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Brown v. City of Houston
8 S.W.3d 331
Tex. App.
1999
Check Treatment

*1 trial grant court to a new permit a trial its initiative at all. own it of its deprive argues BMW explanation infringes

jury verdict without by jury. right to trial constitutional necessary it to reach

I do not think rules, this given procedural our

argument, decisions, consensus

Court’s jurisdictions. given that But

American request refuse late

trial court cannot reason, as we jury good trial without a I Gayle,28 Corp. Motors

held General can refuse

fail to see how a trial court jury without

render on a verdict good reason. with the broad discre- quarrel do century law has for well over a

tion Texas grant courts to new trials

given trial explana- But justice. a reasoned

achieve ruling a court’s does not curb

tion for the sound exercise of discretion

either rather, justice; helps guar-

the cause of why many are reasons

antee both. There may grant

a trial court new trial. should

expectation that at least one reason given is not The refusal

be exorbitant. dangerously peremptory. even one is BROWN, Appellant,

Gerald

CITY OF HOUSTON and General Company Of

Elevator

Appellees.

No. 10-98-166-CV. Texas, Appeals

Waco.

Aug. 1999.

Rehearing Dec. Overruled (Tex. 476-477

28. 951

of to Houston’s dismissing Appellant’s lawsuit. (and vrffe) Appellant Brown his brought pursuant of Houston (TTCA), Texas Tort Claims Act 6, 1993, alleging that on Appellant October was a passenger using ticketed the Hous- facilities; Airport ton that he was descend- ing an on escalator “when suitcase re- Endsley” Kara leased tumbled down escalator, striking him causing leg. severe fracture to his Appellant alleges posses- sion and control airport; of the that the airport facility tangible personal proper- ty of the City injury Ap- which caused pellant as a result of a condition or use property; such liable TTCA, Appellant damages for his 101.121,101.0215 Sections and 101.022. Appellant alleges also negligent in one or more of following: a. Failing to maintain in a the escalator manner; safe b. Failing persons wаrn about the weight luggage size or to be escalators; transported on c. Failing maintain control over the weight transport- size or of luggage escalators; ed on d. Failing provide adequate safety precaution passengers for the es- calators; Portz, Houston, Chuck Richard B. e. Failing adequately passen- inform III, FL, Petersburg, Graves St. Gerald gers public use and Brown, Houston, appellant. elevators; availability of f. Failing adequately pas- instruct Hall, Jr., Anthony City Atty., W. Laura sengers general public about and the Coats, City Atty., Anne Asst. transportation luggage through appellee. area; the terminal VANCE, GRAY, Before Justice Justice g. Failing passengers instruct (Retired). and Chief Justice McDONALD public not to lug- take certain

gage on the escalator or to restrict taking luggage on the certain OPINION escalator. McDONALD, G. FRANK Chief Justice Failing h. to control the size and (Retired). transported ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‍amount of luggage Appellant appeals an of the safety from order escalators to insure the sustaining court Appellee City public. trial undisputed that The record is

Appellant alleged foregoing each of the investigation on on-the-spot proximate- conducted an negligence which act the accident which made the basis the same ly the occurrence caused results of injured. The injuries Appellant his and dam- Appellant’s suit and re- put into a written his were investigation wife ages. Appellant and *3 by airport an signed both damages port in the that was for their City liable report This $1,000,000. supervisor. and his employee amount of report The con- City. was filed summary a motion for The filed accident, description of the a concise tains and Appellant nothing, take judgment that in- right leg was Appellant’s notes that jurisdiction. plea Such filed transported been jured, and that he had Appellant jurisdiction alleged that the also report hospital by ambulance. (1)never provided City with notice the address, name, tele- Apрellant’s contains with the TTCA for claims accordance sex, number, birth, race, and phone date of (2) suit; and failed made the basis his of Ms. Kara the names and addresses and of action under the TTCA. plead a cause (whose Appellant), Endsley luggage fell trial court sustained Jr., Rodriquiz, a witness. and Mr. Albert without reason giving had contends Appellant therefor, law- Appellant’s and dismissed re his claims due actual notice of suit. by airport personnel above port made contending did Appellant appeals that he named. comply with the notice City had that agree and hold We 101.101,Notice, pro- which TTCA. Section of the under Section аctual notice accident

