154 N.Y.S. 1098 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1915
The verdict directed in favor of the payee of the promissory note in suit should stand. Rowan, the maker, owed money to Schwanner Brothers, and had a deal on with them, under which he was to pay them $5,000 if a certain steam yacht was sold. Schwanner Brothers owed $4,000 to the .plaintiff Brown for merchandise, and he was pressing them for payment. Schwanner Brothers told Rowan this and obtained from Rowan his note for $1,000, payable to the order of Brown. The Schwanners took this note to Connecticut and gave it to Brown, who cred- ■ ited it in reduction of their debt to him and gave them a receipt which read:
“New London, Dec. 28th, 1914.
“Received from Schwanner Bros. Co. Wm. A. Rowan note dated Dec. 24 One Thousand Dollars to be applied on acct.
“ $1,000. M. A. Brown.”
The yacht was not sold and the note was not paid. Rowan claimed that the note was given by him to Schwanner Brothers under an agreement that its payment should be contingent upon the sale of the yacht. Brown had never seen or had communication with the maker; he knew nothing of any agreement between
These two points of controversy present interesting questions as to the extent of New York conformance to the interpretation which has been put upon the Negotiable Instruments Law by the courts of a great majority of the other states which have enacted the uniform statute. Excepting an inferential reference in Schreyer v. J. S. Bailey & Co., 97 App. Div. 185, the question whether under the statute the payee of a promissory note may qualify as a holder thereof in due course, upon compliance with the requirements of section 91 of the' act, seems never to have been passed upon in a reported decision in this state. Outside of New York, however, the uniform interpretation of the parallel provisions of the statute has been to confirm and continue the rule of the common law that a payee might claim the protection accorded any other bona fide holder for value. Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. 140, 144; Thorke v. White, 188 id. 333, 334; Merseck v. Alderman, 77 Conn. 634, 60 Atl. Rep. 109; South Boston Iron Co. v. Brown, 63 Maine, 139; Campbell v. Fourth National
Learned counsel for the defendant makes a most persuasive argument for a ruling in this state that a payee be given no immunity from equities existent between the maker and his immediate transferee, but these considerations are far outweighed, in my opinion, by the importance of nation-wide uniformity in the law as to commercial paper and by the many evidences that in enacting the uniform statute the legislature sought to secure uniformity in the application of the law and not merely in its phraseology. When a question arises under one of the uniform statutes and courts of this state have not yet passed upon the interpretation of the portions of the statute involved, I conceive it to be the duty of the trial courts, in the interests of a real uniformity in the application of these commercial enactments, to adopt and follow here the interpretation adopted by the courts of other commonwealths.
There remains the question whether the enactment of sections 51 and 91 of the Negotiable Instruments Law has altered, as to negotiable instruments, the
I am clear that, giving the defendant the benefit
The motion to vacate the directed verdict is denied. The defendant may have ten days’ stay of execution and thirty days within which to make a case on appeal.
Motion denied.