delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a divorce proceeding' instituted in the chancery court of Giles county.
The defendant interposed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, which was overruled by the chаncellor, but sustained by the court of civil appeals, and the suit dismissed.
The substance of thе plea was that at the time of the filing of the bill, and for 30 years prior thereto, the domicile of the defendant was in Davidson county, and that the word “reside” in the statute was used in its strict legal sense; that is, synonymously with “domicile.”
It is well settled that a party may have two or more rеsidences, in the sense that he may have different places of abode, but he cаn have but one domicile. Denny v. Sumner County,
The defendant had a dwelling house at Pulaski, to which he repаired each summer. In other words, he had a summer residence at Pulaski, and was actually living thеre at the time of the separation.
The statute involved is section 4204 of Shannon’s Annotаted Code, and is as follows:
*91 “The hill may be filed in the proper person and name of the complainant, in the circuit or chancery court of the county or district where thе parties resided at the time of their separation, or in which the defendant resides, or is found, if a resident; but, if a nonresident or convict, then in the county where the applicаnt resides.”
In construing statutes regulating the subject of divorce, it is generally held that the word “reside” involves the idea of a domicile.
In 19 Corpus Juris, 26, it is said:
“The word ‘residence/ as used in divorce statutes, shоuld ^ be construed as equivalent to ‘domicile.’ ”
In the note will be found á long list of decisions supporting the text, and we have found many other decisions to the same effect, but have been unable to find any authorities to the contrary.
In the preceding section of the Code (4203), which provides for 2 years’ residence within the State, where the acts complained of were committed out of the State, this court inferentially held in Sparks v. Sparks,
It is also generally held that before a foreign divorce granted against a resident of the State, who was served within the State, will be recognized by the State courts, it
“As used in many statutes, howеver, particularly those relating to the qualification of voters, to homesteads, to taxation, to the statute of limitations, to succession, guardianship, and administration, and in those prescribing the jurisdictional prerequisites to the maintenance of actions for divorce or separation the term ‘residence’ has been held equivalent to ‘dоmicile.’ ”
In 19 Corpus Juris; 397, the author says:
“Generally, where a statute prescribes residence as a qualificatiоn for the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, and whenеver the terms are used in connection with subjects of domestic policy, domicile аnd residence are equivalent.”
We see no reason for departing from the foregoing rules of construction which are sound and which have the approval of most оf the courts of the country.
The courts, on the other hand, with the same unanimity, have construed the word “nonresident,” in attachment statutes, to refer to the abode or place where the defendant actually lives, and hold that he may be domiciled within the State and still be a nonresident. Keelin v. Graves,
The reason usually assigned for permitting an attachment against one living out of the State is to protect the citizen of the Statе by authorizing him to seize the property of the debtor, where, from nonresidence or flight, he
These attachment statutes involve а different principle from those embraced in statutes regulating jurisdiction in matters of divorce, and the two cases are in no sense analogous.
In the instant cause the complainant should have filed her suit at Nashville instead of Pulaski.
We find no error in the decree of the court of civil appeals, and it Avill be affirmed, with costs.