vides: 101.101(c) investigated had and indeed (a) A unit is entitled to investigation report and occurrence. a claim

receive notice of gave ac- City’s employee prepared by six not later than chapter under this had Appellant notice tual after that the incident months injury an accident received some claim occurred. The giving rise 1993, 6, airport operated at the October reasonably describe: notice must no- by Thus the City. maintained and (b) (a) requirements under and Sec- tice (1) claimed; damage apply. tion 101.101did not (2) incident; place the time of the and had actual that since We hold any dismissal of the occurrence and notice (3) the incident. for lack of notice would by the trial court (b) city’s provi- A charter and ordinance proper. have been within a charter requiring sions However, jur City’s plea to the permitted ap- by law are ratified alleged Appellant isdiction further proved; plead a cause action had failed (c) requirements provided of Texas Before State the TTCA by approved ratified and subsection sovereign the limited waiver granted (a) (b) govern- apply do not TTCA, its the State and unit has actual notice that mental full had political subdivisions agencies and occurred, thаt the claimant death has liability from torts. injury, has received or that some Brannan, (Tex.Civ.App.— 111 S.W.2d 347 dam- property been claimant’s ref'd). 1937, The State Waco aged. retain political subdivisions by the TTCA. the extent waived except ann. 101.101 Tex. & Rem. Code Civ. PROc. (Tex. State, 1997) (Vernon Duhart v. 1980); v.Wyse Dept. Safety, Public 733 were not by employee caused n.r.e.). (Tex.App.—Waco S.W.2d 224 City through tangible personal the use of property, nor they prem were caused 101.021, TTCA, Section sets out They ises’ defect. were caused State’s waiver of immunity. negligence of party a third over whom the Liability. Governmental City had custody no or control. Appellant A unit in the State is lia- hаs not a cause of action under ble for: Section 101.021. Lamar University (1) property damage, personal injury Doe, (Tex.App.— proximately death caused writ); Beaumont Dallas Mental wrongful act negli- or omission or the Bossley, Health v. gence *4 any employee acting within (Tex.1998). scope his of employment if: Moreover, Appellant’s allegations (A) the property damage, personal in- City’s negligence acts of the City’s involves jury or op- death from the arises failure to do things certain which the law eration or use of a motor-driven do, does not it require and which are vehicle or equip- motor-driven discretionary thus City under ment; аnd 101.056,supra. Section (B)the employee be personally noted, Appellant asserted the As liable the claimant according to City was in negligent failing to warn and law; Texas regulate passengers and baggage trans (2) personal by death caused ported on the escalator. In order to es tangible condition or personal use negligence, plaintiff tablish must or property property gov- real if the facts which duty, rise to a breach would, pri- ernmental unit were it a duty, damages proximately person, vate be liable to the claimant Colwell, by caused breach. Werner according to Texas law. (Tex.1995). S.W.2d Powers, Discrеtionary Section 101.056. liability No legal can arise from provides: any alleged negligence duty where no ex This chapter apply does not to a claim ists. duty question Whether a exists ais on: based of law for the court to decide under the 1. The governmental failure of a unit to facts and surrounding circumstances perform an act that the unit is not occurrence. Greater Transp. Houston Co. required by perform; law (Tex.1990); Phillips, A government unit’s decision not to Old, Mgmt. Co. v. Lefmark perform an act or on its failure to performance make a decision hold City duty We had no non-performance of an act if the perform alleged aсts and further that performance law leaves the or a non- no negligence under Section performance of the act to the discre- 101.021 of Act. Appellant failed to governmental tion of the unit. plead a viable cause of action of Appellant’s alleged None omis TTCA, and the trial court did not err in sions that in allegedly resulted negligence sustaining jurisdic- immunity. falls waivers of Act’s tion, Appellant’s dismissing lawsuit. Appellant essence asserts The order of the trial court is affirmed. should be failing prevent peo liable for ple from riding airport the escálator at the dissenting. Justice VANCE they if are carrying baggage they which might Appellаnt’s fail injuries concurring. to contain. Justice GRAY pursu- City, attempted to sue the GRAY, Justice, Brown concurring.

