Timothy BROWN, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 10-1292 (RCL)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
July 10, 2012.
872 F. Supp. 2d 388
Benjamin Cory Schwartz, U.S. Attorney‘s Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
This action, which is brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA“),
I. Background
This opinion focuses solely on plaintiff‘s remaining FOIA claim against the FBI, because all other causes of action have been dismissed. See Mem. Op. [40]; Order granting Tax Division‘s Motion to Dismiss [63].
On August 21, 2007, Timothy Brown (“plaintiff“) submitted a FOIA request to the FBIHQ for “a copy of, [sic] all records contained in your files and/or outside agent files and/or related files which contain and/or pertain to the following: (1) Timothy Demitri Brown, (2) Operation Disturb the Peace, and (3) BLSB (LA) Inc.” On a subsequent request form, plaintiff withdrew his request for “Operation Disturb the Peace” and “BLSB (LA) Inc.,” leaving only the request for “Timothy Demitri Brown.” See Decl. of Dennis J. Argall (“Argall Decl.“), Ex. B. In response, FBIHQ informed plaintiff that a search of its Central Records System (“CRS“) yielded no responsive documents. Plaintiff administratively appealed to the Office of Information and Privacy (“OIP“), but FBIHQ‘s determination was affirmed. OIP suggested to plaintiff that he submit requests to the FBI‘s Houston and New Orleans (“FBI-NOFO“) offices. On October 31, 2007, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to FBI-NOFO for records pertaining to himself, “Operation Disturb the Peace,” and other reports. FBI-NOFO made three initial disclosures to plaintiff: 658 pages on January 21, 2009, 534 pages on June 18, 2009, and 438 pages on September 16, 2009. Redactions in these releases were made under the Privacy Act and FOIA exemptions 2, 3, 4, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). Plaintiff sеnt an appeal to OIP on September 16, 2009, which was denied.
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint [1] on July 30, 2010. Subsequently, FBI searched its Electronic Surveillance (“ELSUR“) records and released three audio CDs on November 4, 2010, withholding information pursuant to the Privacy Act and FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C). Plaintiff appealed this response to OIP on November 9, 2009, which was closed administratively because of his past-due fees. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [18] on November 30, 2010 and a Second Amended Complaint [42] on June 24, 2011, 793 F.Supp.2d 368 (D.D.C.2011).
Subsequently, FBI conducted another search, which revealed that some files it had previously mentioned to plaintiff had not been processed. After processing about another 800 pages, FBI released 341 pages to plaintiff on November 30, 2011 (withholding information pursuant to the Privacy Act and FOIA exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E)).
FBI collaborated with two other agencies in response to plaintiff‘s request. FBI referred three documents to the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA“) for review. DEA instructed FBI to withhold information on six pages under FOIA exemption 7(C). FBI also forwarded 21 pages to the Marshals Service for direct response to plaintiff. On October 25, 2011, the Marshals Service released documents to plaintiff (withholding information pursuant to FOIA exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E)).
II. Motion to Dismiss
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint [42] pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drаfted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff‘s complaint “must present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.” Utterback v. Geithner, 754 F.Supp.2d 52, 54 (D.D.C.2010) (citing Chandler v. Roche, 215 F.Supp.2d 166, 168 (D.D.C.2002)).
In this case, the remaining cause of action is succinct enough to reprint here:
12. Federal Bureau of Investigations [sic] has unlawfully refused and/or withheld records in the agency‘s files concerning plaintiff.
13. Plaintiff filed a FOIA request with the agency on November 2001 and October 31, 2007.
14. Plaintiff‘s request was assigned number 1091943.
15. The agency has unlawfully withheld the requested records and/or claimed inapplicable exemptions.
Pl.‘s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-15. Just as in Iqbal, “[i]t is the conclusory nature of [plaintiff‘s] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them from the presumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. The only factual allegations in this complaint are the dates plaintiff filed his FOIA request and the number his request was assigned. For the purposes of this
Because this Court will not assume the truth of paragraphs 12 and 15, it must decide whether the remaining facts, accepted as true, state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint must supply “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evi-
However, the Court recognizes that plaintiff could amend his Complaint with the required factual material, including affidavits and the communication between himself and the FBI. Because these documents are already in the Court‘s possession, there is no reason to wait for plaintiff to file yet another amended Complaint. Despite its objections, defendant has proceeded with litigation and disclosed the very documents that would provide the factual foundation for a proper Complaint. In the interest of judicial efficiency,1 defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss will be denied and instead, the Court will consider its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
An agency may be entitled to summary judgment in a FOIA case if it demonstrates that no material facts are in dispute, it has conducted an adequate search for responsive records, and each responsive record that it has located has either been produced to the plaintiff or is exempt from disclosure. See Weisberg v. DOJ, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983). To meet its burden, a defendant may rely on reasonably detailed and non-conclusory declarations. See McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C.Cir.1983).
