95 Wis. 90 | Wis. | 1897
The following opinion was filed November 24, 1896:
The question principally argued on this appeal, and which seems to be decisive of it, is whether defendants’ title under the tax deeds is concluded by the judgment in Brown v. Lincoln County et al. The claim of the plaintiff is that they are so concluded, while the defendants claim
Nor can one be a Iona fide purchaser of tax certificates who takes them without legal assignment. He does not get legal title to them. It seems clear that the purchasers of these certificates were not such parties as the statute was enacted to protect, but that, on the contrary, they were parties who bought at their peril, who were bound to take notice of the pending action, in which the validity of the certificates and the tax proceedings on which they were based was in the process of adjudication. And the defendants must be held to be bound by that adjudication. The judgment in Brown v. Lincoln County et al. swept away all foundation from under the tax deeds, and left them without support in previous proceedings. They were issued entirely without the authority of the law, and' in defiance of the power of the court. They are utterly without authority. They are not tax deeds, under the statute, and are utterly incapable of supporting the statute of limitations. The effect of the judgment on this tax title is the same as it would have been if John Comstock had taken the tax deed, instead of "Winton. A purchaser from him could get no better title than he had. Lis pendens binds both parties and privies. A purchaser pendente lite is assumed to have notice of the proceedings, because he is bound to take notice of the proceedings of the courts. If Comstock had taken the deed, no defense of the statute of limitations would have been available by him; for the action was already commenced and pending, in which his tax title and the previous proceedings
By the Oowrt.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
A motion for a rehearing was denied February 2, 1897.