TOM Act. Tex. Civ. ant to the PRAC.& Rem.Code need for clarifi- highlights This case (Vernon’s filed § 101.001 immu- governmental law of cation Texas asserting that a Plea to Jurisdiction types generally are two nity. There jurisdic- subject matter lacked court Immunity from immunity. (1) reasons; Brown failed tion for two pleaA liability. suit and from provisions of the comply with the way dispose proper the Act and validated Charter as entity is of a case (2) plead a claim within failed to immune from suit. As subdivision ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‍limited waiver Texas, enjoys Houston grant- Act. The trial court provided by the of governmental the benefits and dis- ed the Plea to Jurisdiction been the extent has not waived. specifying claims without missed Brown’s governmental entity suing When summary A motion for grounds.1 function, a governmental connection with that had been filed statutory which definition includes not decided. was therefor operation airport, plaintiff of an must entity has waived immu- show that *5 THE APPEAL nity that the claim is the terms it Brown asserts that was appeal, On commonly of the waiver. This most the Plea grant for the trial court to error by alleging a claim under the Texas done failure to based on to the Jurisdiction (the Act). Tort Claims Act Charter which con- comply I, too, Because believe that Brown failed provision. Though tains a 90 Act, join I to a claim under the 101.101(b) requires compli- § of the Act portion that of Chief Justice McDonald’s provisions, with Charter notice ance opinion judg- court’s holding trial provision ap- only that this Brown asserts However, proper. ment was I also would municipal- plies against to asserted claims hold that Brown faded to the notice proprietary capaci- operating in their ities by the statute and required 101.101(a) requires § ty, while to Charter and therefore failed invoke the claimant within six months where waiver of the Act. func- to recover seeks Thus, Act. Brown contends tion under the THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND only required comply with he was right leg Brown that his was alleges 101.101(a). § injured down an riding while escalator Alternatively, contends Brown Airport. Bush Intercontinental Houston’s (b) 101.101(a) He § are in conflict. incident, airport personnel Just after further contends because out investigated the occurrence and filled statute, in the Charter creates conflict report report. The accident accident only required be the claimant should by airport employee who signed re- provision six month comply with the investigated by a review- incident argues the statute. He thus quired by report with supervisor. was filed ing court committed error the trial six of Houston. Just less than 101.101(b) § compliance with requiring incident, after the Brown sent a months Act. his claim City giving notice оf letter to the trial Finally, asserts that it. Brown and his wife filed granted it the Plea just years court erred when short of 2 after the incident. appeal. party at trial. Her a notice of Brown’s wife was file claims were also dismissed. She did not Jurisdiction, importance because could have Act is of vital to the State and found that of- Houston did not political all A subdivisions. denial of Brown, have actual According notice. immediately can be actual provided by notice was the accident appealed. Tex. Civ. PRAC. Rem.Code report city employees. filled out 51.014(a)(8). However, § failure Alternatively, actual provided notice was plead a claim within the waiver provisions by Brown’s notice letter which was sent simply the Act is another defense which within the six period month required pleaded proven, must be only it can be 101.101(a) § of the Act. challenged by summary judg- a motion for holds, Chief Justice McDonald I (for ment motion to dismiss failure to agree, pleading that Brown’s failed to state claim). state There is no method a claim I under the thus concur in the immediately appeal a denial of either I judgment. affirm also the trial political these motions. Thus the subdivi- court’s on the alternative basis expenses incur sion must all the of a full that there was error sustaining trial before it can have the trial сourt’s to the because of decision reviewed. § lack of notice required by 101.101 of the Act. Chief opinion Justice McDonald’s legislature clearly expressed its the court holds there was actual notice. I interlocutory intention to allow review of explain will my disagreement with that pleas jurisdiction. CIV. TEX.. analysis. Because Justice Vance has filed 51.014(a)(8). PRAC. REM. CODE Be- issue, opinion dissenting pleading I believe it the legislature’s I separately write address that issue. prevent intent the needless waste of will the pleading address issue first and -public funds to endure an entire trial be- *6 the then notice issue.2 appellate fore review whether claim is a proper govern- under the limited waiver of IS PLEAD A FAILURE TO CAUSE OF Act, mental of the I would hold THE ACTION UNDER TORT pleading a valid claim under the waiv- A CLAIMS ACT JURISDICTIONAL jurisdictional er of is and not DEFECT? merely another garden variety defense. suing When State of Texas a jurisdictional defect, a proper As is the political subdivision thereof for a claim subject plea jurisdiction, of a to the arising out of a is governmental activity, immediately appeal- denial of which can be plead the failure to a cause action under case, applied ed. As to this unlike the jurisdictional Tort a the Texas Claims Act dissent, I that it is a proper conclude basis plea to a ability defect? raisе to the sustaining trial jurisdiction upon plead a court’s order dis- based failure to within missing claim the waiver of the Brown’s claims. jurisdiction mary judgment. plea

