10 Ohio App. 314 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1919
Lead Opinion
Martin G. Bruner employed Albert T. Brown, an attorney of Cincinnati, to secure a reduction by suit or otherwise of the assessment ■levied by the city of Cincinnati against his property on Cass avenue. Under the terms of that
The dismissal of the original suit does not bar the new action. It was not a decision on the merits, and amounted to no more than a judgment on demurrer to the petition. Moore v. Dunn, 41 Ohio St., 62, and Rafferty v. The Toledo Traction Co., 1 C. C., N. S., 538.
If the contract was champertous there is no doubt that the courts will not enforce it. (Davy et al. v. The Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 78 Ohio St., 256.) It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff is entirely without remedy. The law of
In many jurisdictions, where the services rendered by an attorney are not illegal, either on account of the nature of the service or the circumstances under which it is rendered, the attorney may recover in quantum meruit notwithstanding the invalidity of the contract under which the services were rendered. City of Rochester v. Campbell, 184 Ind., 421, 425.
Cases have been cited supporting the opposite view. Such decisions as Roller v. Murray, 112 Va., 780, and Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128 Iowa, 533, arise in states where such a contract for services was criminal. The case of Moreland v. Devenney, 72 Kans., 471, is in point, but we regard it as opposed to the better view. The authorities are collected in 11 Corpus Juris, 269, and in the notes in 2 L. R. A., N. S., 260, and 38 L. R. A., N. S., 1202.
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment in this case for the following reasons:
Plaintiff first brought suit in the municipal court of Cincinnati on a written contract. The petition set up the contract, and the plaintiff relied thereon for recovery. The contract provided for services as attorney to secure a reduction of street assessments, and among other things provided for the payment to the attorney for his services “one-half of the amount saved on said assessment, said attorney to bear all expenses involved in the said litigation.”
The reduction on the assessment was procured, and the attorney brought suit to recover under, this provision of the contract.
The defendant in this case moved to dismiss the cause, and upon consideration the municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the cause at cost of plaintiff. No further proceedings were taken in that case by plaintiff, and that judgment
Thereupon the plaintiff filed his second suit, which is the case under consideration, in quantum meruit for the same services admittedly rendered under the contract sued upon in the first case. I ■am unable to see how this can be upheld. The subject-matter of the suit was the written contract upon Which plaintiff relied for recovery. He elected to pursue that course and should be bound by that judgment.
In the case of The C., L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Pierson, 18 C. C., 392, the syllabus is:
“A suit can not be maintained upon an express agreement which the plaintiff predicates upon an adjudication in a previous case where recovery was sought upon the same cause of action, but covering a different period of time, the recovery in the former case being upon a quantum meruit based upon an implied contract.”
Above case is simply the reverse of the instant case. In the case now under consideration suit was brought on the express contract, and judgment was rendered, and plaintiff should not now be permitted to pursue his action in another suit in quantum meruit.
In the case of Buchwalter, Admr., v. ClenDening, 17 C. C., N. S., 454, the court holds:
“A plaintiff against whom judgment has been rendered is estopped from prosecuting a second action against the same defendant for the same subject-matter by merely changing the form of the suit.”