h'is price or advance abated in consideration of Rabe’s paying being nil) covering the period of suspense when Braker might by dying prevent vesting, and (second) by Braker’s covenant to pay out of whatever he had whencesoever procured, if the estate of Braker, Sr., proved valueless, the $3,500 principal of plaintiff’s assignors was placed beyond the hazard of every contingency, except inability to collect out of Braker or his insurers, as the case might be. This avoidance of legal (as distinguished from natural) contingencies or dangers is one of the oldest marks of usury, when such elimination of genuine hazard secures gains above lawful usance. . Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Vesey, 125; Colton v. Dunham, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 272. And as to the effect of such superadded personal liability as that of Braker’s, see Leavitt v. Enos, 155 App.Div. 584, 140 N. Y. Supp. 862.
It is said that Braker’s covenant is no more than the guaranty considered in Orvis v. Curtiss, 157 N. Y. 657, 52 N. E. 690, 68 Am. St. Rep. 810. We cannot think so, for there was in that case no advance or transfer of money from plaintiff to defendant, but (as definitely found) a joint venture or “contract of partnership,” with a guaranty against positive loss by one partner to the other. Here any personal responsibility is utterly inconsistent with that present -sale of a real contingency on which alone plaintiffs can securely rest.
It follows that, without considering the wholly contradictory and irreconcilable tale told by Braker on one side and Burr et al. on the other, as to what was contemporaneously said, we find the written or admitted words evidencing the contract made, such as to show something more than and different from the purchase of a contingency, viz. an avoidance of all hazard except that of being paid by Braker or his insurers, whose obligation was held by Braker’s “creditor” — i. e., Rabe or his assignees. From this apparatus of papers plaintiff cannot escape. The “treaty was for 'a loan.” Every effort was made to avoid that word by those furnishing the money, but when it was furnished the would-be borrower had in substance and
Decrees affirmed, with one bill of costs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Unless we are to hold that there can be no such thing as an improvident sale of an expectancy in a decedent’s estate, on the ground that an attempted sale must be regarded as a cover for a loan of money on usury, the assignments by Braker to Rabe of his legacies under the fourteenth and fifteenth articles of his father’s will were sales. The instruments he executed expressly so stated, and the testimony of the witnesses to the same effect is overwhelming. There was in neither assignment any promise by Braker to repay the money he received. It is true that in the assignment of seven-tenths of bis legacy of $50,000 under the fifteenth article of the will he guaranteed that it should produce $35,000 to the purchaser. In the case of Orvis v. Curtiss, 157 N. Y. 657, 52 N. E. 690, 68 Am. St. Rep. 810, the defendant not only guaranteed plaintiff against loss of the money he put into a joint adventure in stocks, but also guaranteed him a profit of $5,000. The similarity between that case and this is that the court below held, in it that the contract made was really a loan upon usury (12 Misc. Rep. 434, 33 N. Y. Supp. 589), whereas the Court of Appeals refuse to treat the contract as anything else than what it professed to be. In that respect the decision is an authority for our treating the transactions in this case as sales.
The policies of insurance on Braker’s life were assigned to Rabe and his assigns, and the premiums were paid by him and them. It was natural and proper for the purchaser to take out insurance against the contingency of Braker’s death before anything should vest in him under his father’s will. I do not suppose that a loan upon bottomry would become usurious if the lender protected himself against loss by insuring the arrival of the vessel. That would be a perfectly independent contract.
The policies were not assigned to Rabe “as creditor,” as stated in the opinion of the court. On the contrary, the form of assignment used was absolute, and not the form of assignment of the policy as collateral.
The complainants sued as owners of one-half the legacy under the fifteenth article and of the last installment of $10,000 under the fourteenth article of the will, by virtue of a sale of the same to them under a collateral note securing an advance of $10,000. The court holds that a decree of the surrogate in August, 1912, made after this suit had been instituted in the District Court, is res adjudicata as to the legacy under the fourteenth article of the will. It is quite clear, however, under Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 13 Sup. Ct. 906, 37 L. Ed. 867, and Waterman v. Bank, 215 U. S. 33, 30 Sup. Ct. 10, 54 L. Ed. 80, that the federal courts may determine the rights of citizens of other states in a decedent’s estate, and that the state court must recognize that determination in making distribution. The complainants in this case, citizens of Pennsylvania, submitted their
Of course, if the complainants were mere tools of Burr et al., as the court finds, they are bound by the judgment in the state court ■action; but I think tire proofs show that they were- bona fide lenders •of $10,000 four years before the action in the state court was brought. The proofs leave much to be desired in respect to straightforwardness of all the parties concerned, but for these reasons I think both judgments'should be reversed.