2. The to the was based contends the He to the First, grounds. give proper two only failure to jurisdiction was on the issue of based Second, plead notice. failure to a cause of timely pleadings show notice. otherwise. governmental action within the waiver of im- plea jurisdiction to was also based munity. City’s The trial court sustained upon the failure state a claim under the Act plea jurisdiction. The trial court's by governmental that was not barred immuni specify upon does not the basis Having challengе ty. failed to the alternate only which it was sustained. Brown has at- ruling. basis of the trial court’s Brown has inadequate tacked the basis of notice. preserve failed to error. San Jacinto River challenged possibility Brown has not Duke, Authority v. 783 S.W.2d 209-210 ruling was on the trial court's alter Co., (Tex. 1990); Eagle Langston Printing v. theory plead native that Brown failed a 1990). (Tex.App. 797 S.W.2d However, - Waco cause of action within justice in the we interest of have pleading trial court. Brown contends de addressed the merits of the issues. part was for sum fect motion in the context this issue have addressed HAD NO JURISDIC- TRIAL COURT case, jurisdiction.3 In plea to a TION chal- specifically pleading Brown’s line сases dat In an almost unbroken jurisdiction. plea to the lenged a 1847, governmental at ing least back analy- Justice McDonald’s concur Chief been considered Texas has pleading failed amended sis that Brown’s DeYoung, jurisdictional. Hosner 1 Tex. gov- waiver of within the claim (1847). simply A has no trial court immunity of the Act. ernmental claim jurisdiction to entertain a arising out political subdivision immunity has not Because immuni unless function Brown, plead by to the claims been waived legis waived ty from suit been pre- properly and because issue subject jurisdic matter lature. Like other plea to the trial court sented issues, jurisdiction can be lack of tion propеrly sus- jurisdiction, the trial court aberration in any raised time. The dis- tained the line of cases Davis. Davis of missed Brown’s suit. Antonio, (Tex.1988). San Davis held could the “de you waive REQUIREMENT governmental immunity, and that

