256 Mo. 219 | Mo. | 1914
— This is an action to quiet title under section 2535, Revised Statutes 1909. Two separate* suits were brought to determine the title of the land described herein, and the issues being the same, they were consolidated and tried as one case, and will be so considered here.
The appellant resided in the city of Nevada, where he owned a large number of lots or tracts of land. He failed to pay the taxes on seventeen of these tracts for the year 1904, permitting the same to become delinquent, and in 1909 the treasurer of Vernon county, in which Nevada is located, under his authority as ex-officio collector of the revenue, said county being under township organization, brought suits in the circuit court against appellant as the owner of said delinquent lots to enforce the payment of taxes for said year. Personal service was had on the appellant. On a hearing before the court, judgments were rendered in said suits at "the May term, 1910, and at the following October term, said delinquent tracts were sold under special executions and were bought by different parties. Respondent Chaney at' said sale bought the tract described in the petition as “Lot 66, Block K, W. & B. map, City of Nevada,” for six dollars, and “lots 7, 8, 9 and 10, Block 10, Eobinson-Martin’s Add. to City of Nevada,” for four dollars and deeds to said Ohanev were thereafter made in conformity with the law. Respondent has since conveyed Lot 66, Block K, by quitclaim deed to George H. and Anna M. Speece, for $400.
Appellant’s petitions allege oversight as the cause of his failure to pay the taxes on said lots; that the tax petition insufficiently described “Lot 66 of Block K, W. & B. map of Nevada,” the correct description of which is “Lot 66, Block K, Wood & Blanchard’s map of the City of Nevada;” and that “lots 7, 8, 9 and 10, Robinson & Martin’s Add. to City of Nevada” should have been described as “in Robinson & Martin’s ad
The answer of respondent Chaney is first a general denial, and, second, that he bought said land at a tax sale, obtained title thereto and as to Lot 66, Block K, conveyed same to George H. and xinna M. Speece.
The answer of respondents Speece is first a general denial, and, second, that they claim the premises described in plaintiff’s petition as the owners in fee.
Upon a hearing of these cases before the trial court, a judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents from which the appellant appeals.
Before and during the time of the proceedings herein, the appellant was continuously a resident of the city of Nevada, and had an office within a block of the courthouse. The cause of the non-payment of these taxes as alleged in the petition, and as testified to by appellant, was simply that he had neglected to pay same. No issues are raised as to the regularity of the proceedings other than that the description of the property was insufficient.
An examination of the petition and record entries, therefore, other than to determine their sufficiency in regard to the matter referred to, is not. necessary.
In regard to the description of the other tracts r The lots and block are definitely numbered, and the addition in which they are located is specifically named, followed by the abbreviation “Add.” By parity of reasoning, if judicial notice may be taken of the fact that “Supt.” means superintendent as indicating a managing agent, as was held in Southern Mo. Land Co. v. Jeffries, 40 Mo. App. 360, and that even an information in a criminal case is sufficient, although the letters “Jno.” are used instead of the word “John,”'
Admitting for the nonce the general application of the rule, it cannot apply where the inadequacy is not pleaded, not by implication or as a conclusion of law, but by an affirmative allegation. We state this unqualifiedly, because unless so pleaded it does not become an issue in the case. We do not understand that the Mangold case last referred to announces a different doctrine.
Only in an incidental way does the appellant plead the inadequacy of price. He states in his petitions that his property was and is worth $1400, and that it was sold by the sheriff and bought in by the defendant ■Chaney for ten dollars. Then follows a specific allegation as to the defective descriptions, which is the burden of the plaint for relief, the paragraph closing with the following: “by reason of all of which bidders were deterred and said land sold much below its real value and was sacrificed.” This is all the reference near or remote to inadequacy of price. Even if it be held sufficient as an affirmative plea for relief in this regard, all reference thereto is absent from the motion for a new trial where the errors of the trial court are required to be embalmed to entitle them to an examination here. Not having been planted, therefore, in the pleading nor preserved in the motion for a new trial, the ground of this contention, under the most lax construction of the rules of appellate procedure, is not before us.
We find further no reference to inadequacy of price in the assignment of errors, but as appellant refers thereto in his “points and authorities,” this might
Prom all of which it follows that the judgment of thé trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.