In a FOIA case, the court determines de novo whether an agency properly withheld information under a claimed exemption. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C.Cir. 1977). “The underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the [FOIA] requester,” Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1350, and the exemptions must be narrowly construed. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982). However, courts gеnerally defer to agency expertise in national security matters. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dep‘t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C.Cir.1982) (according “utmost deference” to classification affidavits); Krikorian v. Dep‘t of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464-65 (D.C.Cir.1993) (acknowledging “unique insights” of executive agencies responsible for national defense and foreign relations). While the agency must not withhold information in bad faith, Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981), the affidavits submitted by the agency to demonstrate the adequacy of its response are presumed to be in good faith. Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C.Cir.1981).
In this case, defendant accurately states that plaintiff‘s allegations are “not entirely clear from his complaint.” Def.‘s Mot. [66] to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J. at 7. However, for the purposes of deciding summary judgment, this Court will interpret plaintiff‘s Complaint as alleging both an inadequate search and improper use of exemptiоns.
a. Adequacy of Search
In responding to a FOIA request, an agency must conduct a reasonable search for responsive records. Oglesby v. U.S. Dep‘t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990); Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1352. An agency is not required to search every records system, but need only search those systems in which it believes responsive records are likely located. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. The adequacy of the search is determined by whether it was “reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents, not whether it actually uncovered every document extant.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1991). “Mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” Id.
To demonstrate the reasonableness of its search, the agency may submit nonconclusory affidavits that explain in reasonable detail the scope and method of the agency‘s search. Steinberg v. DOJ, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C.Cir.1994). These affidavits are afforded a “presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.‘” SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200 (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, 692 F.2d at 771).
In this case, defendant submitted a declaration from Dennis Argall (“Argall Decl.“) setting forth, in great detail, the searches conducted on plaintiff‘s behalf. Because plaintiff has given no evidence to the contrary, this declaration is presumed to be in good faith. See SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200. First, Mr. Argall sets forth the procedural history of plaintiff‘s FOIA request with accompanying exhibits. Argall Decl. ¶¶ 9-45. Next, he explains the FBI‘s Central Records System (“CRS“) as well as Electronic Surveillance (“ELSUR“) indices, both of which were searched. Id. ¶¶ 46-59. Finally, he sets forth detailed page-by-page description of the exemptions cited. Id. ¶¶ 60-100.
The scope and method of defendant‘s search was reasonable. Plaintiff originally filed his FOIA request with FBIHQ. Id. ¶ 10. At the time of the request, FBI policy was to only search records at the office to which the FOIA request was sent. Id. ¶ 16 n. 7. No responsive records were found at FBIHQ, but defendant suggested that plaintiff send requests to FBI‘s Houston (“HOFO“) and New Orleans (“NOFO“) offices. Id. ¶ 16. During the administrative phase of plaintiff‘s FOIA request, defendant released a total of 1,630 pages out of 3,843 pages reviewed. Argall Decl. ¶ 4. After the commencement of litigation, an additional 801 pages were reviewed and 341 pages were released. Id. At least one release was made despite plaintiff‘s failure to pay fees. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.
The reasonableness of defendant‘s search is bolstered by FBIHQ‘s encour-
b. Appropriateness of Exemptions
Summary judgment is only proper if the agency‘s search was adequate and FOIA exemptions were properly invoked. See King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.1987). Defendant submitted the Argall Decl., William E. Bordley Decl. (“Bordley Decl.“), and accompanying Vaughn indices to prove the adequacy of its exemptions. The Court will examine defendant‘s justification below.
1. Exemption 2
Exemption 2 protects from disclosure information “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.”