fense” of THE NOTICE jurisdictional it was not and thus could unit, any governmental In order to sue appeal. time on be raised for the first municipality, under the including a Antonio, Davis v. San required com- party bringing suit is at 519. provision found ply with the very Davis At distinguishable. § 101.101. Tex. Civ. Prac. Ann. & Rem.Code least, it should be limited its facts. Houston (Vernon § 101.101 Davis the issue of the jurisdic- trial court’s Torres, In our appeal. tion was not raised before derives from of action Where case, of action plead failure a cаuse statute, provisions are man- statutory waiver complied and must be datory exclusive in a specifically of the Act was raised otherwise, with; maintain- action is not motion. Thus Davis pretrial is distin- jurisdiction. the court lacks able because procedural guishable on facts. *7 Dist., 707 Sch. Indep. v. Tolar Grounds 889, Accordingly, 891 S.W.2d Why Davis held that failure state bring under the party seeking jurisdictional a claim is such required by the provide as Davis must notice explain reconcile clear. cannot comply with the stat- of Failure to it with the other of the courts statute. decisions v. the claim. Smith and after Davis ute will bar this State. Courts before of State, Sign Tex Federal v. CASES AFTER DAVIS: BEFORE DAVIS: Duhart v. CASES (Tex. 740, (Tex.1980); University, 951 S.W.2d 401 Texas as Southern S.W.2d Lowe v. 610 University, (Tex. 1976); 1997); Hencerling A & M University, v. Texas Tech 540 S.W.2d 297 373, (Tex.App. [1st Nav. 986 S.W.2d 375 R. Co. v. Brownsville Missouri - Houston Pacific 1999, filed); Brinkley Dist., Lot (Tex.1970); pet. v. Texas v. Dist.] 812 State 453 S.W.2d 764, Com'n, ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‍244, Dickerson, (Tex.App.— 772 tery 475 986 S.W.2d 141 Tex. 174 S.W.2d 1999, h.); 652, University v. (1943); pet. no Lamar Morgan, 140 v. 170 S.W.2d Austin Doe, State, (Tex.App. (1943);Bishop 971 S.W.2d 191 v. 577 S.W.2d Tex. 620 - Beaumont Morua, 1998, writ.); 1979, writ.); v. Houston no no (Tex.Civ.App. Paso 377 of - El Corrections, (Tex.App. [1st 126 Cuddy Dept. 578 982 S.W.2d v. Texas - Houston th 1998, 522, Mortg. pet.); v. no Holder Mellon (Tex.Civ.App. Dist.] Co., [14 S.W.2d - Houston 786, 1979, n.r.e.); (Tex.App. 804 Pas 954 S.W.2d writ ref'd Calhoun v. Dist.] - Houston th Intern., 1997, District, granted); pet. Green Independent [14 Dist.] 496 adena School State, (Tex.App 428 v. 877 S.W.2d (Tex.Civ.App. Inc. [14th S.W.2d 131 . -Aus — Houston writ, 1994, State, denied); 1973, n.r.e.); Liberty v. Ins. Co. writ Mut. tin ref'd Brooks Dist.] 1934, (Tex.App. Sharp, S.W.2d 736 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 68 S.W.2d - Austin 1994, denied). ref'd). writ writ. 874, (Tex.App.