53 Mo. App. 453 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1893
— Plaintiff’s petition is for a divorce •from his wife. The grounds alleged are her adultery .and indignities which rendered his condition intoler
There was admitted in the evidence for plaintiff over the protest and objection of defendant certain letters produced by plaintiff written by defendant to him. The rule in this state seems to be settled that in an action for divorce the husband and wife are competent witnesses; but that they cannot give testimony of communications made by one to the other. Moore v. Moore, 51 Mo. 118; Berlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151; Miller v. Miller, 14 Mo. App. 418; King v. King, 42 Mo. App. 454; Ayers v. Ayers, 28 Mo. App. 97. We see no reason why a communication which a husband or wife cannot testify to should not apply as forcibly to a letter as to a conversation. There can be no reason for distinguishing between what is spoken by the tongue and written by the hand. Either is a communication, as that term is understood in the law on this subject, and the law should prevent the uncovering of either. Husband and wife should be as free to write to each other as they are to talk together. No motive of policy can apply to the one mode of communication that is not equally applicable to the other. This is the view taken by the supreme court of Texas under a statute somewhat unlike ours, but in this respect applicable. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Tex. 101; Stanford v. Murphy, 63 Ga. 410. But it is insisted that, as it appeared that these letters were not sent by defendant directly to plaintiff, but were sent to their oldest daughter to be by her delivered to plaintiff, they were not private com
This view of the law on this subject does not militate against the proposition that the rule incapacitates or disqualifies the witness and not the communication per se. If the conversation between the husband and wife be overheard, accidently, .or by persons secreted for the purpose, such third parties may give it in evidence. Gannon v. People, 127 Ill. 518; State v. Center, 35 Fert. 378; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181; Wharton on Criminal Evidence, sec. 398. So if a letter, written by one to the other falls into the hands of third persons and' it finds its way into the case through such third persons, it is competent. When a letter falls “into the hands of a third person, the sacred shield of privilege” is removed. State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 540; State v. Buffington, 20 Kan. 599. It is, however, said that letters between married parties have in some instances formed the chief evidence upon which divorces have been granted in this state, and we are cited to Moore v. Moore, 41 Mo. App. 176; Messenger v. Messenger, 56 Mo. 335. But in these cases there was no objection made to the introduction. In the Moore case the husband introduced the letters and the wife appeared willing to abide by the case they made.
As to the merits of the case, we have, after a careful consideration of the testimony, determined that the trial court should not have .found defendant guilty of adultery. Aside from the letter to Josephine Dorsey, there is no substantial evidence upon which to lodge the conclusion of guilt. Including the letter there.is proof of frequent visits made to defendant by the party charged in the petition; that these visits were without the knowledge of plaintiff, and that on such occasions defendant suffered him to make protestations of his love for her; that these visits were numerous, though at intervals, during a period of two years. It was further sufficiently shown that these visits were made with her approval, at least with her passive toleration. The evidence, we concede, sufficiently discloses an opportunity to commit adultery and a disposition on the part of Dorsey to commit the act, but we are not satisfied that it shows a disposition upon the part of defendant. The respective counsel have collected a-number of authorities upon the sufficiency of the proof in such cases, which will be found in their briefs.
This evidence, while not supporting the charge of adultery, is abundantly sufficient to support the second charge in the petition as to indignities, rendering the condition of plaintiff intolerable. Defendant’s letter to Josephine Dorsey can establish nothing less than this. In that letter she admits, in substance, that Dorsey was her lover and that she received his attentions and protestations of love for her. Her letter shows that she became unmindful of the duty she owed her husband and the regard she should have entertained for him.
The court awarded the custody of the three minor
The judgment of the circuit court will, therefore, be reversed and the pause remanded with directions to-the circuit court to render a judgment of divorce on account of the indignities charged in plaintiff’s petition,, and without any order in regard to the custody of the children.