In this case, defendant withholds the internal phone numbers of FBI Special Agents (“SAs“), which it claims relate solely to the FBI‘s internal practices. Argall Decl. ¶¶ 68-69. The business numbers are used in the performance of FBI SAs’ duties. Id. ¶ 68. Defendant asserts that the public interest in these numbers is non-existent, and that releasing them could expose FBI SAs to harassment. Id. ¶ 69. This explanation of why exemption 2 is appropriate does not comport with Milner. In that case, the Court emphasized that the “practice of ‘construing FOIA exemptions narrowly’ stands on especially firm footing with respect to Exemption 2.” Milner, 131 S.Ct. at 1265-66 (internal citation omitted) (quoting DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 181, 113 S.Ct. 2014, 124 L.Ed.2d 84 (1993)). Narrow construal of
Exemption 3 covers records that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ..., provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
Defendant withholds information pursuant to several statutes. First, it withholds files that “explicitly disclose[] matters occurring before a Federal Grand Jury” under
Next, defendant withholds the identities of those who were the targets of electronic surveillance pursuant to
Finally, defendant withholds pen register information pursuant to
Not relying solely on exemption 2, defendant withholds the phone numbers of FBI SAs under exemption 6 as well.
This Court has previously held that “a name and work telephone number is not personal or intimate information, such as a home address or a social security number, that normally would be considered protected information under FOIA Exemption 6.” Leadership Conference on Civil Rights v. Gonzales, 404 F.Supp.2d 246, 257 (D.D.C.2005). Work telephone numbers are different from personal information that would be protected under exemption 6, such as “place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment history, and comparable data.” See Nat‘l Ass‘n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C.Cir.1989). The phone number is, by defendant‘s admission, a work number. It is not a personal number. Because the phone numbers are not “similar files,” exemption 6 is also inappropriate. Fortunately for defendant, it has one more bite of the FOIA apple regarding the phone numbers: exemption 7(C).
4. Exemption 7 (Generally)
Exemption 7 protects from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” but only to the extent that disclosure of such records would cause an enumerated harm listed in exemption 7‘s subsections.
5. Exemption 7(C)
Exemption 7(C) protects from disclosure information in law enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
Defendant asserts exemption 7(C) in regard to many documents. First, the Court will return to the FBI SA phone numbers that have yet to be properly withheld under a FOIA exemptiоn. See supra. It looks like the third time is a charm.
To qualify for non-disclosure, the information must first satisfy the exemption 7 threshold: it must have been compiled for law enforcement purposes. The phone numbers at issue are the work numbers of FBI SAs. Because the purpose of the FBI is law enforcement, it is clear that its special agents’ phone numbers were also created for law enforcement. There is simply no other plausible purpose.
Having crossed the threshold, the Court now must determine whether an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy would accompany disclosure. See
In the instant case, defendant claims that the internal phone numbers would serve no public interest, but that disclosure “could subject these individuals to harassing telephone calls....” Argall Decl. ¶¶ 68-69. This Court finds any public interest in these internal numbers, which would in no way illuminate “what the government is up to,” to be de minimis. While the likelihood of disruрtive and harassing phone calls is debatable, the Court need not decide exactly how much privacy is being invaded. Any amount of privacy expectation outweighs the virtually non-existent public interest. See Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. Therefore, this Court finds that the FBI SA phone numbers were properly withheld pursuant to exemption 7(C).
B. Names and Identifying Information of FBI SAs and Support Personnel
Next, defendant withholds the names and/or identifying information of FBI SAs and support personnel. Argall Decl. ¶ 80. Just as internal phone numbers were records compiled for law enforcement, the information defendant seeks to withhold here is directly related to the FBI and, consequently, law enforcement. Plaintiff provides no objection to these documents being created for the purpose of law enforcement, and the Court deems them to have crossed the thrеshold.
Again, the Court must balance the privacy interest against the public interest. To address plaintiff‘s argument that 7(C) cannot be invoked because “Chadwick McNeal signed a written waiver ‘to release his identity,‘” the Court points out that defendant appears to be protecting the privacy of individuals other than Mr. McNeal. In fact, defendant seeks to withhold information regarding FBI SAs and support personnel, third parties, and government officials. Argall Decl. ¶¶ 80, 83-88. The information withheld goes well beyond Mr. McNeal‘s identity. Therefore, plaintiff‘s objection is meritless.
Having established a significant privacy interest, the Court must determine if there is any public interest that can outweigh it. Disclosing names of FBI SAs and support personnel who “were responsible for conducting, supervising, and/or maintaining the investigative activities,” Argall Decl. ¶ 80, might, arguendo, shed light to the public on “what their government is up to.” However, this Court does not see how knowing the names of FBI agents can possibly outweigh the extremely strong privacy interest in not being harassed by violent criminals. In light of the employees’ privacy interests, the potential for violence, and the insubstantial public interest in the names of clerical employees, defendant properly withholds the names and identifying information of FBI SAs and support personnel.