— Texas Leg., p. Tort Claims 61st (14th Dist.) 1997, 16, 1969, (em Houston pet.); § ch. Tex. Gen. Laws Dist., added). Indep. Grounds v. Tolar Sch. 707 phasis legislature When the codi 891; Torres, at S.W.2d Houston v. Chapter 101 fied of the Civil Practice and 621 S.W.2d at 590. Code, substantially Remedies it did not alter the language legislature. of the 61st GENERAL SIX MONTH NOTICE RE- QUIREMENT the Legislature amended Civil 101.0215, Texas Practice and Liability § Remedies Act to include aof provides Code Municipality, unit gov which includes a list of entitled to receive notice of against a claim ernmental functions for which a municipal it not later than six months after ity can be held liable under the waiver giving incident provisions rise the claim Act. While the list is not exhaustive, occurred. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann cоnsidered oper includes & 101.101(a) (Vernon 1997). § This notice of “airports.” ation Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. (10) (Vernon must describe the damage § 101.0215 1997 & Ann Code claimed, incident, place the time and The section goes to include 101.101(a)(l)-(3). § incident. Id. proprietary non-exhaustive list of functions dispute does not municipality of a chapter to which “this 101.101(a) complied fully with providing apply” person does not taking thus a notice letter within the six month seeking re- claim arising redress for a from a quirement of that section. proprietary function Act. out Claim ants retain all common-law causes of ac REQUIREMENT NOTICE FOR MU- tion a municipality injuries NICIPALITIES performance municipali caused of a special The Act requirement notice ty’s proprietary functions. Lawrence suing the claimant municipality. Falls, City Wichita Where the unit is a munici- denied). (Tex.App. Worth - Ft. pality, proper notice under the Act also Act applies func compliance requires city’s with a charter operating airport, tion as this case. and ordinance where city’s notice requirement is within pe- a charter The legislature ratified the charter and permitted riod by law. Tex. Civ. & provisions of Prac. ordinance cities in the State 101.101(b)(Vernon 1997); § 101.101(b). Rem.Code Ann of Texas enacting Torres, Houston apply proprietary Act does not claims. prоvision 590. Brown contends this notice statute, plain reading Under it is applies only proprietary functions. clear that if pertains 101.101 101.101(b) brought for claims under the Act Apply Only Does to a *8 operation an airport of is a func- Proprietary Functions? Act, by tion covered a claim under the In 61st legislature passed what (b) Act must with comply also subsection 101.101(b). § now is codified as The ses (b) Thus, of 101.101. subsection of 101.101 law following sion contains the language; chap- part should be read as of the entire Provided, however, except where there provisions ter which re- ratifies the notice notice, such is actual charter and ordi- quired by city a charter.4 рrovisions nance of no- requiring cities period by a permitted place requirements tice within charter The Act does not hereby law are a expressly upon city except charter and ordinance ratified require approved. that such notice “within a is 4. say asserting proprie- This is not to that someone a requirement sion. The notice for a proprietai^r against municipality a claim does tary simply part claim is not of the Act. comply city’s provi- have a not with charter

339 applicable to them by Id. at 590. This made law.” period permitted ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‍charter Tex. 101.101(b) func- proprietary as as § well PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. Civ. (Vernon сhallenged has tions. provision. validity of the charter The Courts Houston mu- a specifically a claimant sues Where in Houston have appellate courts Both Act, of provisions under the all nicipality city in char provisions notice also held the 101.101(b) § To apply. read mandatory. are In ters and ordinances for provision only Act as notice actions a Dinh, city notice re the court states brought (proprietary of the Act outside by are ratified the Act under quirements functions) contends, make as Brown 101.101(b). Hosp. County Dinh v. Harris (b) pointless. City v. sub-part LaPorte of Dist., (Tex.App.— 896 253 (Tex.1995). S.W.2d Barfield, 898 292 S.W.2d dism’d [1st Dist.] Houston REQUIREMENT CHARTER NOTICE party that once a w.o.j.). The court held Suprеme specifi The Texas of the Act procedural devices invokes by city cally required that notice held action, they of bound bring a cause are provided. Hous City must be charter of including the limitations of the Act Torres, v. 588 ton S.W.2d comply In provision. Id. order to notice Torres, against was In action instituted party comply with with the must injuries for a letter city sustained when (a) (b) of the Act. both subsections stepped into an uncovered residen carrier the 14th receptacle. Appeals of Dis City water meter Hous The Court tial of Torres, provisions held the notice v. at 589. Torres trict has also ton S.W.2d in complied at must be with order to brought his Act. Id. 101.101 claim under the the Act. Smith v. provision bring at issue a claim under 590. The same charter Houston, passenger City in an automobile at issue Torres. case was also city employee for question presented city was whether sued the and a sole vehi City injuries in a collisionwith a giving excused from sustained Torres was ninety employee. City cle Smith injury writing notice of driven Houston, (Tex.App.— as 960 S.W.2d 326 days after such sustained th (14 writ.). Dist.) 1997 no Be City Id. 590. Houston required Charter. at the issue appellate fore the court reached Supreme Court held that Torres notice, it first accor of actual determined required 101.101(a) (b). day provision. with its 90 The Su notice issue dance at noted that Texas authorities Smith preme Court Smith, claimant, had com consistently compli recognized have provision con provisions plied man ance with such charter in Houston’s Charter. datory timely of written tained filing stated, ratifies “The Tort Claims Act precedent to court notice of claim is condition provisions ordinance municipali- city’s charter and maintenance of a suit 590; period charter requiring Id. LaBove v. notice within a ty injuries. see (Tex.1980); Groves, permitted by law. These notice S.W.2d limitation, and suit 75 are City, akin statutes Roberts v. Haltom Odessa, complied (Tex.1976); precluded they are not with.” McCrary *9 appeal (Tex.1972); holdings Id. The of both courts of Philliрs 482 S.W.2d 151 com Abilene, Supreme Court 147 of and the 195 S.W.2d of refd). the Act port legislative intent of (Tex.Civ.App.Eastland with the 101.101(b). comply not it Brown did the Act and Legislature the enacted When 101.101(b) of He city § as a matter law. with approved ratified and specifically or his actual notice notice of must therefore show provisions requiring charter claim is barred. property. or injury persons claim for ACTUAL NOTICE incident. The report contained a concise description of the accident which noted Having found that Brown did not com- right leg injured that Brown’s was when ply city with require- the charter notice he was struck another person’s falling law, ment as a matter of the issue be- suitcase, that aid first was not adminis- comes: Was there actual notice under tered, transported and that had been he (c)? subsection a hospital ambulance. The of identity notice, The provides includ- persons and witnesses involved were also notice, actual ing must reasonably describe report. report contained the was claimed, injury place the the time and of signed by the airport employee his and specific the incident and the incident. The supervisor, City. and filed with the wording of the is as statute follows: report While the injury shows that an § 101.101 Notice was sustained the possible from fault of (a) A governmental unit is entitled to parties another person and names the in- receive notice of a ... claim The notice volved, suggestion any there is no of of act reasonably must describe: the City that caused or contributed to the (1) claimed; damage or injury which can be shown report from the provided which would have no- actual (2) place the time and of the inci- city tice of fault alleged in caus- dent; and ing injury. Brown’s does not notice (3) the incident.... test, meet the prong Cathey second of the (c) requirements The notice provided the notice must identify City’s approved or ratified and by Subsections fault in producing contributing (a) (b) do not apply govern- injury. report does not show that the mental unit has actual notice that death City or its employees should have known occurred, has that the claimant has re- report from likely more injury, ceived some or that the claim- than plaintiffs inju not the of cause property ant’s damaged. has been Dist., ries. Hosp. Dinh Harris County 101.101(a) Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code 253; See v. City Collier of (c) (Vernon’s 1997). is enti- (Tex.Civ. City, Texas tled the same notice under subsection th App. Be [14 Dist.] - Houston (c) as it would have received under subsec- Brown failed to comply (a) (b). tions provisions required by Although readily apparent on the subdivision of statute, Supreme face the State of Texas was within the construed descrip- the statute to include a subject matter court. why tion how or enti- ty responsible for the claim. Thus in properly ground. sustained impart govern- order actual notice to a unit, Supreme