C. Names and Identifying Information of Third Parties of Investigative Interest
Defendant withholds the “names and identifying information of third parties who were of investigative interest to the FBI.” Argall Decl. ¶ 83. Whether or not these investigated individuals were ever charged with a crime, “the mention of an individual‘s name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.” Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990) (quoting Branch v. FBI, 658 F.Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C.1987)). The identities of third-party suspects are routinely withheld. See, e.g., Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 998-99 (D.C.Cir.1998) (protecting suspects’ fingerprints, interviews with law enforcement officers, and photographs). The privacy interest of third-party suspects, with the stigma associated with being part of an investigation, is much greater than any conceivable public interest. Therefore, withholding the names and identifying information of third parties of investigative interest is proper.
D. Names and Identifying Information of Law Enforcement Personnel
Defendant withholds the “names and/or identifying information of state and/or local law enforcement officers” and “non-FBI federal government personnel.” Argall Decl. ¶¶ 84-85. These employees were “acting in their official capacities and aided by the FBI in law enforcement efforts.” Id. There is no question that this information was compiled for law enforcement purposes, and the employees’ privacy interest outweighs the public interest in disclosure for the same reasons as the FBI SAs and support personnel. See supra discussion, § III(b)(5)(B) of this opinion. Therefore, defendant properly invoked exemption 7(C) regarding the names and identifying information of state and local law enforcement personnel and non-FBI federal government personnel.
E. Names and Identifying Information of Third Parties
Defendant withholds “the names and/or identifying information concerning third parties merely mentioned in documents related to the FBI‘s investigations
Plaintiff alleges that, “[d]efendants continue to provide this court with knowingly false, fabricated and irrelevant information and have implicated this court, Judge Lamberth, as a willing participant in its cover-up of the murder of a state judge by the FBI, the fabrication of evidence and their continued obstruction of justice.... Plaintiff must assume that this judge is the “dept‘s pitbull on the bench. . . .”4 Pl.‘s Reply [73] to Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J. 1.
When such governmental misconduct is alleged аs the justification for disclosure, the public interest is “insubstantial” unless the requester puts forward “compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request has engaged in illegal activity” and shows that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282 (quoting SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1205-06). The Court finds no evidence whatsoever, let alone “compelling” evidence, that there is a grand conspiracy between the executive and judicial branches to cover up a murder and obstruct justice. Therefore, the public interest is insubstantial and is not outweighed by the substantial third party privacy interest. See id. at 1281. Exemption 7(C) was properly invoked regarding third party identifying information.
F. United States Marshals Service Documents
The FBI referred twenty-one documents to the United States Marshals Service (“USMS“) for review and direct reply to plaintiff. Bordley Decl. ¶ 2. The documents were related to аsset seizure by law enforcement agencies. Id. ¶ 3. USMS asserted exemption 7(C) to withhold the names and telephone numbers of government employees and third parties. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. The Court finds asset seizure by the USMS to fall squarely in the realm of law enforcement. Additionally, the privacy interest of third parties outweighs any public interest in disclosure. See supra discussion, § III(b)(5)(E) of this opinion.
Exemption 7(D) protects from disclosure those records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that
could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source ..., [who] furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation ..., information furnished by a confidential source.
Confidentiality can be established expressly or impliedly. Regardless of which type of confidentiality is asserted, the focus should always be on whether the source of the information spoke with the understanding of confidentiality, not whether the document is generally thought to be confidential. Landano, 508 U.S. at 172. To claim express confidentiality, an agency must offer “probative evidence that the source did in fact receive an express grant of confidentiality.” Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Davin v. DOJ, 60 F.3d 1043, 1061 (3d Cir.1995)). This evidence can take many different forms, but it must “permit meaningful judicial review by providing a sufficiently detailed explanation” for the invocation of Exemption 7(D). Id.
While express confidentiality is relatively easy to spot, implied confidentiality warrants a more nuanced analysis. “A source is confidential within the meaning of Exemption 7(D) if the source ‘provided information ... in circumstances from which such an assurance [of confidentiality] could be reasonably inferred.‘” Landano, 508 U.S. at 172 (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-1200, at 13, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 6285, 6291). Implied confidentiality exists when “the source furnished information with the understanding that the FBI would not divulge the communication except to the extent the Bureau thought necessary for law enforcement purposes.” Id. at 174.
This Court has stated that “[t]he nature of the crime investigated and informant‘s relation to it are the most important factors in determining whether implied confidentiality exists.” Amuso v. DOJ, 600 F.Supp.2d 78, 100 (D.D.C.2009). The “violence and risk of retaliation attendant to drug trafficking warrant an implied grant of confidentiality to a source who provides information to investigators.” Lasko v. DOJ, 684 F.Supp.2d 120, 134 (D.D.C.2010). With these principles in mind, this Court turns to the facts at hand.
In the instant case, defendant asserts exemption 7(D) “to protect the names, identifying information, and investigative information provided by third parties under an implied assurance of confidentiality.” Argall Decl. ¶ 93. First, defendant must cross the “law enforcement threshold,” as with all exemption 7 claims. The information being withheld is portions of interviews that would disclose
Next, the Court must determine whether implied confidentiality exists, as defendant claims. Id. ¶ 94. Defendant failed to explain on under what circumstances its sources were assured of confidentiality, claiming only that it was implied and that to find otherwise would “have a chilling effect on the activities and cooperation of those and other future FBI confidential sources.” Id. Though unimpressed with defendant‘s vague assertion, this Court will uphold its precedent of implying confidentiality to sources who provide information about drug crimes. See Lasko, 684 F.Supp.2d at 134; see also Fischer v. DOJ, 596 F.Supp.2d 34, 49 (D.D.C.2009) (implying confidentiality to cooperative witnesses in a narcotics trafficking case). Exemption 7(D) was properly invoked regarding information that would disclose the identities of FBI sources.
7. Exemption 7(E)
Exemption 7(E) protects from disclosure law enforcement records “to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”
A. FBI SA Procedures and Techniques
In the case at hand, defendant asserts exemption 7(E) “to protect procedures and techniques used by FBI agents to conduct criminal investigations” and techniques “used by FBI SAs during the investigation of plaintiff‘s drug activities and plot to kidnap the granddaughter of a federal judge.” Argall Decl. ¶¶ 96-97. It claims that disclosure would minimize the techniques’ effiсacy and allow criminals to educate themselves about FBI procedures and thereby avoid apprehension. Id. By saying this, defendant does nothing but parrot the statutory language. Affidavits claiming exemptions must still be sufficiently detailed to allow effective judicial review. Church of Scientology, 662 F.2d at 786. The Court appreciates that some information is extremely sensitive. Secret law enforcement techniques need not be described even generally if doing so will disclose the very information the agency seeks to withhold. See, e.g., National Security Archive v. FBI, 759 F.Supp. 872, 885 (D.D.C.1991).
If a party wishes to claim secrecy and not describe the techniques in any way, it is free to submit the documents for an in camera inspection. Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. National Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 831-32 (D.C.Cir.1979) (citing Albuquerque Pub. Co. v. DOJ, 726 F.Supp. 851, 857 (D.D.C.1989)). Defendant submitted the documents for an in camera inspection at the Court‘s request. Having reviewed the documents, the Court determines that all documents were properly withheld pursuant to exemption 7(E). They describe secret law enforcement techniques and procedures, and their disclosure would promote circumvention of the law. The Court recognizes the sensitive nature of the documents, and an in camera inspection affirms defendant‘s claims.
B. DEA VIN Numbers
The DEA also withheld vehicle identification numbers (VIN) “associated
III. Plaintiff‘s Motions for Sanctions
Sanctions may be rendered against a party who violates
After considering the motions, replies, record, and all relevant materials to this matter, the Court finds that: (1) defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss should be denied based on the factual evidence now disclosed, (2) defendant‘s search for plaintiff‘s records was adequate, (3) exemption 2 was improperly invoked regarding FBI SA phone numbers, (4) exemption 3 was properly invoked regarding grand jury information, electronic surveillance, and pen register information, (5) exemption 6 was improperly invoked regarding FBI SA phone numbers, (6) exemption 7(C) was properly invoked regarding FBI SA phone numbers, identifying information of FBI SAs, support personnel, law enforcement personnel, third parties, and USMS asset seizures, (7) exemption 7(D) was properly invoked regarding FBI confidential sources, (8) exemption 7(E) was properly invoked regarding FBI SA procedures and DEA VIN numbers, (9) plaintiff‘s Motion [74] for Sanctions is unmerited, and (10) plaintiff‘s Motion [80] to Supplement his Motion for Sanctions adds no meritorious arguments. For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s Motion [66] to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, plaintiff‘s Motion [74] for Sanctions is DENIED, and plaintiff‘s Motion [80] to Supplement his Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.
A separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH
Chief Judge.