mental Court of Texas CONCLUSION requires knowledge that there be must stated, For the reasons affirm (1) death, injury, or property damage; the trial judgment, court’s which sustained (2) unit’s fault jurisdiction, to the on both death, producing contributing grounds plea. raised (3) injury, damage; or property identity parties Cathey involved. VANCE, Justice, dissenting. BILL Booth, I agree with Chief Justice McDonald on disposition contends that the had actual notice” ques- the “actual report disagree his claims due to a made tion. I with the remainder of the by airport personnel opinion. on the

341 is wheth- question before us to uations. The plea filed a the The of Houston claim under the TTCA summary failing state a motion for er to jurisdiction and a jurisdiction subject plea to a The the defect plea jurisdictional is a judgment. subject the court mat- if the jurisdiction asserted that lacked as it would be to the (1) jurisdiction plain- the Browns the ter because the and fell outside TTCA claim exception to the plead failed to an sue obtained tiff had not consent they governmental immunity because did I it is not. State. believe within allege falling act or not оmission Court acknowledge that the Beaumont I Act Texas Torts purview Claims plead held the failure that (“TTCA”) (2) the claims were barred plea a to the subject TTCA is a of law for failure as matter of waiver jurisdiction. pleading “A mere Summary for proper The Motion notice. not consti immunity does that, a Judgment as matter of asserted tute, subject jurisdiction pur matter for (1) duty no to the owed law: La immunity.” a such poses, waiver of Browns; (2) governmental Doe, 191, 196 Univ. v. 971 mar S.W.2d (8) claim; if governmental barred the 1998, pet.). (Tex.App . —Beaumont waived, immunity were the Browns could Thus, plead Court held that where prove “ordinary of an elements defect, premises condi do а ings premises Special defect.” The filed tangible personal property, tion use Exceptions Original to the Browns’ Peti- vehicle, plaintiffs a or use of motor a alleging they that had not tion the trial court with sub provide “failed The cause of action under the TTCA. plead ject jurisdiction by failing to matter a response filed to the Browns Id. at under the [TTCA].” cause of action jurisdiction only addressing University’s granted Court question adequate notice. Id. plea jurisdiction. disagree granted plea the court Although with decision. jurisdiction, specify did not order guid- is, Supreme offers “It The Texas Court grounds. simply It stated: State, 740, In Duhart v. therefore, 610 S.W.2d ance. ORDERED Defendant (Tex.1980), plaintiffs sued City of Houston’s Plea to the Jurisdiction 742 exemplary ordered the TTCA for dam- SUSTAINED and this State under wrongful though ruled on death suit even ages DISMISSED.” The court never exemplary summary expressly disallowed judgment. the motion for damages. governmen- State asserted immunity protects Governmental exceptions special filed tal legislative from sued absent being State Id. at 740. The plea abatement. Sign v. consent. Federal Texas Southern want of the cause for trial court dismissed Univ., (Tex.1997). 401, S.W.2d jurisdiction plaintiffs refused to after the in a When the State is made defendant Id. upheld Supreme amend. consent, legislative without juris- for want of the trial court’s dismissal im based diction, had not finding legislature be sustained. munity should exemplary for the State’s waived Lain, 579, 162 Tex. damages. (Tex.1961). suit, In a non-TTCA the court to maintain the suit lacks Duhart Supreme Court clarified plaintiff not obtain consent. legislative did Antonio, San Davis Id.; Sharp, Ins. Liberty Mutual Co. Davis, city em- (Tex.App. - Austin defamation, rights civil ployee sued denied). conversion, prose- violations, malicious cution. Id. TTCA, trial court direct- legislature 519. The By enacting the city all of the causes immunity in sit- a verdict waived the State’s certain ed *11 except defect, of action prosecution. malicious Id. dictional I the proper believe vehi- granted court n.o.v. on the cle was thе summary-judgment mo- prosecution malicious gov- tion, action based on which the court never reached. On however, ernmental immunity. city, remand, City may be able to establish pled had governmental never immunity. as a matter of law that the have Browns question governmental ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‍was whether failed to state a cause action under the immunity is a defense that be can waived. TTCA, juris- but the dismissal want improper. diction reverse city argued that im- dismissal order and remand the case munity is different from other defenses trial court for further proceedings. because the trial court lacks legislature’s claim lies outside the waiver of Id. immunity. at 520. The Su-

preme rejected this argument, Court clari-

fying Duhart: do not our opinion

We read in Duhart holding

as that the trial court lacked case,

subject matter any

and that judgment rendered for the

plaintiff would been have void. We fur- perceive

ther in requiring unfairness pleаd units their immu- Texas, Appellant, The STATE of

nity liability in order to avoid ground. By enactment of the Tort Claims Act in Legisla- the Texas WEISS, Appellee. Donald Edward expressly ture waived to suits injured No. claimants and consented to CR. 09-98-072 liability specified under circumstances. Texas, of Appeals We sovereign immunity conclude that Beaumont. may jurisdictional not be as a asserted power obstacle to the trial court’s Sept. Submitted 1999. against governmental hear cases defen- Instead, judgments dants. erroneous Decided Nov. 1999. against governmental may units be cor- Rehearing Overruled Jan. rected, cases, in as appeal. other Id.

As I holding, understand the Davis be-

cause the TTCA waives cer- circumstances,

tain failing facts show waiver of immu-

nity is not a defect that TTCA

deprives the subject juris- court of matter Rather,

diction. See id. gov- the claim of

ernmental must be asserted

special exception byor a motion for sum- judgment.

mary

Here, asserted the Browns pled

had not action within the immunity provided by

limited waiver of opinion TTCA. Because Davis juris- pleading

holds that defect is not

Case Details

Case Name: Brown v. City of Houston
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Dec 15, 1999
Citation: 8 S.W.3d 331
Docket Number: 10-98-166-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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